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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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EDITORIAL

IF WE MEASURE our recent efforts toward peace by the change in the concept of sovereignty, the distance we have come seems small. The Moscow Declaration struck the first blow at the idea of sovereignty as isolationism. Later blows came at Teheran, Cairo, and Quebec as the leaders of the major belligerents co-ordinated their strategy to win the war and lay down the terms of peace. At Yalta came another important development—the first practical demonstration that national sovereignty could be used for international collaboration in a specific area, Europe. And later in the Act of Chapultepec a not dissimilar action was taken for the collective security of the Americas. Both Yalta, at which America accepted her share of the responsibility for immediate political reconstruction in Europe, and Chapultepec, where she accepted her responsibility for hemispheric solidarity, were essentially limited to the duration of the war, yet both held out some hope for similar agreements *post bellum*.

Meanwhile the framework of a permanent international organization had been sketched out at Dumbarton Oaks. Here was the plan for the future peace, but at first glance it seemed unworthy of some of the temporary wartime agreements already arrived at. In the midst of world anarchy, no general agreement was possible unless the Great Powers agreed first. Hence the agreement was a Great Power agreement, and hence it turned out that the chief difference between the proposed international organization and a plain Five Power Pact seemed to be the fact that in the first the lesser nations were to be present to watch the proceedings. It is significant that the temporary international victory at Yalta called forth a much greater popular response than the longer-range proposals of Dumbarton Oaks. Under the circumstances a Security Council dominated by the Great Powers was unavoidable, but it was hardly de-

signed to stimulate full enthusiasm from those peoples who already know weakness and tyranny. National sovereignty was enthroned as a first principle. Read the first proposal of the second Chapter of Dumbarton Oaks: "The International Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states."

Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the ultimate victory of sovereignty as foreordained. For there will be many within the halls of peace who know the enemy for what it is. The fact is that the formal structure of any new world organization can not by itself maintain peace. The particular structure which we are to have must come to be important principally as it remains flexible enough to respond to popular pressure all over the world. Such pressure can be applied through international public opinion and through international communications—communications which at all cost must be kept free. But most important, pressure can be applied through a group of sub-organizations, whose shape can already be seen somewhat dimly in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It is just here —in the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Food and Agriculture Organization, and others—that men of international good will can come to close grips with the problems of the peace. In the deliberations of these and similar organizations lies the possibility of many Yaltas, of many apparently small victories which could total up to international accord.

There is no guarantee, of course, that when the world's experts in a certain field of activity have worked out a plan for co-operation that the plan will not be rejected or modified out of all sense by the various national governments. Even so regional and "minor" an agreement as the Mexican water treaty, looked upon by all Latin America as a testament of the good neighborliness which we have so vehemently projected, runs the gauntlet of the United States Senate with great difficulty. And the proposals of the international air conference at Chicago, where America obtained possibly more of what she plumped for than she should have had, face a stiff Congressional fight. Yet the very number of such agreements is in their favor, for they cannot be turned down or emasculated one after another without even the most oblivious and isolationist of the world's statesmen understanding something of the significance of such action.

The immediate danger is that some of these new tools for international co-operation will be either blunted or destroyed before they can be used. Consider the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which are already being considered for ratification. Their acceptance (which at the moment of writing is trembling in the balance) is far more important now, for example, than changing the voting arrangements in the Security Council. By being constantly on the job, the fund would provide a means for currency stabilization, the lack of which during the 1930's led to economic breakdown, depression, and the present war; it would seek, in the words of Alvin Hansen, to "promote stability of exchange rates without running the risks involved in a rigid fixity of rates." The bank, contrary to a widespread impression, is not a bank in the common meaning of the term; it is not designed to supplant private lending and investment, but will be essentially an institution for guaranteeing and underwriting. These proposals are not something pulled out of a hat; they are the considered plans of some of the world's foremost experts in money, banking, and economics. This fact is recognized by such groups as the Committee for Economic Development who support the proposals; it is ignored by opponents like the small, inner group of reactionary bankers.

On this, the economic level, national sovereignty becomes that very real menace, imperialism. But on this level, a monetary fund and a bank could oppose imperialism with more realistic ideas. Working with other sub-organizations, they could help to promote a sound program of industrialization, wage increases, and an expanding consumer market everywhere in the world. No other victory would loom larger for world peace.

Are many such "small" victories really possible, and can they, together, spell world peace?

We have chosen to have our national sovereignty and to try to eat it too. Like all feats of magic, this is a trick which must be fully understood to be successfully performed. And like magic, too, it is obvious that one of the two contradictory patterns must turn out to be an illusion. If enough of us understand the conditions and the mechanics of the trick, it is just possible that we shall be able to avoid World War III.

THE PROFESSIONALS

By EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

In 1932 I made the attempt to interpret certain democratic principles to a group of students in a German university. They listened grimly to my first lecture which was mainly historical in character. My choice of title for the second was "The Emergence of Leadership under Democratic Conditions," but this lecture was never finished. The students grated their feet on the floor until my voice could no longer be heard. They had already absorbed a contrary belief regarding the nature of leadership.

Later, as some of the local professors strove to explain this new attitude on the part of youth, I was startled to hear one participant say: "When Germany next chooses a leader he will not be a trained university product. The masses no longer trust the educated professional. They do not believe that doctors, engineers, lawyers, ministers, and teachers will labor on behalf of the people's needs." A few months later Adolf Hitler assumed power and ruled the German people with a rigorous will which was soon to be transformed into an absolute dictatorship.

Why, I asked myself, has this hiatus between the trained professionals and the people widened? Does the same condition hold in my country? In a crisis would my people turn for guidance to trained persons or would they follow a demagogue? No deep crisis thus far has arisen and hence we do not know the answer to this important question. One thing we do know, however, and that is: *American professionals are not a reliable asset to the American historic progressive movement.* A peculiar element lies hidden in this equation, a situation which is not readily explained. In the first place, the various professions come into existence as a response to human needs. This is their *raison d'etre.* In the United States it may also be said that the great bulk of our professionals—doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, ministers, social workers—have received their training as a gift from the people, either through taxation or indirect levies upon their labor. Why then do they not identify themselves with the needs and aspirations of the people? Why do they not think of themselves as dedi-

cated to the progressive principle of democratic expansion? Stated bluntly, why can we not rely upon these trained persons to be faithful to American democracy?

If we can locate appropriate answers to these queries, it should be possible to convince professionals that their future lies with the people, that genuine democratic leadership should arise automatically from the ranks of the trained and the educated. (I am assuming, obviously, that the "peculiarity" mentioned above is traceable to an error in social reasoning.)

My proposition as now evolved calls for at least four definitive and descriptive statements: a) what are the qualities of an American progressive? b) what causes individuals to become progressives? c) why do trained specialists (professionals) tend to dissociate themselves from the progressive movement? d) can professionals adapt themselves effectively to the emerging pattern of American society without identification in the progressive movement?

* * *

An American progressive is a person who accepts the democratic affirmation, which, since it is dynamic, cannot be defined once and for all. Some of its ingredients are, however, unmistakably clear: the democratic affirmation assumes a general movement in the direction of equality but it associates equality with dignified freedom. Mere equality may be achieved through regimentation but not dignified democratic equality. "Movement in the direction of equality" constitutes an important conception for progressivism and the accent belongs on the word "movement." In a democratic society all citizens should be animated by the hope that they will move continuously in the direction of an equitable share in property, income, and culture. This is the measure of democratic health. Where this hope does not exist the democratic affirmation will either fail in outright fashion or it will become a hypocritical tradition and will hence fail as falsehood.

An American progressive is a person who thinks of himself and his fellows as units in an everlasting experiment in which the ultimate outcome is neither foretold nor certain. This human enterprise, to use Max Otto's telling phrase, consists of two challenging factors, namely: a) man's adaptation to this planet, and b) man's relatedness to all other men. The first of these factors involves faith in science, man's chief instrument

of adaptation to the physical environment, and the second calls for faith in humanity itself. Democratic progress cannot be attained when science is separated from humanism. Cynics and pessimists are a liability in any society but in a democracy they breed tragedy.

An American progressive is a person who recognizes the functional relation between ideas and action and hence strives to establish harmony between theory and practice. To him ideals which cannot be reduced to trial and experiment are no ideals at all. He who preaches but does not practice is a charlatan and a deceiver. "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue," said Milton, a virtue "unexercised and unbreathed, which never sallies forth and seeks its adversary, but shrinks out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat." Progressive action is social action and hence the test of genuine progressivism is the ability to join with one's fellows in the effort to apply democratic means to the achievement of democratic goals. It may even be said, as indeed it has been said,[1] that "effective participation" is the *sine qua non* of democratic faith.

* * *

If these simple criteria may be taken as descriptive of the progressive attitude and temper, how then do individuals become progressive. Since there appear to be at least four varieties of progressives it seems logical to describe the process which produces the progressive mood in terms of these types.

Van Wyck Brooks, speaking of Washington Irving,[2] writes as follows: "He was singularly untroubled by thoughts of his own in speculative, religious, and political matters, although he had antiquarian tastes and a liking for old customs and was therefore, in a sense, a natural Tory." Irving's brother William, was, however, a Democrat, a Jeffersonian. Washington Irving was "a Hamiltonian, . . . not so much from conviction as from atmosphere and habit" and "those who cared most for American principles forgave the author his Tory tastes, for he was so remote from politics." We may infer from the above distinction drawn between brothers that Van Wyck Brooks believes progressivism to be a by-product of temperament and environment. Environment alone is not

[1]See "The Great Uneasiness" by Paul Bixler in *The Antioch Review*, Winter, 1944-45.
[2]In *The World of Washington Irving*, pp. 128 and 160.

a sufficient explanation. But when we attempt to interpret progressivism or its antithesis in terms of temperament formidable difficulties are encountered, difficulties which require psychiatric insights. For our purposes it should be enough to state merely that environmental and temperamental factors play an important part in shaping the progressive's attitude.

The second source of progressive stimulation is equally subtle and complex. It often happens that individuals join the ranks of the progressives (more frequently the extremists) as a consequence of some personal lack of fulfilment. Since most people are incapable of analyzing their own failures it invariably happens that they seek some external object upon which blame may be fixed. It is a simple matter to direct blame toward those who happen at the moment to be in positions of authority. The desire to dispose of those in authority automatically leads to alignment with those asking for change, and hence many persons find themselves almost accidentally in the ranks of the progressives.

Another type of progressive is the person in politics who achieves success during one of the intermittent waves of progressive sentiment which mark the alternations of political fortune. This politician, wanting only office and power, finds himself, nevertheless, identified with the successful progressive party. Thus there have been many anti-progressives who have been elected to office under the aegis of the New Deal. The existing coalition between Northern and Southern reactionaries in Congress demonstrates this process. It does happen, however, that accidental success in a progressive wave often transforms a conservative into a bona fide progressive.

The above three processes according to which progressives are brought into existence are all unreliable and do not produce progressives of the type needed in crises. If the United States is to avoid such reaction as will negate the entire purposes of the current war, it will need a responsible group of progressives who have arrived at their position by the method of historical reasoning and logical judgment. If the reactionaries attain power after this war and they thereupon attempt to force this nation backward into the mold of the nineteenth century, they will in the process destroy our liberties and bring our democratic experiment to an inglorious close. "The first judgment we should make," writes Ralph Barton Perry, "is the judgment that we should form judgments—responsible, practical judgments, judgments formed on the threshold of action,

as though they were to govern our wills, and through our wills our national policy, and through our national policy the course of history." Progressives of this type, progressives by conviction, are the product of reflection and one would have thought that American education might be depended upon to produce a sufficient number of this type to guarantee a steady movement in the direction of progressive change. But no such guarantee exists, as we will soon discover when we examine the mood and temper of that great body of professional specialists who have been trained in American colleges and universities.

* * *

> It is not enough that you should understand about applied science in order that your work may increase man's blessing. Concern for man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical endeavors. . . .

These words of Albert Einstein's should be engraved on the portals of all technical schools in America. Wherever applied science is taught some voice should repeat to students over and over again those meaningful words, "concern for man himself." In recent years three important positions in the field of library service were filled by the selection of persons untrained in library techniques. Why? Because in each instance the aim was to secure a person whose concern was primarily for man himself and secondarily for books, and no such person seemed available among professionals. The plain truth of the matter is that our colleges and universities are still content to train specialists regardless of whether or not they will also be good citizens. But a specialist who is not a good citizen is a menace in a democracy. Sometimes I hear publicists condemning science because it is so often used as an instrument of exploitation and destruction. They should condemn the specialists in applied science who, because they hold no concern for man himself, will prostitute their skills for any purpose.

It might appear from the foregoing discussion that I am appealing for a liberal arts training for professionals. In a sense this inference is correct but I must hasten to add that it must be a humanistic training of an order different from that which now prevails in most of our colleges and universities. We have not yet claimed the liberal arts for democratic purposes. The great bulk of liberal arts teaching is still attached to the aristocratic tradition. (Farmers and industrial workers labor to produce the funds for supporting colleges and universities which turn out

technicians who promptly utilize their skills in exploiting farmers and workers.) So long as this practice continues, professional education in America cannot be said to have been democratized.

Another deficit in American higher education, especially that branch which leads to professionalism, is its failure to provide graduates with adequate stimulation for continuing intellectual growth. A great advance would follow if one of the conditions of receiving an academic degree would be the promise to go directly from college to an adult education class. The consequence would be, not merely an increase in humility, but a variety of learning which would help the specialist to relate his skills to the experience of the people.

In a democracy it should be the natural expectation that graduates of democratically supported colleges and universities would put their skills to democratic uses. In that case, there would always be a sufficient number of professionals to furnish leadership for the progressive movement. But something more would still be needed. When the professional person begins to function as a specialist he finds himself precipitated in the midst of a community "plot." I do not mean to imply that a consciously organized conspiracy exists, a conspiracy which is designed to turn doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers into conservatives. The effect is, however, the same as if such a conspiracy existed. In the local community, as Archibald MacLeish insists, one finds that the "aristocracy of wealth and talent" constitutes an intertwined reality. The successful young doctor, for example, soon finds himself aspiring to membership in the best country club and once he has made the necessary accommodations to this "set" he will discover that he has paid a price, the price of independent thought.

In American society as now patterned the professional person, unless he is a government employee, depends upon two sources of income: fees charged clients or a salary received from an established institution or industry. One might think that the fee system would leave the professional a considerable range of independence but unhappily this is not so. In order to establish some degree of regularity of income and provide for emergencies as well as old age, the successful professional must invest his income. Having thus become a member of the investing class, he gradually but inevitably absorbs those conservative notions which support the *status quo* and he subsequently finds himself in the ranks of the anti-

progressives. There are, of course, exceptions to this procedure. In every large American city one is sure to find independent lawyers, engineers, doctors, ministers, social workers and teachers who are both successful and progressive. In the recent presidential campaign professionals were organized for political action and it was revealed that there are more of this type than had been supposed. But it is safe to say that there are never enough to control the policies of the professional organizations either locally or nationally.

* * *

What lies before us? Is this awkward design which seems to keep the majority of professionals out of progressive ranks to continue? If so, what are the chances of adapting professional services to the needs of the people? These questions combine to form the more general inquiry which may be stated thus: By what means is it likely that our vast equipment of professional personnel may be utilized for purposes of democratic expansion?

I have already indicated that the long-term process rests upon education, as is true of all human problems, but I shall now turn my attention to certain social changes and imminent necessities which will, so I believe, hasten the educational advance.

The first and most urgent of these necessities involves the prosaic task of furnishing employment to sixty million potential workers. Maximum employment at wages which will enable our people to purchase the essentials of a high standard of living is the price we must pay for our democratic freedom. A satisfactory balance may be maintained if we can hold unemployment to a basic level of three to five per cent of the total employables. This number, from one and one-half to three million unemployed, can be satisfactorily handled through unemployment insurance. Nothing less than steady employment at good wages for the remaining fifty-seven million will serve as a guarantee of social stability.

How is this task to be accomplished? Full employment could be readily achieved if we were to abandon private enterprise completely and make the federal government the sole employer of labor. But under these circumstances we should automatically lose our liberties and I assume that the American experience with freedom has been so profound that we will not easily deny the worth of that experience. The only alternative

which seems to me feasible and still integral to the basic American tradition is a planned economy in which a wide variety of business enterprises would operate side by side: some private, some co-operative and some under government auspices. A mixed economy of this type could not succeed, however, unless joint planning in the interest of common goals were practiced. A democratically organized and operated planned economy designed to maintain maximum employment at high wages would precipitate certain significant consequences which would have both a direct and an indirect influence upon the role of professionals. Many specialists would be employed by municipal, county, state, and federal agencies of government. A continental distribution of industries would create a demand for more specialists in regions now understaffed. A guaranteed wage would lead to expanding purchases of both goods and services. For example, it is my belief that students in secondary and higher education would soon mount to a figure three to four times as large as the present enrolment.

The chief argument against a planned and diversified economy in which the central government becomes the guarantor is the claim that this constitutes a step in the direction of collectivization. I am never quite certain what meanings are included in the word "collectivization" but I presume the one clear meaning is governmental control over business and the professions. This seems to me to be no longer a debatable question. The only issue remaining, and it is of prime importance to peoples having had an experience of freedom, is what kind of collectivism is most suitable for the particular nation in view. If anyone still imagines that governments anywhere will henceforth recede from or diminish their control over business and the professions, such a person reasons outside the structure of historical fact. Security is the price which modern nations must pay for stability, and security is indivisible: a stable government must offer a basic security to its entire population, and this involves regulation, control, and planning.

Education, medicine, recreation, and social services will, under the dispensation of a diversified planned economy, move in the direction of increased socialization and democratization. Teachers, doctors, social workers, and recreation specialists will be called upon to expand their services and this implies a vast extension of public agencies. Will these specialists be content to work as civil employees? Will they still long

for the "good old days" *(sic)* when a few garnered "fat" fees while the bulk of each profession lived on the margins of insecurity? There are signs that the younger professionals have already begun to adapt themselves to the coming era. Thousands of doctors, engineers, chemists, educators, and social workers have worked for the Army and Navy during the war. Many have come to enjoy the experience of working on behalf of human needs even though the stipulated salary may have been smaller than their former levels. I have talked with many in this group and they seem to me to have already become progressives. They speak excitedly of the time when professional services will be made available to all people, and some glow with pride when they speak of the coming opportunities for research and service. In short, they already speak as though their professions had become democratized, as though movement in the direction of equality had become in part at least a reality.

Lawyers represent a special case. Many will, of course, become government employees and this trend has been accelerating over the past quarter-century, but the majority will still remain in private practice. They will find new employment for their skills as we have already seen, for example, in connection with labor-management-government relations. They will also become technicians assisting in the operation of an economic society dedicated to human welfare. As they come closer to democratic aims and achievements they too will join the ranks of progressives.

Under these conditions which I have imagined, what happens to the old dream of personal success and attendant wealth? This dream, and it has always been in large measure a fiction and a fantasy, will be supplanted by another and a more valid dream, namely the dream of serving one's nation and in turn mankind. The professionals will learn the lesson taught long ago by Horace Mann that "enough of the materials of worldly goods has been created to answer this great principle—that up to the point of competence and self-respect, few things are more valuable than property; beyond this point, few things are of less. And hence it is that all acquisitions of property beyond that point, considered and used as mere property, confer an inferior sort of pleasure, in inferior quantities."

It will be objected by some that the picture I have drawn of an expanding democracy will pull our professionals straight into politics. This point was raised recently after an address which I had delivered before the scientific faculty of a large university. My subject had been

"Science and Democracy." When the question period opened a thin, wiry man with a rasping voice arose, and pointing his finger at me ominously, he said: "Do you mean to say that in the future chemists like myself should participate in politics?" To which I replied: "That is precisely what I mean." With increased emotion he then shouted: "That's sheer nonsense. Where would chemistry be if I spent my time and energy on politics?" In response I attempted to keep the emotional tone of our colloquy in check. "I do not know how to answer your direct question," I said, "but I think I know where chemists will be if they do not participate in politics: they will be under the yoke of political dictators." This I believe, but it is not my custom to use negative arguments. In a democracy all issues tend to become political and hence all citizens must learn to become politicians. Scientists, technicians, and professionals will be required in increasing numbers if the people's needs are to be met. They will either help in bringing scientific truth and efficiency to bear upon political matters, in which case politics will become man's highest preoccupation, or they will hinder, in which case politics will degenerate into a vast, unrepresentative, and corrupt bureaucracy. I do not look upon this challenge to professionals as an onerous duty. On the contrary, it is my firm conviction that a new and finer spirit will pervade the whole of professional life and experience when trained persons devote their skills to the achievement of democratic aims and aspirations. New satisfactions and new loyalties will appear of necessity. I believe this because I am convinced that science is inseparably related to human improvement and is hence progressive.

THE PROFESSION OF MANAGEMENT

By CHARLES E. NOYES

MANAGEMENT is gradually becoming a profession. The traditional office boys who rise to be presidents of great corporations are more and more being replaced by college graduates trained in the techniques of industrial and financial organization.

But the man with the slide rule still works side by side with the man who operates by rule of thumb, and professional judgment is more often than not overruled by limited practical experience. The men and women who manage business enterprises are subject to the same internal conflicts which characterize other groups of a society in transition.

Sooner or later, specialists will have most of the management jobs. The growing size of corporations puts a premium upon specialization of training and skill, as against general ability and intelligence. Instead of executives, as a broad classification, modern business wants sales managers, time study engineers, market analysts, accountants, public relations counsellors, comptrollers, traffic managers, research engineers, purchasing agents, product stylists, office managers, experts in employee relations. In short, it wants professionals.

However, many of the older, top executives of American business are still men who came up the hard way, and they profess a contempt for academic knowledge while they hire more and more junior executives who have it. By tradition, a successful business man is a shrewd trader, an inventor-promoter, or a financial manipulator. The John D. Rockefellers, Henry Fords, Thomas Edisons, and W. C. Durants remain the popular exemplifications of success. The fact that most of their sons and many of their successors are men with a professional education has not yet caught the popular imagination.

So there is an unhealthy conflict between what a business man is supposed to be—what he thinks he is—and the qualities which make for success in the management of business enterprise. The criterion of success in business is still making a profit, even though four-fifths of the

executives in the larger corporations never have any direct connection with profit and loss. They do their jobs and get paid for them, and whether they do their jobs well or badly often has little to do with their company's financial position.

Managers actually spend far more time on the improvement of production and distribution—on production for use—than they give to the concrete problems of making money. But because their opportunities to produce and distribute depend upon their companies' profits, they minimize the professional aspects of their work, and emphasize the commercial. During this stage of transition from business as trade to business as a profession, the attitudes and opinions of business men and women are of vital importance.

It is a mistake to generalize about them as if they were a unified group. The managers are not homogeneous; they are not a class. The chief of a government bureau, the head of a department in a university, and the director of research for a corporation have much more in common with each other than any of them has with the pure entrepreneur.

At the same time, they may all be socially and ideologically close to the entrepreneur. While they are diverse in skills and even in selfish interests, they tend to come together in their thinking about social problems. The managers particularly identify their own advancement with the volume of business profits, and they feel an important distinction between themselves and the manual laborer, even between themselves and their white collar employees.

Having achieved relative success, they are naturally conservative. Their conservatism goes deeper than their own immediate financial interests: they dislike the idea of change which might be upsetting to their professional routine, to say nothing of their prestige and personal comfort. They view with alarm any shift in the economic climate which might subject them to technological unemployment. They are not at all sure that their skills would continue to be useful and in demand if the conditions governing production and distribution were altered.

So they are almost inevitably antagonistic to radical plans for remaking the economic world. And when they find themselves bracketed with the monopolistic exploiters of consumers and labor, their natural tendency to identify themselves with the promoters of big business is increased.

But the economic interests of the management group do not really lie with the exploiters. Given a reasonable opportunity, most of them can understand that. The lessons of the depression are not wholly forgotten: management suffers along with labor and the general public from business policies which constrict production in the hope of maintaining prices and the rate of profit. The managers find their greatest opportunities in times of mildly inflationary prosperity, not only because salaries go up, but also because their professional services are in greatest demand, and they have then the brightest opportunities to find real satisfaction in constructive achievement.

The example of Russia has had an unfortunate effect upon the thinking of the managerial group in the United States. Russia in 1917 did not have any large number of executives skilled in problems of production and distribution. Under the circumstances of bitterness following civil war, the Bolsheviks may have been justified in their decision to dispense with virtually all of the old managerial class, training new executives as they built their new factories, utilities, and distributive organizations. The Russian example has led some radicals and many conservatives to believe that drastic social change in the United States would lead to a similar liquidation (not necessarily by shooting) of the whole existing group of managerial talent, and the training of a complete new set of executives from the ranks of labor. This attitude is not representative of serious thinking, even among radicals. But it has gained sufficient currency to give nightmares to a substantial proportion of the American middle class.

On the other hand, the vast majority of business executives who are in the lower salary brackets almost equally resent efforts which have been made to convince them that they are really proletarians, exploited by the bosses just as much as any common laborer.

The typical manager is ambitious and somewhat above average intelligence. He started at a low salary, and he hopes to get up near the top: he does not usually expect to make $100,000 a year, but $10,000 or even $20,000 is no fantastic dream. His desires are bound up with the American tradition that a poor boy can become rich and famous by ability and hard work. He discounts his special advantages of technical training and social connections; the Horatio Alger story (in a more sophisticated, twentieth-century version) is part of his folklore, and he resents anyone

who tries to tell him that the story is not true. He has seen it enacted often enough to know that it *can* happen.

These beliefs are an important economic reality in America today, because they are held by a majority of the men and women whose skills and experience are indispensable to high production and efficient distribution. They cannot be changed by argument, any more than the doctor who is opposed to socialized medicine can be moved by figures showing that most of the members of his profession are poorly paid.

The attitude of the managers is by no means altogether unrealistic and undesirable. Individual competition and prospective advancement are outlets for man's aggressive tendencies, and it is not inevitable that they should take an antisocial form. Nor are they by any means always antisocial in the present economic organization of society. They have contributed to a steady advance in the standard of living (whether or not it might have been more rapid) for which business executives deserve a large part of the credit.

The way to use their skills for social progress is to give more, not less, prestige and dignity to the managerial profession. Every effort should be made to preserve and strengthen the tradition that the managers are a fluid group, into which anyone may gain easy entrance, out of which anyone may rise to be the president of a great corporation, or the President of the United States.

There is grave danger in any tendency to regard the managers as a rigid class, set apart from and antagonistic to other classes. If they were ever solidly organized and disciplined, convinced that their own interests lay in complete unity, they would constitute the most powerful group in the country. A strike by management could paralyze the nation instantly. They have the power which comes from being the *sine qua non*. But it does not follow, as James Burnham has assumed, that they will therefore inevitably get together to rule the world, any more than doctors will get together and refuse to treat patients until some full set of demands is met. (Burnham, in *The Managerial Revolution,* apparently thinks that the doctors and lawyers and teachers will join with business executives to become a ruling elite, which makes his assumptions even harder to accept. The potentiality of power does not always lead to the exercise of absolute power.)

The managerial group does have an influence in the community out of proportion to its numbers, because the skills needed to organize production and distribution are properly recognized as indispensable. But business executives have been unduly set apart because of the American tendency at once to worship and deride success, and even more by the popular belief that ability in one field gives a man the right to be an oracle in all others. It is difficult for the public to understand that meeting a payroll and making money does not qualify anyone as an economist.

Perhaps it is even more difficult for the business executives themselves to realize that few of them know the elementary principles of modern economics. It is natural for them to believe that production and distribution must forever be organized in the ways and under the conditions they have learned through their own personal experience. They are, in fact, often extraordinarily blind to the extent to which they have already adapted themselves to change—they do not readily grasp, for example, the peacetime implications of the growth of gross national product during the present war.

They have strong ideas about sound finance, although most of them have little real financial training. In this respect, as in many others, they are not thinking as a managerial group, but as members of the middle class, believing that their stake in their usually small savings is greater than their stake in national and world prosperity.

This middle-class thinking constitutes a barrier to enlightened social change in the United States because it is quite possible for the middle class to be comfortably prosperous for a time while large segments of the economy and the population are unnecessarily and seriously depressed. During the 1920's, scarcely anyone except the farmers realized that the farmers were far from prosperous. It was the mid-1930's before the nation as a whole began to wake up to the fact that one-third of the people had been living in poverty in good times as well as bad. Many members of the middle class still believe that the depressed one-third are destined to be poor forever by their own laziness and lack of initiative, though it is no longer entirely fashionable to say so out loud.

So it is difficult for the middle class, and especially for the managers, to view with alarm the possibility that the national income after the war may drop back to $135,000,000,000 a year, or even to $125,000,000,000. That would be forty to fifty per cent above the most prosperous level

ever achieved in peacetime, and they are sure that it would mean plenty of jobs and good salaries for them. A little mass unemployment, they think, might be a good thing: it would put labor back in its proper place.

Fortunately, this attitude is by no means universal, even among the middle class. Many business executives look forward to expansion rather than to guarding themselves against another depression. Men like Kaiser and Reynolds and Higgins have recaptured some of the spirit of those who took pride in building railroads and steel mills and oil refineries as well as in making money. And the men who have performed miracles of organization in the War Production Board, the men all over the country who have built some of the biggest plants in the world in a matter of months and made them produce, may not be satisfied to settle back into a business world where the merger is mightier than the new invention. The engineers who built the Alcan Highway, the docks on the Normandy beaches, the port at Saipan, will miss something if they are given no opportunity to equal those feats in America after the war. Some of the men who have organized a service of supply for millions of troops in all parts of the world may have ideas about improving distribution when the war is finished. They may even grow a little impatient if they are told too often that things can't be done because they cost too much.

There will be, in short, tens of thousands of men with a new kind of training in solving the problems of production and distribution. They are too busy today to think much about applying their knowledge and their skills in the postwar world, but sooner or later they will furnish a very keen competition to the managers who were trained in the period between world wars, and many of them will be more likely to think in terms of getting a job done than in terms of money.

It would be fatuous to predict that the pull of divergent forces in the next five or ten years will tend to draw the managers together into a predominantly conservative class, or that it will give them opportunities which will make them leaders in a full-scale job of building and rebuilding America. They will go along with economic and social trends which are far beyond their own exclusive control. It is at least safe to say that there will be enough of them with the requisite skills and experience willing to undertake whatever jobs of production and distribution the nation gives them to do. If their abilities are properly recognized and rewarded, they have far more to gain from a rapidly expanding economy which

aims at prosperity for all of the people than from a reactionary attempt to maintain the position of the middle class by keeping workers and farmers in relative poverty.

This implies, however, that since the median family income in the United States has been raised from about $1,075 per year in 1935-36 to about $2,600 today, the job which paid $10,000 in 1935-36 should pay $25,000 when controls on wages and salaries are removed after the war. Otherwise, the man who is still making $10,000 will bitterly resent the skilled craftsman who may get $5,000 or $6,000, and will almost automatically become a foe of the labor union which supports the craftsman's wages.

Upgrading all along the line would undoubtedly mean that wartime inflation of prices would stay with us indefinitely, and would probably result in some further inflation. It would mean that the 150 per cent increase in dollar wages and salaries would not raise the general standard of living more than 100 per cent above 1935-36 levels. And it would mean real hardship for those people—including the widows and orphans—who did not share the average rise in dollar income.

Nevertheless, it is a key to the difference between a reactionary and a progressive management group, and the advantages must be weighed very carefully against the disadvantages. If managers are to regard themselves as professional men and women whose primary job is increasing production and facilitating distribution, they have a legitimate right to expect a commensurate social and financial position in the community. Like skilled and unskilled workers, they will give their best when the incentives are both great and tangible.

There is no economic reason for abolishing the traditional differential between wages and salaries in order to achieve the mass purchasing power which is the primary essential for prosperity. Not all such differentials are justified, but many of them are, and a mistaken policy of egalitarianism could jeopardize universal prosperity. The standard of living of American workers is not in inverse proportion to the profits and salaries of management.

However, one disadvantage of raising middle-class incomes must be considered. People with incomes over $5,000 a year usually save a much larger proportion of their incomes than do those with less. The salaries paid to executives therefore contribute less to the maintenance

of total purchasing power than the wages paid to workers. If salaries were increased substantially, it might become necessary to revise conventional notions about the virtues of thrift, and more specifically to prevent the accumulation of savings in such relatively sterile forms as savings bank deposits and life insurance. The Temporary National Economic Committee made some important suggestions along this line which should be revived immediately after the war.

The present American economy is so balanced that the solution of any one problem almost invariably creates two or three new ones, and the proper level of compensation for management is certainly no exception to this rule. Nevertheless, it is a problem which cannot be allowed to go by default without grave danger of making reactionaries out of tens of thousands of key individuals who are still potentially progressive. Unless there is a quite improbable revolutionary change in the economic system, the attitudes and ambitions of the managerial profession must be recognized as a very important factor in the postwar situation. Under present and probable future conditions, these ambitions are perfectly legitimate. So it would seem to be the part of wisdom to plan for their satisfaction, rather than to wish they were different or try to suppress them.

Because the generally satisfactory position of the managers under existing conditions makes them naturally conservative, it would be foolish to expect them overnight to become the leaders of social progress in an expanding economy. But it is equally foolish in designing such a program to leave out the incentives which would persuade the managers to go along with it.

The profession of management will eventually carry with it recognition of social trusteeship, involving obligations and ethical standards comparable with those subscribed to by doctors and other professional men and women. Of course such standards are never fully adhered to, but they can have genuine force in an atmosphere of social approval. Prestige and position are, after all, the proper rewards of those who exercise primary responsibility for increasing the supply of goods and services, whoever they may be.

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON SMALL BUSINESS

By JULES ABELS

A CONSERVATIVE STATISTICAL ESTIMATE is that 650,000 small business concerns, that is, firms with 200 wage earners or less, have perished since Pearl Harbor. This staggering total speaks eloquently by itself of the catastrophe that has befallen small business because of the war. The casualty figure will rise higher even if V-J Day were to come tomorrow. The war has built up the financial position, reserves, and savings of large firms and has left small firms on a precarious financial basis; in addition, carry-backs under the excess profits tax are a stowed-away nest-egg that will accrue mostly to large firms in the postwar years. Superiority in financial resources will give the large concern an overpowering advantage in competition after the war with its smaller rival. Thus as a result of World War II, the desperate position of small business which was the focus of attention ten years ago in the TNEC inquiry has been enormously aggravated.

It is comforting to know that an aggressive "small business movement" has crystallized in the last year. Political leaders including the President, wave its banner. Genuflections to small business are regularly found in recent Congressional legislation, such as the Reconversion Act and the Surplus Property Disposal Act. House and Senate Small Business Committees are active. Several Washington agencies have a small business section. A special agency, the Smaller War Plants Corporation, headed by the dynamic Maury Maverick, energetically espouses the cause of small business. It would be illusory, however, to believe that these efforts can halt the anti-small business groundswell generated by our colossal war effort.

Attrition in the number of small business firms is only a part of the story. Hidden under the surface, less palpable than the number of business casualties, is the fact that the pattern of business relationships, the topography of the business structure, has been radically altered as a result of war economics. Small businesses by the thousands have forfeited

their independence; have been reduced to a condition of subservience by being absorbed into the bloodstream of the mammoth firm. For them the term, free competitive enterprise, retains only a paper meaning.

This deprivation of freedom has not been the result of conspiracy or a deliberate plan but has emerged inevitably from the nature of war procurement and the mechanics of war production. There were three distinct stages in the manufacturing area. First was the method of the letting of war procurement contracts. It is conceded that the bulk of war contracts, particularly those let by the Army, were assigned to a relatively small number of war contractors. A figure often quoted is that 75 per cent of the contracts were let to only 56 firms. It was considered far more practicable for procurement agencies to deal with a small number of contractors who were technologically equipped to turn out the maximum amount of a standardized war article. This economic reality could not be contained. As far as effecting an increased distribution of contracts among small business, the new SWPC, headed by Maverick, has been no more successful than its predecessor agencies headed by Floyd Odlum, Colonel Robert Johnson, and Louis Holland.

Second step was the operation of the Controlled Materials Plan governing the distribution of materials for war production. The prime contractor was able to choose his subcontractors at will, thus endowing them with priorities which soon became the magic passport for materials and for life itself. This power held by the prime contractor over his subcontractors was fortified by CMP, set in motion early in 1943. This plan gave the prime contractor autocratic authority by allotting to him steel, copper, and aluminum, which he, in turn, fed down the chain to subcontractors and sub-subcontractors. The prime contractor thus was able to carve out a veritable baronial empire among innumerable suppliers perhaps remotely connected with it. The vertical integration of industry that has developed is nonetheless solid because the members have the legal option to withdraw after the demise of the Controlled Materials Plan. The members of the horizontal combination also have the option to withdraw but find it profitable to stay within it. The truth is that the bonds in this wartime vertical combination have been knit together by habit, association, engineering assistance and most important, loans and financial aids. The *raison d'etre* for the combination is a compelling one

—to the member the security of a fair return on his investment outweighs the loss of independence and initiative.

A final factor in hammering together the chain will be the procedure in paying off settlements on the billions of war contracts soon to be terminated. Contract termination procedures are designed mainly to serve the prime contractor's interest. The small business, the subcontractor, because of lack of legal "privity" between the subcontractor and the government, must file his claim "up the chain" through his prime contractor and, in turn, must wait for payment "down the chain" after the prime contractor has gotten approval of all the claims from the contracting officer. Only in certain unusual cases, such as where a prime contractor is in danger of becoming insolvent or in cases of special hardship, under the new Contract Termination Act can there be any deviation from the procedure of the "filter down" payment. This exposes the subcontractor to the risk of great delay—largely at the mercy of his large customer, substantial concessions can be wrung from him in exchange for loans or financial favors.

A counterpart to the vertical integration that has sprung up in the manufacturing areas is the envelopment of retailers and wholesalers within the spheres of influence of large manufacturers. In manufacturing the instrument of control was priorities, in distribution it was scarcities which starved out distributors unable to build a contact line with large suppliers. Companies like International Harvester, Packard Motor, and Firestone Tire and Rubber, have been able to maintain their distributive network by aggressive dealer-aid programs. Distributors have been maintained by aids ranging from supplies of new products, repair parts, subsidized advertising and employee training to outright loans. Restraints and obligations imposed on the distributor will not be easily shed when the war is over, certainly not in the long period while consumer goods are produced only in scarce amounts.

There has been a great deal of publicity about the desperate position of airplane companies if payments are delayed, of automobile companies if there is delay in the removal of government-owned property from their plants. There has been little publicity given to the desperate position of small companies in the turnabout period. The National Industrial Conference Board in a study published in November, 1944, of 125 manufacturing corporations engaged in metal fabrication with worth ranging

from $100,000 to $1,000,000, reached the following conclusion:

> The ratio of current assets to current liabilities is dangerously low for all size classes. For the group as a whole, current assets are only 1.17 times the current liabilities. For the smallest-size class—corporations with net worth of less than $100,000—the current assets are only 1.07 times the current liabilities. In other words, the current liabilities are just about equal to the current assets. While such a situation need not spell disaster, it does require a fine balancing of cash income and cash outgo. A slight miscalculation in estimating the magnitude or in the timing of cash receipts could very easily involve these companies in difficulty.
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> In the period of transition a situation might arise in which these companies would be drained of their cash. With their war contracts canceled, their principal source of cash—other than their current assets—will be taken away from them. In returning to normal operations, the outflow of cash in the critical interval will most likely exceed the inflow. Raw material inventories will, in many instances, have to be built up, wages paid, quarterly payments of the huge income-tax accruals made, and expenses incurred in re-establishing distributive channels and rebuilding markets. During this period cash payments from sales to civilian markets may be comparatively small. This situation may very well prove disastrous to corporations with a poor current ratio.

The precarious financial position of small firms should be considered in the light of Treasury estimates that even after taxes and dividends paid, corporations will have accumulated for the years 1942, 1943, and 1944 a total of nearly $14 billion of undistributed corporate profits. The SEC has estimated that the total net working capital of American corporations was $46.5 billion at the end of last year compared with $41.3 billion at the close of 1943, $36.2 billion at the close of 1942, and $32.1 billion at the close of 1941. These profits rest largely in the coffers of the large corporations which have freely admitted in hearings before Congress on renegotiation bills that their existing reserves are ample to tide them through reconversion. This financial advantage will be even further heightened by the payment of carry-back refunds. Suppose in 1946 United States Steel just breaks even in operations. It would normally have a deficit of $25,000,000, representing its obligations on its preferred stock, but under the carry-back provision, it would receive a tax rebate of $49,600,000 on its 1942 tax payments. Small firms, too, are entitled to carry-backs but unfortunately, they have paid in relatively so little in taxes that they don't have much of an excess profits credit to fall back on. A firm which has stored up a carry-back can count on that as an asset in competing with

a new firm which can't hope to collect a carry-back. This is over and above, of course, the effect of the provision for a postwar refund of 10 per cent of the excess profits tax—in effect, a compulsory accumulation of a postwar reserve. This reserve is estimated now by SEC at about $2 billion.

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An effective program for aid to small business requires drastic, discriminatory action in its behalf—no halfway, middle-of-the-road, improvised or compromised solution will do. The present unsatisfactory record of the small business program during this war, however well-publicized its efforts, has proved that. Minimally, to keep small business going in this country there must be a clear-cut recognition that since the war has set back small business, it is entitled now to a substantial differential advantage to help restore the balance. However, above and beyond that, large and small business can no longer contest on the same basis. Since the cards are stacked against it in an ordinary game, small business must have a new deal. Large business has advantages flowing automatically from its size and government must step in to supply the corresponding deficiencies for small business. This course must be taken in spite of the enormous monetary expense it entails to government and in face of the opposition of big business, that is, if the goal of keeping small business alive is to be achieved.

This conclusion appears most forcibly from a consideration of financial aid. What small business needs most can be summarized in one word —money. It takes money, and constantly more of it, to enter a new business, it takes money to expand a business, it takes money to set up reserves against normal business vicissitudes and contingencies. The traditional method for a company to raise capital or to get credit is the slow but sure and steady method of plowing profits back into the business. Prior to the war the relatively meager prewar profits of small companies gave them very little to plow back.

Nor have small businesses fared much better during the war boom. High profits coupled with high tax rates have left small companies in the same position. Many small enterprises, starting with insignificant capital and poor earnings records, have had phenomenally high incomes during the war period. But since they could claim almost no excess profits tax credit, a major portion of their earnings has been subject to a 95 per cent excess profits tax, with an over-all income and excess profits tax

ceiling of 80 per cent. This means that they can grow only to the extent of 20 per cent of their profits. Since, as a practical matter any income they have retained has gone into plant and equipment under the pressure of additional war production, they are almost uniformly in a very precarious cash position.

There are three ways of raising money through private channels: short-term loans from banks and private investment houses, long-term loans from the same sources and equity financing, that is, the flotation of stock issues. Small businesses have found it traditionally difficult to get short- or long-term loans because their relatively poor earnings records make them poor banking risks. Moreover, short-term loans don't help where money is required for carrying on business over a long period. The long-term loan is only less satisfactory since it obliges the borrower to undertake the dangerous burden of paying interest or principal in fair times or foul. Equity financing is by far the ideal method for obtaining capital but here again small business has been stymied. The costs of financing are heavy; percentage-wise, the rates for registration, underwriting and flotation are higher for small issues than for large; more important is the fact that investors are peculiarly apathetic to the issues of small companies.

Present governmental financial assistance to small business is insignificant. Only loans are available, not sources of equity financing. The loans of the Smaller War Plants Corporation are limited by its capitalization of $350,000,000, the fact that loans can be made only for specialized purposes, such as for working capital for war production, loans on terminated war contracts and for the purchase of government surplus property. RFC loans have gone principally to large companies—its reports have shown that loans of $5,000 or less have been only 1.5 per cent of the total authorized. Federal Reserve loan procedures have been ineffective.

To preserve small business in the postwar period a governmental spending program must be geared to the objective of supplying small business with adequate funds for working capital and expansion. It seems inevitable that some time in the postwar period the government will turn to a spending program as a permanent or an interim device for creating jobs along the lines of the Murray Full Employment Bill. At such a time the investment of government money in small firms would be a legitimate method of combining the creation of jobs with a desirable socio-economic

goal. It would certainly be as defensible a method as subsidization of large corporations à la the RFC. Money need not be squandered recklessly on small firms, but might be invested along the lines of a bill sponsored by Senator Mead to set up an Industrial Loan Corporation, which would purchase the preferred stock of small firms or lend money with preferred stock as security. A definite maturity date for loans would be set and amortization would be made by periodical payments.

Private banking interests are mobilizing to head off the possibility of government financing, the most potent threat they face in the postwar period. Before many forums including Congressional committees, spokesmen for private banking have reiterated that all needs of small business can be adequately met by private capital. The American Bankers' Association has formulated a program, the chief feature of which is the establishment of credit pools in various areas to spread the risk among member banks within the area. It would be a hardy optimist, indeed, who would put reliance on a mere generous banker's attitude and a credit pool, commitments to which may not exceed more than $500,000,000, to solve the financial needs of small business. The ABA plan is confined to short- or long-term loans. The Investment Bankers' Association has appointed a committee to study methods of supplying small business with equity capital. Though months have passed since the committee was appointed, no program has yet been framed.

Whether or not due to private banking pressure, all bills for enlarging financial aid to small business, notably the Murray Bill to increase SWPC's capitalization coincident with the extension of its life beyond June of this year, are slumbering in committee.

Big business will not easily relinquish the firmer grip it has gained on the economy during the war. How hard it will fight was emphasized in the reconversion battle which, with major military assistance, it seems to have won. When a limited reconversion appeared imminent about a year ago, a reconversion program was sponsored by industry divisions in WPB, chairmaned by big business representatives, to put reconversion production within the framework of the Controlled Materials Plan. Present members of the industry would be assigned reconversion quotas based on a percentage of what they produced in 1936 to 1939. This so-called "grandfather clause" would have prevented newcomers from breaking into the field and would have prevented small firms from

getting quotas large enough to make break-even operations possible. Another wrinkle that was included was to set a quota on a three-year basis so that big firms which were tied up with war contracts when they were set free could make up in one big rush what they had missed earlier. When this plan was discarded, big business fought for the "even start" principle of reconversion, that is, delaying the whole process until all members were set free from war contracts; small business fought for the very narrow "spot authorization" principle which would permit WPB field offices to lift limitation orders for small firms in areas where labor supply was adequate and thus allow them to get an early start in reconversion. Donald Nelson drove the "spot" plan through with the concurrence only of one Vice-Chairman, Maury Maverick, and over the opposition of the Armed Forces, and a big business bloc headed by Charles Wilson. However, Nelson lost his post as WPB chief as a result of the internal schism, not long surviving his victory.

The months since the "spot authorization" plan was put into effect witnessed constant sabotage of the plan within WPB. It was encumbered with manpower requirements, engineering surveys, complicated forms, restrictions on use of materials, omission to set up materials reserves for successful applicants under the plan, etc. Well before the military took over the direction of the war economy at the time of the Ardennes breakthrough and killed it altogether, constant chipping away had left "spot authorization" an empty husk. A clearer consciousness of the issue at stake, a forceful public support for SWPC's position might have put "spot authorization" on so secure a foundation that it might not have been readily demolished. The shelving of "spot authorization" and the certainty of a minor cutback after V-E Day means that a real opportunity for small business has been lost.

The active support of liberals is required behind a bill like the O'Mahoney-Kefauver Bill, which would prevent a large corporation from buying up the assets of a small one unless the merger was considered desirable. This is a far more salutary measure so far as preventing monopoly than the proposal of Thurman Arnold merely requiring corporations to register when they plan to bring under single control more than 50 per cent of the total amount of a product. Recent studies conducted by SWPC have shown a trend towards the gobbling-up of small concerns by large ones. There is no legal restriction blocking the way since the Clayton Act

prohibits interlocking directorates by purchase of stock but not by purchase of assets. The postwar period may well see a wholesale absorption of small concerns by large ones in view of the disparity in their financial resources.

The war has seen a virtual suspension of antitrust activities. No antitrust suit is begun today unless the War and Navy Departments agree that it will not impede war production. By statute the Antitrust Division is authorized to grant a certificate of immunity from suit in the case of joint industry programs. It will probably require a strong push to put the administration back into the "trust busting" era of Thurman Arnold. No program, however, for aiding small business in the postwar period can be carried out without the presence of aggressive antitrust action by way of surveillance of industry to spot collusion and to prosecute where necessary.

A liberal program for preserving small business must include action to break the stranglehold that certain industries have on vital products by virtue of the ownership of patents and licensing and cross-licensing agreements. Maverick has testified before Congress that the so-called "umbrella patent" (which covers an entire field of activity) and the so-called "bottleneck patent" (which can block an entire field of activity) can usually prevent all but the very largest manufacturers from entering a given field because enormous expense is involved in designing machinery and products that will avoid possible infringements. The recent Hartford-Empire case was a grave disappointment to the Antitrust Division, since the court ruled that violation of the antitrust laws does not void a patent and moreover, it turned down a request of the Antitrust Division that the patent holder be required to grant royalty-free licenses. The Voorhis Bill, now pending in Congress, would compel the registration with the Attorney General of all agreements relating to patents including patent applications, interference proceedings, and licenses. It would also void patents which were used in violation of the antitrust laws, to raise or fix prices, or limit the supply of a product in interstate commerce.

Tax relief is indispensable for safeguarding small business in the postwar period. Assuming the continuation of the excess profits tax, a proposal vigorously advocated by Maury Maverick is to increase the specific exemption well beyond the present $10,000. A $50,000 exemption figure is the one most commonly mentioned. War Mobilizer Byrnes, on the other hand, has suggested an increase to only $25,000. To stimulate

newcomers in the small business field, tax exemptions should be granted for a limited period for newly organized small corporations. A bill to give small, newly organized corporations exemption from federal income, excess profits, capital stock, declared value, excess profits tax and payroll taxes for roughly three years, has already been introduced in the House. Encouragement for the investment of equity capital in small firms can be stimulated through the tax laws by giving special tax benefits to those who invest equity capital in the small companies. This might be accomplished by allowing a full deduction for loss or a very low maximum tax on gains. A tremendous boon to small business would be to treat small corporations as partnerships. The idea is to give small business the legal protection that flows from the corporate tax. The argument is that small, closely-held corporations are actually partnerships in all but technical form. Taxing them as partnerships would mean elimination of the corporate tax; the individual partners (stockholders) would report the income of the business according to their share of the profits.

These are some of the main ingredients which should be included in a comprehensive program to save small business during the postwar period. The maintenance of genuinely free enterprise, of which small business has historically been the keystone, demands affirmative and far-reaching governmental action.

CONSUMERS GIRD FOR BATTLE

By DONALD MONTGOMERY

"Consumers," we have come to believe, are middle-class people. I put quotes around the word because everyone who lives consumes, whereas a quote consumer unquote is one who knows how, or is beginning to learn how, to turn money wisely into things wanted. Mostly middle-class people have been called consumers in this sense, not because they consume more than workers or less than the rich, but because they have enough money to care, and not enough to be careless, about what it will get for them when they spend it.

But thus defining the consumer still leaves the middle class undefined. Back before the war I found the statistical middle class. In 1940 one-fourth of all of us at the top of the ladder made one-half of total consumer expenditures. One-half of us at the bottom made only one-fourth. In between was one-fourth of all of us spending one-fourth of what we all spend. There was the middle class, on the nose! But of course it was not; it spent in 1940 from $20 to $35 a week per family, whereas we all know that middle-class families spend from $50 to $200 a week.

If statistics will not serve, maybe psychology will. The middle class sees, whichever way it looks, people who know what they are and know what they want. In the worker they see people proud of status and unashamed of purpose; in the tycoon, people proud of purpose and unashamed of their status, conspicuous and vulnerable though it be. In short the middle-class person finds himself, and I know, wallowing in a sea of doubt surrounded by certitudes. That is the strongest element in his makeup, and the most unhappy. And that, too, is why those opposite poles of organized certitude in our day, the Catholic Church and the Communist Party, find the middle class relatively poor pickings.

That, also, is why middle-class "evangelists" paint horrid pictures of the middle class being pressed in the middle by powerful pressures of organized groups. For one thing, they call on the government to set itself up as a self-ordained pressure group for consumers, not knowing what consumers are doing for themselves pressure-wise. Actually both

labor and consumer representatives in Washington have joined forces for some time now to advance, not solely middle-class or labor objectives, but common objectives that serve public purposes in the broadest sense.

At the Office of Price Administration, for instance, is a Labor Policy Committee. Paid representatives of CIO, AFL, and Railroad labor serve on it. They meet frequently and work hard. They work wholly on the consumer issues involved in the administration of price control. They are fighting those representatives of business who are officials of OPA, those who pressure OPA from outside, and those who as members of Congress exert terrific pressure for business interests against stabilization of the nation's economy. Labor is fighting to defeat this plunder and to expose this profiteering.

Seated with the Labor Policy Committee at each meeting are two representatives of CIO and AFL women's auxiliaries. These women come in as delegates from another committee at OPA, the Consumers' Advisory Committee. In that committee are the representatives of national organizations of women or consumers, middle class, definitely. Like the Labor Policy Committee they are fighting the business pressures and the subservience of officials thereto which, unchecked, threatens to destroy wartime stabilization. On virtually every issue the Labor Committee and Consumer Committee at OPA think and act alike. Neither is beholden to OPA, but vigorously holds it to account. Both have battled for price control against great odds.

This common and allied action of labor and consumer representatives within the high-powered halls of OPA is a symbol of something new in this land. It signifies, for one thing, that labor begins to use its organized power for broad public purposes which serve not only its own members, but the middle class also. Price control is not the only proof of this or the most important, but it is a significant example.

The joint operations of labor and consumer committees signify a further thing, that labor is losing its traditional and understandable distrust of the middle class, and that the middle class is no longer shocked or sullied by collaborating with labor.

If this is not enough fully to frighten our financial upper class and its henchmen in official posts, let me add one other thing it signifies. American labor and the American farmer are discovering that the road to prosperity for each is a larger pie, not a larger slice. Until this war

proved how tremendously productive we can be when we want to, labor and agriculture largely followed the defensive tactics of business—to play it safe and try to stake out, each for himself, a larger slice of a pie that was, from the start, baked too small to feed the whole family. That is the monopoly game. If American industry has learned no other, it will find when this war ends a large and growing part of labor, agriculture, and the middle class arrayed against it. A progressive movement begins to find common objectives among the leading spirits of several classes and occupations.

But what, peculiarly, is the role of the consumer in all this, whether it be espoused by middle-class housewife, or by working farmer, or factory worker? One thing it is not, most certainly; that is to serve unaided something vaguely called the "public interest." For a consumer to assume that he and no other speaks the public interest is folly; it may swell his spirit, but it will weaken his arm.

This point deserves more than passing notice. Consumer interest centers on the kinds, qualities, and quantities of goods and services that may be obtained for individual or family purposes. It is concerned with income spending; though it is common to everyone, it is not anyone's sole interest. The citizen is a bundle of economic, social, and cultural interests. But only in his spending does he perform in an economic sense as a consumer. And just as each person is a compound of a great many individual interests, so the public interest is a compound of many group interests. The consumer interest of all citizens together is only part of the public interest.

Nor is it true that the consumer interests of all citizens are similar. Their differences are as great as those which divide the income interests of employers and wage earners, farmers and city workers, skilled and unskilled, though with consumers, as with others, what concerns one is of concern to all. The consumer interest, then, is a special interest. Only when it is so understood will fruitful efforts be made to do something about it. Though a special interest, the consumer interest ranges more comprehensively than most others over the whole field of economic behavior. When he appraises his economic world with a consumer eye, the citizen begins to approach a comprehensive judgment concerning it. Then he becomes aware not merely of who is getting what out of it, and at whose expense, but of its over-all continuing ability to produce the

goods, and to keep doing so, and to do it better year after year with an ever lessening burden of human toil and degradation.

Plenty and the facts about plenty are the distinguishing characteristics of consumer pressure. In their demand for plenty consumers are the declared enemy of monopoly, because monopoly is the practice of making things valuable by making them scarce which flies in the face of consumer common sense whether it be exercised by industry, labor, agriculture, or government. In their demand for facts about plenty and about comparative costs and quality, consumers are the declared enemy of fraud. This persistent demand for facts, it so happens, is a unique feature of the American consumer movement. Consumers here want such facts whether or not they join co-operatives in order to get them. Co-operatives here furnish such facts whenever they are available. Co-operators abroad, however, have not shown this kind of shopping curiosity. The head of the largest retail co-op in the world told me on a visit to America that he wondered how their shops would fare if they told their members such facts as we want about the patent medicines which they displayed on their shelves.

This is no accident nor any particular virtue in the American consumer. It is environmental. It grows out of the perpetual din poured in upon American ears with all the wit, charm, urge, and outrage to decency that the American advertising mind can concoct. Never in the world's history has the cult of the merchant risen to such heights as in these United States since World War I. They tell us what we are, what we want, what ails us, what we shall laugh or cry at, what art and music shall be ours, what we shall read, and, incidentally, what we shall spend our money for.

That would be enough if their power ended there. But it reaches further. Those who command the mass markets also command who shall engage in the business of supplying the market. Free enterprise becomes a system that is free for anyone who happens to have a few million dollars to buy himself a share of the advertising channels to the mass mind. All this uproarious guff that clogs the airways day and night is not just a species of high-frequency fun. It's a deadly serious business carried on by those who, having command of the market, intend to hold it against interlopers, new inventions, improved products, or little fry.

If there be any doubt of that, let the doubter challenge in any effective way the power of this power that is America today. It would be interesting to watch what would happen to Maury Maverick, government champion of small business, if he should make just one move that threatened to release small business from what chiefly ails it—the power of national advertising.

The hue and cry after grade labeling nowadays is proof enough of the same thing. Consumers want grade labels because they want facts—comparative facts. But comparative facts made known to consumers would place the highly advertised brand and the little known brand in a nearly comparable position, competitively speaking. And that is what the big advertisers do not intend. Although grade labeling is a system of comparing quality of canned foods that was worked out and has long been used by canners, jobbers, and bankers, it becomes a threat to free enterprise and to the future of America when consumers clamor for it. So Congress, to save the nation at least for the duration of the war, stepped in with a special law to command OPA not to require grades upon the label, nor even to use grades in fixing prices for processed fruits and vegetables. Of course this amounted to a legislative authorization of the widespread cheating and profiteering that has resulted, but it avoided a greater peril. It saved the country for that which it cherishes most, the command of big business over the right to do business, exercised through control of access to consumers. This is the end product of a quarter of a century's dominance of our culture by the master merchants.

Organized, informed, articulate consumers will one day challenge this merchandising monopoly. That is why they are feared, and should be. Middle-class consumers lead the assault in that sector where the weapon used is a simple demand for facts about goods. Farmers lead with tactics that simply jump the hurdle by producing the goods in consumer-owned plants or selling them in consumer-owned stores, the co-operatives. Labor is now joining both; it is side by side with middle-class housewives on the grade labeling and legislative fronts, it is joining the farmers in the ownership of co-operatives. Thus what was once just a theory of the consumer movement becomes patently a fact. It is a binding force that welds into common interest programs special interests that otherwise might waste themselves in conflict.

There is enough for all to do, heaven knows. Current ethics of government, for example, put scant restraint upon the public official to protect consumer interests from a fleecing. On the contrary, they condone his active participation on the side of the fleecers. Senators, representatives, administrators, cabinet officers, yes, and judges, they neither hesitate nor apologize to lend their good offices when some business group, large or small, needs the help of a law or a decision to perfect its inroads upon the consumer's purse or its exploitation of his gullibility.

OPA has been hammered quite out of its original shape by a perpetual barrage of congressional blocs, so that today it is not so much a price control agency as a profit insurance bureau. This is not external or unfriendly criticism. One need only watch OPA officials in their frequent encounters with the real estate bloc, wool bloc, cotton bloc, oil bloc, strawberry bloc to observe that what they spend their time proving to congressmen is how profitable they have allowed industry to become under price control. Just recently the Administrator sent Senator Brewster (New England cotton-mill bloc) a statement on the profits cotton mills are making and the $120,000,000 OPA has given them this past year in its faithful devotion to Bankhead, author of a price-raising amendment. At present prices the cotton mills are making $365,000,000 profits, before taxes, which is thirteen times the $28,000,000 they averaged in 1936-39. OPA says it will roll those back to $325,000,000, which, by simple arithmetic, still leaves them eleven times more profit than peacetime prices provided them.

This, of course, is among the big-time services rendered to consumer fleecers. Another is the cold $150,000,000 or thereabouts which OPA is now serving up to the steel mills, for no better reason, so far as one can discover, than that they are making about $450,000,000 *more* profit than they made in peacetime, and that they may have to pay out before long an additional $90,000,000 in annual wages.

Nor is any service too small. Last year the dry milk industry decided to give one of its products a face lifting. The product is called dry skim milk, because that is what it happens to be. Under the Food and Drug Law that is what it had to be called, until the industry got to work on Congress, when presto it isn't dry skim milk any longer, it is defatted milk solids. It's worth more that way. Consumers will not recognize it as the excellent, but very cheap, product which they had known skim

milk to be. It doesn't seem true, even as I relate it, that the United States Congress with a war on its hands passed that law through both houses, sent it to the President, and the President signed it. That so much official effort and public money should have been spent perverting the laws of the land to permit, nay require—under penalty—an industry to conceal the identity of its simple but wholesome product from thirty million American housewives can prove only one thing. We are still determined to promote prosperity by plundering our own pocketbooks, as in the gorgeous 1920's when we plundered ourselves right on up to and over the precipice.

The story of war plunder at consumer expense could go on for volumes, and let us hope some of these volumes get written soon enough to bring on the day of vengeance in good season. Profiteering is firmly seated in the saddle today, and only the efforts of a handful of labor, consumer, and some farm-organization hired men and women at Washington are at hand to cope with it, almost pitifully, at its source. Thousands of volunteer OPA workers mop up the innumerable rivulets flowing out from the central corruption with a valor of undecorated heroism that is one of the high human spots of this war.

We who read or write magazine articles, however, might pause a spell to be warned of worse to come. Profiteering on the grand scale will end some time after the war. Right then the wise citizen will look elsewhere for the peril that threatens his purse. Unless I misread the signs (I hope so), many a mild, unexciting bill will be introduced in federal, state, and even municipal legislatures with the purpose of protecting one segment or another of free enterprise from any exhibition of either freedom or enterprise upon the part of its competitors. I mean, simply, that we shall enter upon such an orgy of protective bill drafting as we have never seen. And many of the bills will pass.

We liberals discovered "security" under Roosevelt. We enshrine it as social security, and a fine thing it is in a world that subjects the workingman more readily than the corporation to the hazards of a "free economy." But business discovered "security" long ago, right after the Civil War. We called it monopoly, and went after it with the Granger laws and the Sherman Act. Yet security persisted, because the tramp of history had taken us into a conserving era, and adventure and risk were no part of its vital forces. World War I gave birth to normalcy,

meaning play everything safe, capture the consumer, tickle his heels, and shake out his pockets.

Laws were devised then to perfect the safety of competitors, and this in turn enhanced the proceeds from the shaking out of consumers. By 1937, looking back over my notes, I find I was able to record that twenty-four states had passed tax laws to hamper chain stores; thirty-nine states had passed "fair" trade laws to force retailers to sell (Please note!) advertised goods at prices fixed by their manufacturers; thirteen states had passed "unfair" trade laws to require retailers to sell goods at their invoice cost plus a markup, so as to abolish "loss leaders" which smart consumers turn to good account when the family budget is pressed; and twelve states, plus the federal government, had enacted laws to outlaw discrimination in prices, especially in cases where that might be of benefit to the consumer. In a breath, this barrage of public statutes was laid down for the purpose of separating the consuming public from the possible savings it might obtain from large-scale methods of distribution. It was a war among merchants, but on the winning side were the national advertisers who feared, far more than they feared organized consumers, the power of chain retailers to take their command of the American consumer away from them.

These were the early skirmishes. What World War II will spawn in the field of protective legislation for "free enterprise" we can scarcely guess. Only one thing is certain, it will be daring. American businessmen, especially large ones, have learned more about government during this war than they ever knew before. They have been the government, for all practical purposes. Their only challenge has come from the American military man. He, by comparison, is a dull sample. Furthermore he has challenged business only on pride, not principle. So it has been a rich schooling. Business now knows what government is good for. It has discovered its many conveniences. It may use that discovery to cross purposes now and then, but it will hardly stow it away on the shelf.

I have a file of forerunners of postwar legislation that may be born out of this discovery. But by way of prediction I would not venture more than that a great grist of laws will be offered, and many of them enacted, to determine who may engage in what under what conditions, and whose already-staked-out claim shall be protected how from whom.

Against the two horns of monopoly, organized consumers must launch their fight if they are to make their contribution to the world of plenty. The manipulated and legislated monopoly which restricts output to increase price and the domination of the mass market by advertisers are twin enemies of the proposition that if we earn enough and spend enough we shall work enough and earn enough.

Faith in the efficacy of purchasing power is firmly held by most of us, but the price level remains to be reckoned with. And that requires us to reckon with monopoly. For monopoly is as ready as ever to take whatever spending power we may have and convert it into a limited supply of goods purchased at high prices. When that happens the spending power that is large enough to pay for full employment provides something very much less, and the merry-go-round breaks down. Monopoly taps the fiscal circulatory system to build up its own private blood bank. At the same time it does away with many weak competitors who need the plasma and could restore it to the nation's blood stream. So we shall have to do more than assure purchasing power. We shall have to make sure it is not swindled out of us. We must force it back in full force to shops and plants and counting houses where it is turned promptly into payrolls for the production of things we want.

Keep prices down while we put wages up. That is the goal, and there are several roads to it. Once labor gets past its battle to organize the unorganized, and has regained its right to bargain collectively without benefit of briefs and boards and the governmental runaround, I suspect and devoutly hope that labor will assert its rights with respect to prices at which its labor is sold, wrapped up in products, as well as the price at which its labor is bought. For if prices are to be kept in line while wages rise (and otherwise wages do not really rise), antimonopoly prosecutions and competition will not prove sufficient.

Signs that this new role for labor will arrive are not wholly lacking now, but consumers must carry the frontal attack on monopoly practices. Farm, labor, and middle-class consumers have a like interest and the same stake in forcing monopoly to come to terms. Antitrust prosecutions will win more attention from the organized consumer movement when the special problems of war have passed. The domination by national advertisers of the blurb-roads and blah-ways to the ears of the nation's millions is beyond the reach of antitrust actions for the most part. Perhaps a

successful fight will be waged to preserve what is left of the airways as a common carrier for little merchants as well as large. That seems none too certain. The FM ether will more than likely end up in the control of those who already control the AM ether. But a "consumer" fight for it has been launched by labor.

Another consumer move against this merchant power is the slow process of developing standards for the definition and comparison of products. Only when standards suitable for this purpose have been established, and only when the public has been educated to their use, will goods sell on their merits without regard to the size, antiquity or gagline of the firms that peddle them. Eventually the government may aid the development of such quality criteria for commodity information. Meanwhile its chief proponents are women's clubs which ask for it and consumer co-operatives which supply it. Which will move ahead faster is anyone's guess.

The perennial quarrel with distribution costs comes also into the fight that consumers must make if they are to play their part in turning a plenty of spending power into plenty of products, and jobs producing them. What we spend for distribution services that we want is no more a waste of money than what we pay for the production of the product in the first place. But if we pay for either more than it is worth, we are paying something for nothing, and what is worse are more than likely contributing to monopoly's blood bank.

Since production therefore waits upon selling, and selling has become a primary rather than a secondary pursuit of commerce, the discovery naturally has followed that it is both easy and profitable to sell the consumer many fanciful items of "merchandise" that do not have to be delivered at all. Most obvious of these is pride of ownership — the snob appeal, our masters call it, speaking among themselves. Another is familiarity, the magic of the well-known name, so that high quality actually seems to taste better when the name Heinz is on the label and Clifton Fadiman is on the air. The same magic probably adds flavor when the famous Del Monte label is wrapped around merchandise which, the trade tells me with one voice, is only average quality stuff.

Last January I gave some examples of the things we pay for when we buy distribution, in a talk to the Wholesale Grocers' Association. They are appropriate here:

"When an electric refrigerator that costs $58 at the time it leaves the factory is priced at $155 in the retail store, we think that's just too much. Maybe we are crazy. Maybe we don't know what we're talking about. But mind you the man who finishes off that job in the plant may be the husband of the woman who buys it at the store. Unless husband and wife can get closer together than $58 and $155 on an identical product the institution of the American family is in jeopardy. How can he get enough wages out of $58 to set aside enough so that she can pay $155 when the time comes to buy a refrigerator? I don't believe it works. I believe that little problem in family budgeting is precisely why, all of a sudden one day last 1929, a lot of American bankers began to call their loans.

"Now look at this: The deluxe refrigerator. It cost $10 more to make than that $58 box I was talking about. But when the wife prices it at the dealer's showroom it costs her $225 which is $70 more than the other one. Ten dollars more to make it, seventy more to buy it. Why? Well, I don't know all the answers, but I know one of them is that the salesman spends more time persuading the customer she wants the deluxe model, and therefore she has to pay him more for the extra effort he expends on her. I imagine if she knew how much she was paying him for talking her into paying it to him, they wouldn't get along too well in all cases.

"Getting around to groceries I remember some years ago checking up on a packaged cereal—puffed wheat. Farmers were getting 53 cents a bushel at that time. Three and a half ounces of puffed wheat at the corner grocery cost a dime. Not much money, of course, except that it happens to amount to $24 for a bushel of wheat. At a nearby chain store the same package, same brand name, cost 30 per cent less, $16.00 per bushel of wheat. The consumer co-operative in the town sold its own brand of puffed wheat, a 4-ounce package for 5 cents. Maybe the quality was different, but if so I couldn't eat the difference because I tried both and couldn't tell which was which. Even this co-operative price amounted to $10.50 for a bushel of wheat, just 20 times what the farmer was getting at that time. Let me add that at the same time rolled oats were selling at 7½ cents for a 20-ounce package, and that was equivalent to $1.08 per bushel of oats."

The moral, of course, is that puffed wheat was still a new product at that time, rolled oats were old stuff. The function of fine selling is to

delay as long as may be the descent of a commodity from its early days of novelty and high profit to its ultimate resting place either among forgotten things or among the staples that sell without fanfare. Soap is one of the marvels of longevity in holding out against this fate. Cheap as the dirt it is aimed at, as highly standardized as any commodity might well become, it has been so magnificently merchandised that consumers pay happily almost any price the merchant's imagination may inspire.

Facts about goods, facts about what we pay for what we get, or do not get, will arm consumers against the wastes of distribution. Co-operatives will do more than provide the arms; they will use them. Labor and farm groups made fully aware of the implications of monopoly to their program of interdependent full production and full employment after the war will join the consumer crusade against restriction of output and control of the mass mind.

When labor and farmer become "consumers," they do not therefore forsake their traditional producer role. Rather they shake off the shackles that long have forced them to seek higher producer income only at the risk of facing higher consumer cost. We begin to get wise, together. Labor, farmers, consumers—working class and middle class—get knowledge in these days, and with it power.

THE WOMAN PROBLEM

By ELIZABETH HAWES

ALL THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE in the United States are wondering today whether this country is going to be a "better" one, a more democratic country, after the war—or not.

It is quite clear that a few active citizens cannot get better lives for a majority of people who are totally inactive as citizens. Do-gooders have accomplished all that they can (and that was a lot) by working in a humanitarian fashion.

All genuine do-gooders are faced today with the realization that all the good they can now do must consist in getting all the citizens of our country to go out and do it for themselves. The old basket-carrying days are over.

It is patent to everyone that the women of this country—most of them—say ninety-nine per cent—have never taken any very active part in the affairs of their communities, states, or the nation. It is gradually becoming obvious that, regardless of what the women may be missing for themselves by not going out to get it, the whole country may miss getting any better if nearly half its potential citizens remain inert. If things don't get better, they can only get worse. There is no standing still.

Therefore one of the major problems facing all those seriously interested in a better country is how in the name of heaven the rank and file of women can become active citizens.

There are about 54,000,000 females over 14 years of age, of whom about 19,000,000 are gainfully employed and 34,000,000 are living at someone's else expense—which, incidentally, is the definition of a parasite.

The women of this country are, by and large, the most self-sacrificing human beings imaginable. They constantly do what they are supposed to by tradition or necessity, asking practically nothing for themselves, and grumbling chiefly only to one another (so as not to upset their men). Sometimes women are driven to protesting over their lot right out in public—but they do practically nothing to change their conditions of work, whether at home or outside—and, most important, they always do that work come what may.

Kindly note that I am talking of almost all American women. There are a few beasts among the female population who make such a fuss over doing nothing, or by doing something irritating or useless, that they are often taken for a majority. But this misconception is only in the minds of such people as that Phillip Wylie who described all American women as "Moms" who had stolen their husband's check book to get out of the kitchen. Poor Wylie has known a very restricted number and type of females. The Japanese also believe the United States is a "woman-ridden" country. They are wrong.

There are also American women who make great efforts to improve their own lot and even that of all women (and people), but they are, like the beasts among the sex, very few in number compared to the total. These women deserve a great deal of credit for crusading or pioneering along that road which has led from chattel slavery for all women to partial freedom for most of us. But these women do not present a problem. They are the exceptions, proving the present rule that American women are not yet behaving as citizens.

Women can become useful citizens. What's stopping them? Under what circumstances will they get going?

Let us first take the 34,000,000 nonworkers, most of whom are housewives, some mothers, some maiden aunts, some grandmothers, and so on.

As everyone knows, housewives clean and reclean their old-fashioned houses. They cook the food they manage to buy on the budget (and with the ration stamps)—day after day they cook that food. They struggle about the children's clothes, get the children to school and back—to bed and up—to school—and to the doctor. They send their men to work—or to war. They listen to their men talk, or read what they write, about what goes on in the outside world.

And never does anyone thank or praise that housewife for doing all this endlessly. The husband takes it for granted. The children take it for granted. The nation takes it for granted.

And the housewife goes on doing it. BUT this is not to say she likes it that way. An editor of one of the largest women's magazines told me recently that her magazine did constant research on the psychology, hopes, fears, and desires of housewives through personal contact in interviews all over the country. What the housewives want more than anything, she believes, is to be praised once in a while for something.

Once a housewife got a lot of praise or thanks for things she no longer has to do: for the wonderful jelly, the finely knitted socks, the cornbread—for dozens of things she made or did for the members of her family. Most of these things (made by machines) she now buys in a store.

Furthermore, today girls are most apt to be taught stenography or bookkeeping as a training for becoming a housewife. Practically nobody thinks a female should learn to be a good housewife. Practically everyone, consciously or unconsciously, seems to agree that being a housewife is not a job worth training a girl to do. So most females are bad housewives.

In my belief practically everyone is now of the conscious or unconscious opinion that a simple housewife who contributes nothing much but children to the society in which she lives is a social parasite. The housewife wants praise and she can't get it by being a housewife, or a mother. So she has become rather slipshod at both jobs.

It is quite clear that a community, or state, or nation can only function today by the overt action of the individuals who make it up. Those who do not act in behalf of the group get no praise for their parasitical behavior. A century ago it was still O. K. to be a simple housewife. Today it isn't. But very seldom does anyone come out and say so loudly enough to encourage the housewife to do something more praiseworthy.

The trouble is not that the housewives do not want to change their status. They do not know what to do or how to do it. They are afraid to try. A basic reason for the fear is that any change of attitude may lose the housewife her means of support. The husbands of most housewives do not wish their wives to do anything except be on hand to take care of the children and get the meals. Someone has to be on hand for that and it is much easier to let things go along as is than to risk any change which might result in the loss of the nurse, cook, laundry woman, or cleaning woman.

Personally, as a working woman, I have sympathy for this narrow point of view. If I could have a good little housewife in my home, it would be dandy—for me. Not for her, or the community.

The beautiful myth that women are too wonderful to go out and work in horrid old industry, that "we protect our women" by keeping them in their lovely homes—that sort of talk is just a cover for keeping women from competing with men on their own ground in an insecure society where there have never been enough jobs or praise to go around.

The majority of housewives are under no illusion as to their lack of freedom.

It is of course much more difficult to get housewives active as citizens than it is to get working women active. One thing that is badly needed so far as activizing housewives is concerned, is a very broad educational campaign aimed at their men. The men must ultimately see that as long as there is a large inert mass of inactive citizens in the United States the country can't move forward very fast. Since moving forward means more for the majority (the arrival of the day of the common man) the educational campaign can at least be limited to the middle and lower class. The upper classes have nothing to lose by the present situation. That educational campaign is a long-term project.

Meanwhile, housewives have initiated a good deal of group work during this war which shows promise of more if properly fostered. I am not referring to Red Cross work. I am not referring to a little job done here and there for the OPA or to any other wartime activity.

For example, there has been a lot of talk about group care of children of working mothers during this war. It put ideas into the heads of housewives, to whose children the doors of wartime nurseries were closed. Women who never in their lives before dreamt of pooling their children for an afternoon or evening have taken to the practice in a big way. In some instances this has led to the development of co-operative nursery school groups. It is a very hard job to organize even a few mothers for a pooling system, an almost insurmountable job to make a co-operative nursery. But it has been done.

Now, attention, please. Many, probably the majority, of the mothers who have engaged in this activity did not do it so they could have time free to do some "worthy" work. They did it because they wanted some time off in which to relax.

Many large pressure groups were organized to work for more nursery schools in public schools. Mothers learned to appear at city councils, lobby at state capitols, wire Congress—mothers who were not war workers, who probably haven't given a drop of blood, or rolled a single bandage. Mothers went out to get playgrounds opened with supervisors for their children after school. They lobbied for hot school lunches—not because they thought it better for their children not to have to rush home at noon, but because the mother didn't want to get the lunch.

And the motives of these women have been questioned, sometimes by people who are so terribly high-minded they think it's wrong to try and make your own life better; more often by people whose children go to private schools and who don't like to see their tax money used to provide children in public schools with what private school children always have.

If the housewives of the United States are to become active as citizens, projects must be put before them which are going to better their own lives, going to lighten the conditions of their work, and lighten them as immediately as possible. There is nothing wrong with trying to get a better life. The point is to learn it cannot be done individually any more. Now we must act in groups.

Do-gooders have got to cease dreaming up lovely things which they think they can do FOR housewives—like making better public schools for children, with nursery schools and lunches and the whole works. Do-gooders have got to find out exactly what the housewives in any given ward want. Then the Do-gooder can expect some of the housewives to get busy working for whatever it is. It'll be something useful, never mind the motivation. The motives of the men who built up our great industries were to make money for themselves, but nevertheless the industries turned out as useful as they were great.

The average housewife today has little or no interest in Mr. X who runs the board of education—but when she finds out that Mr. X is the guy who is making it necessary for her to get her child's lunch every day, she'll go out and do a job on him in the next election campaign. And she'll go out and do that job whether her husband likes it or not!

If, in order to get the housewives of this country to take a part in it, a few Do-gooders have to forget Dumbarton Oaks and the Atlantic Charter for a while, nothing will be lost in the long run. And if, in the process of arousing the housewives, a few homes are broken up, one can only say they couldn't have been very well stuck together at the start.

As to making more active citizens of women workers in this country, that's a good hard job, but easier than with the housewives by far.

Of the 19,000,000 women working today, about 85 per cent would be working, war or no war. This is proved by government statistics on the steady increase of women into gainful employment since 1870.

The mental condition of many of these women is shown by the fact that although a good many of them know full well they will continue to work after the war, they say, when questioned, that they do not want jobs. Do you know why they say that? They mentally go through the process of thinking that the men will need all the jobs after the war, so they must say they don't want one.

This is why, when the United Auto Workers, CIO, polled their women members on this subject, they asked: If there is a job for you after the war, do you want it? They received eighty-five per cent affirmative response—an answer which checks with the government figures.

It is a known fact that the entrance of women into industry in this war has cut wage rates as it did in the last war. This is not because the unions did not fight for equal pay, for the Auto Workers and the United Electrical Workers won the WLB decision calling for equal pay. But too many women have been willing to accept unequal pay without fighting.

Too many women have been willing to become skilled workers and remain in unskilled pay classifications.

And too many men have not understood that in allowing this to happen, they have in reality cut the pay of all workers.

Too often in a union education meeting a woman will get up and say, "But I don't think any woman should have any right to a job if any man needs it," or "Why should women get the same pay as men?" There is always a man around to agree with that woman—and help crack up the seniority system and lower everyone's wages. But there is always another woman present who believes a worker is a worker and should have identical pay and seniority regardless of sex. And there is always a man who agrees with that woman. So there is an argument. And a few more people begin to understand that you can't let any worker's pay or working conditions fall below anyone else's without undermining the whole system.

(Whereas when that housewife suggests to her husband that she would like to go to a meeting every Thursday night, there is no one around to help her put her point across.)

It's true that most women union members never come to a meeting—and that most women workers are not yet organized except in a few major industries. Fewer women come to union meetings than men—but

very few of either sex take an active part. There are problems of transportation for both sexes, insurmountable problems most of the time.

But a lot of women who might secretly like to come to a union meeting, to take part in their club, don't do it because "a union is the men's affair." They'll join—but let the men run it. The women, most of them, will not speak at all on any subject as long as there is a man in the room. They have been taught to be quiet on matters outside the home, so well taught that many of them don't dare raise their voices in front of men even when it is their own business.

And it has to be admitted that many men do not want women to become active in unions. It is normal to want to keep power when once you've gotten it. Men built most unions, control them, and don't want to lose control.

I would like to reiterate that I am talking of the majority of working women. A few women have come to the fore in all unions. The Auto Workers, a union which had scarcely a woman member three years ago now has about one-third women members. Sixty per cent of the locals with women members, and those are the biggest locals, have a woman member on the executive board. That is a fine record.

But the leading union women, like the leading men, are cracking their heads hourly on the question of getting the mass of women active. Unfortunately, since practically all unions were organized through more or less violent strike action and usually on the matter of pay, it is difficult for some union leaders to realize that new workers, particularly women, can become active along other lines.

Women in organized industries, usually in industry for the first time, are earning the highest pay they ever got. They aren't interested in more pay, don't care too much about raising the Little Steel formula. Like housewives, they don't connect their problems much with community or state or federal government. They do not feel they have a real voice in their government.

Like housewives, they are afraid of losing their jobs if they place their grievances before the management and demand better conditions. And, like housewives, they have plenty of grievances in every shop. To many men, a lot of these grievances seem silly. Men use dirty rest rooms. Why not women? Men don't have a place to sit. Why should women? Men put up with bad food in the shop. Why do the women squawk?

So the majority of the women stop squawking—except when they are alone. Then they'll tell you what they want—and they'll listen to and discuss suggestions on how they can get it. And if they can plan a way to have a lot of women all place a grievance at once, then they aren't afraid to do it.

In the course of trying to get better food in the cafeteria or some chairs in the rest room, women find out first how the union machinery works. They also find out about the laws in their state, about the Mr. X's who are blocking something they want.

Presently they become bold enough, in the absence of men, to bring up the fact they are not getting equal pay or an equal chance at a better job. They begin to learn about the War Labor Board.

Of course it's easier to start women workers into action than to start housewives. The workers are all together every day. They always have a common shop problem. And they are more self-assured than the average housewife, because they know they are turning out the goods. They're doing a job someone wants done enough to pay them money to do it. And they can do their jobs as well as any men in the shop, often better. They all know that.

They aren't fooled by veiled male condescension. When an inept male addresses a meeting of women workers and patters along about how "if the girls want to have a tea party, I'll be glad to come," the speaker is greeted in stony silence. No one slaps him down, but as the meeting breaks up, he is softly cursed from one side of the room to the other. If there is one thing women workers do not want to do, it is to get into a fight with the men. And that is lucky because the provocation is often great.

If the women industrial workers are keeping quiet, it is rather from tradition and from lack of knowledge of how to speak and act than from actual fear of the men with whom they are joined together in their work and in their unions.

The problem of making these women into active citizens is partly a problem of educating the men with whom they work. But this education takes place slowly in the very process of work. Highly paid men see themselves lose their jobs to women who are equally skilled but who have remained in low wage classifications. That teaches 'em. Men see women successfully fighting workers' grievances with foremen, doing hard jobs

in the shop—and in the union. And gradually an equality is built up between the sexes. Slow—but very sure.

That many of the women workers are first concerned with personal, small shop problems is not odd. There is no sense in any Do-gooder, union leader or outsider, being irritated with them.

The men who organized the great unions did it for their own small personal benefit. They simply wanted more pay in their envelopes and human working conditions. That the result of organizing to get these things raised the standard of living of every worker in the country was not the first thought of the majority of early union members.

It is all very well to keep screaming that we must win the war and the peace; that Teheran was important, and what went on in Greece was hell; that every American must exercise his democratic right to vote; that there must be 60,000,000 jobs at decent pay after the war; that the public school system must be revised and bettered; that Abraham Lincoln was a great man and we have a great democratic tradition in our country, including Tom Paine.

It's all very well to recognize the fact that saying woman's place is in the home is a tried and true Hitler tactic; that only a fascist would say the role of woman is "kitchen, children, church."

And it is all important to see that if we do not succeed in broadening our democracy, we are very likely to find ourselves going backward into a fascist state. Because that is what will happen if we don't go ahead. And the women of this country with their tendency to keep quiet, to individualistic rather than group behavior on the one hand, and doing what some man says on the other, these women are a fine base for fascism.

But—"I'm just a simple woman, see? I'm supposed to keep house and take care of the kids and I do. I go to work every day and I do my work O.K. and I get paid and I go home. Don't start telling me I'm not doing my duty as a citizen. I'm doing all that anyone ever taught me to do—all that anyone ever expected my mother or grandmother or great grandmother to do—and even more."

"I'm just a woman. I don't know about politics. Why should I learn about unions? They're for men. I'll probably be out of this job soon—but I'll get another somewhere—like I had before."

"Any little thing I'd like? Well—an electric icebox. Can't have it now? Vacuum cleaner? No? A seat by my machine? Well—my foreman

told me—what? Really? How'd they do it? And the kids get a hot lunch at school every day???? You mean it's just up to the superintendent of the school? You mean they have 'em over in that other school?"

Nobody needs to make a blueprint of what the women of America want and need. The women know. They need dozens of things to lighten the conditions of their work at home or in the shops.

But—the mass of women in America have never been encouraged to go out and get any of these things. As a group they have been patronized to their faces and laughed at behind their backs by the very men who so assiduously profess to love and admire and protect them. They have been discouraged at every turn from becoming active citizens.

All that the majority of women need is to be shown how they can get the things they want so much. They have the brains and the energy to do the job—the job which can only be done in groups, which will inevitably result in their becoming active citizens—which will help let all our people go ahead.

FASCISM AND THE GERMAN MIDDLE CLASS

By FRIEDA WUNDERLICH

WHEN A GALLUP POLL was taken some years ago in the United States asking people whether they felt they belonged to the upper, middle or lower class of society, some 80 per cent chose the middle class. A poll in Germany before the rise of Hitlerism would have shown very different results. Wage earners in Germany—even if skilled and well paid—were proud to be proletarian, and it may have been a feeling of inferiority combined with the traditional adoration of the leading feudal class which, on the other hand, aroused the longing in large middle-class groups in Germany to belong to the upper strata of society. Election returns showed the attraction of parties of the right to middle-class people, who could there mingle with those groups to which they aspired to belong.

I

Who made up the middle class in Germany? There is no exact definition possible. A widespread explanation distinguished the old and the new middle class, allocating to the new the salaried employees and civil servants. Of these two latter groups, only a small percentage called themselves proletarians and united with wage earners in voicing Socialist doctrines and following the same political and trade union policy. Their number would have been still smaller had not the Social Democratic Party and the free trade unions been in command of many jobs for which party membership was a necessary condition. Thus many officials who relied on political influence for their careers, and employees of consumer co-operatives had no choice but to organize with the Socialist unions, which, moreover, proved attractive to technical employees and some of the lowest-paid groups of commercial and office employees. That their feeling of proletarian solidarity was not too strong, however, can be inferred from many indications. For example, the Socialist unions were never able to combine wage earners with white collar workers in the same unions, although it was their philosophy that they should be so

united. And when the Socialist white collar workers' unions published a program for unification of the separate agencies of invalidity insurance for manual and nonmanual workers, the election returns to the institutions showed so great a desire of white collar workers to maintain separate status that the Socialist union program had to be changed to prevent loss of membership.

The first group of the new middle class, the salaried employees, was far from uniform. It embraced commercial employees occupied in distribution, clerical employees in factories and all kinds of offices such as law and public administration, technical employees, and semi-professionals. In the prewar period these groups had differed from wage earners particularly because of their chances for social and economic advancement and possible independence. Their position was more secure, their standard higher. With growing concentration, bureaucratization, and specialization of business and mechanization of office work, the number of salaried employees rose—by 66 per cent from 1907 to 1925—while their position became less stable.[1] Their working conditions and wages became less favorable. Salaried work ceased to be a transition to independent work. Realization of the sociological change, of the necessity to defend their status against deterioration and to match the growing power of organized wage earners, resulted in the formation of trade unions paralleling the wage earners' unions. Three movements developed—a socialistic movement, a liberal-democratic movement, both organizing men and women together, and a third in which the German National Union of Commercial Employees, an organization of men, cartelized with a women's union, took the leadership.

At first, white collar workers seemed to be equally attracted by the two non-Socialist groups, with a somewhat weaker appeal by the Socialists. During the fourteen years before the rise of Hitlerism, however, the German National Union of Commercial Employees grew in power—even during the depression years. Its ideology, which stressed that commercial employees were skilled workers forming an estate of their own

[1]As Hans Speier has rightly shown (*The Salaried Employee in German Society*, Vol. I, translated under the auspices of WPA, New York 1939, p. 14) the stratification of salaried employees resembled that of a pyramid the broad base of which "rested on a proletarian plane while its apex reached into the sphere of high capitalism."

which protected them against proletarization, appealed to the middle-class aspirations of the white-collar group.

This attraction of salaried employees to a middle-class ideology can be only partly explained by the fact that many continued to work in small shops in which the relation to the employer remained personal. Nor can the resistance to the proletarian ideology be explained by a growing attraction to National Socialism. Only the numerically small semi-professional group, wedged between the working class and the professions, and lacking the power of the former and the prestige of the latter, were so frustrated that many of them fell prey to Nazi propaganda. Not quite immune to the lure of getting rid of gifted Jewish competitors were banking employees, who had always considered themselves the elite of the white-collar group. Consequently large numbers of discharged army officers entered their ranks after World War I; so did the sons of the impoverished *bourgeoisie* after the period of inflation. Most of them were discontented elements, attracted by the Nazi promise of prestige. Of the large masses of white-collar workers, however, the unemployed were mainly caught by the propaganda of those who promised them jobs and security. Only during the last few months before the Nazis came to power did they begin to attract the employed white-collar workers.

So also must the second group of the new middle class, the civil servants, be placed in those ranks. Although the living conditions of the middle and lower strata (which had deteriorated during the inflation period and risen thereafter) were slashed in the depression, the civil servants enjoyed life tenure and pension rights, and regarded themselves as representatives of the state. As far as they did not owe office to political influence or hope to achieve promotion thereby, they remained neutral in party politics. Only when Nazi victory seemed certain did many officials try to insure themselves by seeking party membership. When, therefore, the rise of Nazism is blamed to a large degree upon the German middle class, we must exclude the civil servants and salaried employees, and look to the old middle class.

II

Who made up the old middle class? According to traditional conceptions, those engaged independently in handicraft, trade, transportation, agriculture (except large estate owners), and members of the liberal

professions were included. Schmoller,[2] who found such categorization confusing, regarded not members of certain social groups but people with medium incomes as middle class. There was, however, no uniform opinion on the size of income and property characterizing the class. In fact, the middle class was determined by a combination of factors, such as occupation, size of enterprise, income and property, and—not least—an ideology of their own. The small farmer and the small businessman, craftsman as well as trader, formed the core of the old middle class.

Handicraft and trade in Germany, as in other European countries, are in part the successors of the bourgeois class which dominated the late medieval town. The artistic houses in old German towns still testify to the well-to-do status of their former owners. The growth of industrialization and big business threatened the number and wealth of these classes. Handicraft was endangered from two sides. Part of it disappeared where industry revolutionized production (soap boilers, tilers, turners), and another part was reduced to repair and auxiliary enterprises (watchmakers, shoemakers, blacksmiths). The Marxian prophecy which ascribed future leadership to the wage-earning class condemned the middle class to wither away, to be gradually destroyed by big business and recurring depressions of growing force. The prediction of doom seemed to be confirmed by the absorption of independent skilled craftsmen into industries. While at first the Marxian prophecy seemed to come true, the remaining enterprises consolidated and adjusted their methods to capitalistic production, which meant not only a change to machinery but from work for the customer to work for the market combined with exact calculation. Craftsmen began to combine workshops with retail shops or to specialize production. After the first shock had been overcome, a process of concentration began which led to the reduction of the smallest shops (in 1925, however, these still formed 87.1 per cent of the total) and to an increase in middle and large shops.[3]

According to the census of 1933, 1,731,086 industrial establishments (90.9 per cent of the total) employed not more than five persons (3,049,362

[2]G. Schmoller, *Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstand?* Verhandlungen des 8. evangelisch sozialen Kongresses. Göttingen 1897, pp. 157 ff.

[3]Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugung und Abstazbedingunger der deutschen Wirtschaft. *Das Deutsche Handwerk (Generalbericht)*, Berlin 1930, Vol. 1, p. 3.

=33.9 per cent of the total)[4] as compared to 41.4 per cent and 2.1 per cent respectively in the United States. Even if repair shops, small business service shops which do not appear in American statistics, were excluded the enormous difference would still indicate the cleavage in the economic structures of the two countries. The German economy was less mechanized than the American, and the share of the artisan was larger. An official committee investigating handicrafts found that there were 1,307,867 artisan enterprises on October 1, 1926 employing 3,713,522 persons.[5] During the depression the number of artisan enterprises fell to 1,506,556 in 1933.

However, the increase in the number of enterprises is no indication of inner strength. In fact, since the beginning of industrialization artisans had felt so insecure that they joined the opposition against the freedom of trade which was introduced in the beginning of the nineteenth century and confirmed by the first industrial code of the Empire.[6] Artisans demanded restrictions which they more or less succeeded in obtaining before the first World War. Although access to industrial and commercial enterprises remained open, administrative licenses and permits were required for the setting up and carrying on of business in numerous fields. The right to keep apprentices was made dependent upon the passing of a master examination.[7] The endeavor to make all artisan corporations (*Innungen*), which had replaced the old guilds, compulsory by statute did not succeed, however.[8] Artisans tried by self-help to overcome their weak position as competitors of big business. They developed a whole network of co-operatives of various kinds—for credit, for the purchase

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[4]Source: "Gewerbliche Betriebszählung," in *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs,* Vol. 462 (Berlin 1935), Part 2, pp. 12ff., 58ff. Owners of artisan shops represented 72.9 per cent of all owners and managers in industry, their employees nearly one-third of all employees in industry.

[5]Ausschuss zur Untersuchung, etc., *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[6]"Gewerbeordnung of June 21, 1869," *Bundesgesetzblatt für den Norddeutschen Bund* 1869, p. 245.

[7]Statute of May 30, 1908. *(Reichsgesetzblatt,* p. 356).

[8]Only by majority decision of the artisans exercising a craft in a given locality could membership in a corporation be made compulsory. Moreover, compulsory corporations were limited in their economic activities, e.g. price fixing. In 1933, 83 per cent of all members of corporations were in compulsory organizations.

of raw materials and supplies, for organization of sales or joint use of equipment and power.

Small trade too had expanded in spite of the change in the social and economic structure. The figure of small shops employing one to five persons had increased from 603,209 in 1895 to 813,187 in 1933.[9] In the latter year enterprises employing up to five persons totaled 96.4 per cent of all enterprises and employed 73.7 per cent of all persons employed in retail trade. Shops with one to ten persons represented 98.8 per cent of all establishments. Small shops had increased more rapidly than the population. However, they found a superior competitor in department stores, against which they had fought from the time that type of business was started. In the prewar period this fight had succeeded in the imposition of a special sales surtax on department stores and chain stores. The tax had been shifted, however, and had done only harm to the small businessman. A second undesirable competitor were consumer co-operatives, which enjoyed privileges in lower taxes and cheaper credits from public funds. In 1932 department stores did 2.7 per cent of all sales, chain stores 7 per cent, five-and-ten-cent stores 1.3 per cent, consumer co-operatives 4.6 per cent, mail order concerns 4.3 per cent.[10] But their competition was more serious than these figures would indicate. The department stores, large specialty stores and consumer co-operatives demanded cash payment. The small shop in workers' districts was left with the "poor" customer, and forced to extend insecure credit to him in order to remain in business. The growth of small trade was far from sound, especially during the depression, when many unemployed persons started small shops.

After the World War the struggle for existence became more intense. The necessity of competing with large-scale business and with combinations continued and intensified. War and postwar inflation accelerated industrial concentration, new chain stores and department stores were springing up. Currency inflation revealed to the middle-class groups in industry and trade their vulnerability. Their savings disappeared, and with them economic security protecting them from proletarization. Stocks could not be replenished with the depreciated paper money they received

[9]"Gewerbliche Betriebszählung," *ibid.*

[10]Yielding to pressure of small business, Chancellor Brüning, by Emergency Decree of March 9, 1932 (*Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 121) and Decree of December 23, 1932 (*Ibid.* I, p. 571) forbade the opening of new five-and-ten-cent stores.

from their customers. Artisans often had to pay more for the new raw materials than they received for their finished products. Assets of credit co-operatives were destroyed. Although many sectors of the population suffered, the small businessman believed that he had to bear the brunt.

The rising power of labor, which challenged the paternalistic attitude of the small employer, brought new severe tests. Wages and social insurance dues increased, expenditures for the working class for housing and welfare work were supported by public taxation. The middle class looked with deep resentment upon the improving status of the wage earner which seemed to contribute to the pauperization of the independent businessman.

Another factor of insecurity was the unfriendly attitude of socialistically influenced public authorities who believed public enterprises to be the beginning of industrial democracy. Attempts to satisfy the enormous needs of a large city either by publicly-owned production or by purchases in co-operative stores aroused resentment and political opposition of the groups endangered. What seemed to loom up before them was a choice of being crushed either by the socialization policy of the government or by industrial monopolies. As early as 1925 nearly one-third of all artisans and more than one-third of all retailers had incomes no higher than or even below those of laborers. There seemed to be no recognized ideological status, either. The working class sneeringly called them bourgeois, while the upper *bourgeoisie* looked down on them as *"Spiesser"* (philistines).

The depression brought the severest trial. It was the last straw. Millions felt degraded to a proletarian level of poverty or loss of independence. The cumulative effect of sufferings from revolutionary disorder and inflation losses while others had profiteered, the dread of social degradation, seemed too much to bear.

The threat to their very existence and standards increased the feeling of solidarity within the middle class. Retailers and craftsmen had organized into associations and national federations which gave publicity to the plight of their members, stressed their contribution to civilization, and demanded government protection. They had fought prison labor and consumer co-operatives, had demanded credit facilities with government assistance, consideration for the artisan and small tradesman in the purchase of supplies by public authorities, and cessation of government participation in business.

The political parties of the right competed for their votes by promising help against socialization and offering parliamentary seats to small businessmen. A special Economic Party (*Wirtschaftspartei*) was formed for the protection of the independent middle class. Most demagogical in their promises were the members of the Nazi Party, who pretended to stand for abolition of department-, chain-, and 5-and-10 cent stores, and of public enterprises; for division of war and inflation profits; for the fight against big business; and promised to eliminate Jewish competitors. They promised to protect profits and property and the home; they appealed to patriotic sentiment, a plea which the democratic government had neglected. They succeeded in directing the resentment of the small businessman against the Weimar Republic, which had imposed such a heavy burden of taxation and social legislation upon the little man without granting him the same security or the restriction of competition he demanded. Many of them flocked to the Nazi party.

Ground between big business, government enterprises, and the decreasing buying power of the impoverished masses, in constant fear of being thrown into the witch cauldron of proletarization, the small businessmen became the backbone of the Nazi party which promised to crush the competing powers and which—as they thought—would restore the world as it had been. Too late the Socialists realized that they had neglected to win the group which, according to Marxian philosophy, should have disintegrated and automatically turned Socialist, but did not.

III

Although in Germany small and middle-sized farms prevail,[11] it was the big land owners, the Junkers, who controlled agricultural Germany and whose leadership was accepted by the little man. The Junkers dominated the army, the bureaucracy, and the crown in the imperial Reich. Following the liberation of the peasants until the '70's, agriculture had been prosperous. When, however, it began to face world market competition with lower prices, when its artificially enriched soils had to compete with virgin soils overseas, agriculture began to suffer. A Farmer's League (*Bund der Landwirte*), founded in 1893 under the leadership

[11]In 1925 60.8 per cent of all German farms were family farms on which only members of the family were employed while 22 per cent were owner-worked without any help whatever. Only 17.2 per cent of the farms hired workers.

of large-estate owners for stimulating a high protective tariff policy, was joined by owners of holdings of all sizes. A German Peasant Association (founded in 1909), which emphasized promotion of peasant interests only and which co-operated with the urban middle class, gained much less importance. The League in defending the threatened privileges of the large owners found the willing co-operation of the small owners, though the interests of the groups were not the same. High tariffs on grain in which large-estate owners were interested increased prices of feed for the livestock-raising small-holder.

Like the craftsman, farmers developed a well planned system of credit and other co-operatives, partly based on self-help, partly established with government assistance. Credit societies and co-operatives for the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, feed, cattle, machines, dairies helped especially the small and middle-sized farmer to overcome his weakness in the market.

The revolutionary movement following the first World War was essentially an urban movement. With exception of a brief Soviet episode in Bavaria, it did not stir up the rural population. Peasant and worker councils formed in the revolutionary period were of short existence. In 1921 as a counter-revolutionary measure the farmers were rallied by large-estate owners to the National League of Agrarians (*Reichslandbund*) a fusion of the former Farmer's League with other agricultural associations. Two peasant organizations remained outside. The agrarians made skilful use of the *Reichslandbund* for gaining political control of the peasantry who had no clear program of their own and had failed to produce leaders in its own ranks.

That their attempts were successful was partly due to the failure of the democratic parties to win the followership of the peasants (with the exception of the Catholic Center Party). Although the Republic embarked on a large program of peasant settlements and in fact succeeded in creating more than 57,400 new peasant holdings in the fourteen years of democratic regime and enlarging another 96,100, they failed to develop a program which appealed to the peasant. The Social Democratic Party, the largest and leading party until the depression, remained unshaken in their Marxist belief in the large estate. According to their view the economic development of the country depended on large-scale production and in such a program the lower middle-class group of small farmers had no place.

That the Social Democratic Party shrank from alliance with the small farmers for the fight against the depression helped to drive them to the opposition.

Since operating capital had been exhausted during the inflation period, farmers had to ask for new credits which could be provided only at very high interest rates. The heavy burden of taxation resulting from defeat in war, the high cost of machine equipment and fertilizers, the ease of getting credit, resulted in new debts with even higher interest payments than before the war. Although small farmers were working harder and living more frugally than ever an alarming number of farms succumbed to foreclosure and forced sale during the depression. This gave the last stab to sympathies of farmers with the democratic regime.

Family farmers in some parts of Germany had at first been not unfriendly to the Revolution and supported the parties of the Weimar coalition. They were tired of war—they had paid a heavy death toll, the rural population having provided a high percentage of soldiers. They were opposed to the bureaucratic wartime regimentation and to the rigid price control which prevented their making use of a favorable market while industry profited unrestrictedly. But the new regime had to continue the system which kept agricultural prices down in order to secure a fair distribution of the food supply. Aversion against this system of control created a community of interest between the big owners and the small. With the introduction of stabilization of the currency, small farmers resented the heavy tax burden, high interest-rate, and social-insurance dues and wages. Their feeling of insecurity resulted in antagonism to the Republic and the democratic regime which seemed unable to restore security.

Large-land owners were dissatisfied as well, in spite of huge subsidies they received. They became embittered when large agricultural enterprises ceased to be profitable at the end of the '20's. The *Reichslandbund* joined the National Front, with a "national" dictatorship as its aim.

Meanwhile the National Socialists, the partners in the National Front, had used the economic disaster to stir peasants to revolt against the state, the tax collector, and the sheriff. The peasants, even those who at first had been friendly to the regime, soon became inimical with growing distress. "The peasant sees in the official who attaches his grain, in the auctioneer who brings the indebted farm under the hammer the per-

sonification of the state bringing him ruin in the service of mammon." It was not difficult, therefore, for agitators to incite a kind of peasant war which in Schleswig Holstein became open revolt, in other parts took the form of passive resistance. In the summer and fall of 1928 farmers in some parts of the country began to refuse to pay taxes because of the increase in foreclosures; to prevent forced sales by violence and to refuse co-operation to the regime. *Reichslandbund* leaders, Steel Helmets, Nazis, and members of the so called *Landvolk* movement which had originated in militant opposition to the regime poked the fire. Attacks on tax collectors and courthouses occurred. With appeal to the plight of the farmer and his animosity to the democratic regime, especially the Social Democrats, by promising all the farmers themselves had demanded, reduction, even abolition of interest rates, prohibition of importation of food produced in Germany, restriction of trade profits, lowering of taxes and social insurance dues, security of tenure, the National Socialists succeeded in 1930-1932 in attracting the rural population in many non-Catholic parts of the country. Of Schleswig Holstein where the party obtained 63.8 per cent of the rural vote on July 31, 1932, Heberle writes: "In the summer of 1932 only three rural groups still stood outside: the owners of large estates, or rather the older generation among them; the richest farmers and part of the working class."[12]

* * *

Thus the old middle classes in their resentment against growing economic insecurity and against the democratic regime which they blamed for it were preparing the way for the revolution. They supported the party which promised a new system, which appealed to their national sentiment and promised fulfilment of all aspirations of the peasant and small businessman. However, not all of them succumbed, and they were not the only groups to follow the drum. Other factors besides class structure determine political attitudes. Thus the artisan and small tradesman of Baden and Wurtemberg succumbed more slowly and to a lesser degree

[12]Rudolf Heberle, "The political movement among the rural people in Schleswig Holstein," *The Journal of Politics,* February-March 1943, pp. 133-4. Heberle shows that "certain elements of thought akin to Nazi ideology had attained wide dispersion even before the National Socialist Party consolidated the more militant currents of counter revolutionary opposition in the democratic regime" (p. 140).

to Nazi propaganda than those in Hesse or Bavaria, because many of them had democratic family traditions dating back to 1848. Farmers in Catholic districts resisted the Nazi lure, partly because the Catholic Church, which could not but reject the new ideology, was more deeply rooted in the population than the Protestant Church, partly because Catholicism was politically organized and Protestantism was not.

The Nazi party penetrated nearly all strata of society except employed urban wage earners. From 1919 to 1932 the members of the middle class had migrated from party to party. The establishment of dictatorship made it possible for them to shift to other political affiliations as they had done in the past. Too late it was realized that they had lived up to the German proverb: *Nur die allergrössten Kälber wählen ihren Metzger selber* (Only the most stupid calves vote for their own butcher).

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE: IV. THE MIDDLE CLASS

By LEWIS COREY

THERE ARE, obviously, specific economic problems of the peace that must be tackled and solved. But they cannot be separated from the historical drive toward over-all changes in economic institutions and values. Nor can these changes be separated from changes in class relations and in class-political power, among other reasons because the *direction* in which social change moves is affected by human consciousness and action.

What labor and the farmers decide to do on the specific and over-all problems is important. But just as important is what the middle class decides to do. While the old middle class of small independent enterprisers may not be much of an economic power, because of monopoly domination, it is still an influential, ideological, and political force. And the new middle class of salaried employees, especially the technical-managerial and professional personnel, possesses the technical, administrative and educational skills without which the old society cannot carry on or a new society be built. The middle class will face specific postwar economic problems of its own. Will small enterprise shrink still more or grow again? Will economic expansion be enough to bring full employment for technical-managerial personnel and higher pay for white collar workers? Will rising incomes multiply the demand for professional services, including the services of teachers? Finally, will the technical-scientific and educational talents of the new middle class be used for peace or war? All these specific problems of the middle class tie in with the larger problem of over-all social change.

1. *Changes in Class Relations*

Class relations have developed differently from the expectations of the early democratic and socialist philosophers. Democrats foresaw the continuation and expansion of a middle-class democracy of small independent producers, in which a majority of the people draw their livelihood from property which they work and own. The early socialists, including Marx, prophesied that middle-class democracy was doomed by the con-

centration of industry and of property ownership, and the prophecy is largely fulfilled. But the Marxists were wrong, too, for there is no fulfillment of their prophecy of a rapid, inevitable polarization of classes into proletariat and bourgeoisie, with the virtual eclipse of the middle class.

Evidence is overwhelming that the early democrats were wrong. The middle class of small independent enterprisers grew in absolute numbers from 1870 to 1910 but underwent a relative decline; since 1910 the numerical size of the class has remained virtually stationary while it has considerably shrunk as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons. (Table 1.) Its economic power has shrunk even more than its numerical strength because of increasing monopoly domination.

But while it has declined the old middle class has not disappeared, and it is still a class-political force to reckon with. Moreover, a *new* middle

Table 1—Class Divisions in the United States: 1870-1940

(In thousands)	1940	1930	1920	1910	1870
I. Farmers	5,265	6,012	6,387	6,132	3,100
1. Owners	3,227	3,463	3,954	3,864	2,325
2. Tenants	2,038	2,549	2,433	2,268	775
II. Working Class	29,518	25,813	22,665	19,730	6,035
1. Industrial	16,124	16,198	15,118	12,982	3,225
a) Manufactures	9,250*	9,150	9,450	7,425	1,812
b) Mining	824	887	982	862	179
c) Transportation	2,950*	2,961	2,386	2,204	465
d) Construction	3,100*	3,200	2,300	2,490	768
2. Farm Laborers	2,312	2,606	2,217	2,658	1,500*
3. Other Workers	11,082	7,456	5,329	4,089	1,310
III. Middle Class	16,633	14,884	11,682	8,870	2,289
1. Old—Enterprisers	3,863	3,751	3,350	3,261	1,532*
a) Business	3,382	3,304	2,943	2,895	1,304
b) Professional	481	446	406	366	128
2. New—Salaried	12,769	11,580	8,332	5,609	756
a) Technical-M'g'rial	2,062	1,966	1,527	999	129
b) Professional	2,660	2,413	1,581	1,179	204
c) Clerical	3,889	3,345	2,719	1,403	68
d) Salespeople	3,347	3,003	1,877	1,595	282
e) Public Service	439	418	290	208	48
IV. Upper Bourgeoisie	240	300	200	...	...
Total	51,656	47,457	40,935	34,733	11,424

*Partly estimated.

The final totals are all persons "gainfully occupied" or "the labor force" (new Census terminology) minus unpaid family farm workers. "Labor force" and "gainfully occupied" are not strictly comparable; the 1940 total is "labor force" and would be slightly higher if the older concept had been used.

Under "manufactures" are included some workers not working in factories. "Transportation" includes workers in communication industries. "Farm Laborers" includes only hired wage-workers. The "salaried" total includes "unspecified" salaried employees and telephone and telegraph operators (See Table 7). "Salespeople" includes "clerks" in stores. "Public Service" includes federal, state and local officials, police personnel and probation officers; it excludes doorkeepers, laborers and other wage-workers; and does not include the much larger total in government service.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

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class of salaried employees has come into being that, since 1870, has grown faster than the proletariat.[1]

Let us look at Table 1 again. The working class increased slowly from around 53 per cent of all gainfully occupied persons in 1870 to a peak of 57 per cent in 1910; then it fell to 55 per cent in 1920, was stationary in the 1920's, and rose again to 57 per cent in 1940.[2] But "working class" includes farm laborers and workers in domestic and personal service, while

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[1]Marx, with the foresight of genius, had glimpses of the new class development. "As modern society develops," said the *Communist Manifesto,* "the petty bourgeoisie sees the moment approaching when it will cease to exist as an independent section of modern society, *to be replaced,* in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, *by managers, superintendents and foremen.*" In *Capital* Marx saw the increasing significance of management: "Not the industrial capitalist but the industrial managers are 'the soul of our industrial system' . . . management as a function [being] more and more separated from the ownership of capital." And in *Theorien uber den Mehrwert* (v. III, pp. 59-60) Marx said: "That the middle class should grow and the proletariat, employed in production, become a relatively smaller part, even if it grows absolutely, of the whole population . . . is in fact the course of bourgeois society." These were glimpses that the orthodox Marxists never developed.

[2]The "gain" in 1940 was primarily a post-depression result of unemployment and the slowing down of gains in professional and salaried occupations. It was not the expression of an upward trend in the working class but of a downward trend in the expansion of capitalism. It is worth noting that, of the roughly 7,000,000 increase in all workers from 1920 to 1940, around 1,750,000 were accounted for by cooks, waiters, housekeepers, and servants (the gain in family servants alone was almost 1,000,000).

the "proletariat" in the Marxist sense is composed of industrial workers. The industrial proletariat reached its numerical peak in 1920 and has been almost stationary since, but its relative weight has fallen. From around 55 per cent of the working class in 1870 the industrial workers rose to a peak of 66 per cent in 1910 and 67 per cent in 1920, falling, however, to 62 per cent in 1930 and 55 per cent in 1940. This relative shrinkage in the proletariat appears clearly from another angle: as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons the industrial workers rose from around 30 per cent in 1870 to 37 per cent in 1910 and 1920, falling to 34 per cent in 1930 and 31 per cent in 1940.

Two major factors underlie this shrinkage of the proletariat: the growing trend toward use of automatic machines and automatic plants, which displaces manual workers while it multiplies the number of technical-managerial and clerical employees; and the constant growth of professional and personal services, much of them to serve workers themselves as their living standards and leisure rise.

While the working class multiplied six times from 1870 to 1940, the middle class as a whole multiplied eight times and *the new middle class sixteen times.* The absolute numbers of the industrial proletariat has remained virtually stationary since 1920 while the new middle class scored an increase of 50 per cent. From an almost negligible proportion in 1870 the new middle class moved up to become 25 per cent of all gainfully occupied persons. Technical-managerial and professional employees alone have multiplied thirteen times since 1870, from 330,000 to 4,772,000.

This tremendous growth of the new middle class is an integral part of basic economic changes in the structural set-up of capitalism:

1. The growing technical-scientific nature of industry, which calls for constantly greater numbers of technical employees.

2. The increasingly complex nature of production and distribution, and the separation of ownership from management in collective enterprise, which calls for constantly greater numbers of managerial employees.

3. The growing amount of planning, regulation, and control within industry, and the consequent need for more administration, which calls for constantly greater numbers of clerical employees.

4. The multiplication of goods and leisure, which calls for more employment in distribution and trade and for more personal and professional services, the performers of which are primarily members of the

new middle class. The proportion of people employed in the production of physical goods fell from around 75 per cent in 1870 to 50 per cent in 1940. If incomes and leisure go up again, as they can, it will mean more employment in the performance of services.

5. The growth in the economic functions of government and of public services, which has brought the grand total of all public employees, federal, state and local, from around 175,000 in 1870 to 3,100,000 in 1930 and 3,200,000 in 1940, exclusive of relief workers. The small increase shown in 1940 over ten years earlier was due to contraction in state and local employment; federal employees rose from 580,000 in 1930 to 1,000,000 in 1940. Around one-third of public employees are workers (including mail carriers); the balance of two-thirds are technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees.

2. *The Old Middle Class*

The economic basis of early middle-class democracy was the widespread ownership of small independent property in a society of small producers. But small ownership was disastrously limited by the onsweep of industrialism. In the America of the 1820's around 80 per cent of the people owned property from which they worked a livelihood; in the 1940's only 20 per cent do so, the great majority being now dependent on income from a wage-or-salary job.

Ownership of farms was the basis of earlier economic democracy. The absolute number of farmers kept on increasing until 1910, although they moved downward in a relative sense. But for twenty years thereafter the number of farmers remained stationary while population grew; and in 1940 there were fewer farmers than in 1910.[3] Farmers today are not much more than 10 per cent of the gainfully occupied. The decrease in tenancy, from 42.4 per cent in 1930 to 38.7 per cent in 1940, did not represent an increase of free farmers but dispossession of tenants from the soil.

Small business enterprisers (Table 2) increased from 1870 to 1910, from 1,404,000 to 2,895,000; there was a small rise to 3,304,000 in 1930 and

[3]Because of Census Bureau changes in enumeration the decreases in the number of farmers in 1940 over 1930 is exaggerated in Table 1. More comparable statistics are those of the Agricultural Census, which shows a drop from 6,288,648 in 1930 to 6,096,000 in 1940 (U. S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1943, p. 573).

hardly any change in 1940. The trend for the old middle class as a whole, including professionals, was pretty much the same, with a small increase

Table 2—ENTERPRISERS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Manufactures	145,000*	207,901	235,618	47,000
Building	100,000*	167,512	174,422	
Mining	12,000*	15,511	14,287	500
Trade	1,926,000	1,800,000	1,278,000	440,000
Laundry, etc.	53,694	49,461	30,000	1,000*
Entertainment	70,844	67,744	34,347	1,185
General Services	535,000	467,000	390,000	110,900
Garages	100,000	95,000	18,000	2,000*
Professional	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175
Unclassified	439,590	434,332	720,734	802,014
Total	3,863,249	3,751,199	3,261,631	1,532,774

*Partly estimated.

Under "Laundry" are included laundry, cleaning, dyeing and pressing establishments. "Entertainment" includes theatres and motion picture houses, pleasure resorts, race tracks, etc. "General Services" includes hotels and boarding houses, eating and drinking places, barber and beauty shops, etc. "Garages" includes cab and truck owners, and, for earlier years, livery stables. "Professional" includes self-employed performers of professional services. "Unclassified" includes, especially for the earlier years, independent artisans and artisan shops.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

from 1910 onward but a very large decrease as a percentage of all gainfully occupied persons.[4] It is important to observe, however, the relative and absolute decline in the number of independent *industrial* enterprisers (manufactures, construction, mining)—from around 425,000 in 1910 to 390,000 in 1930 and 257,000 in 1940. The statistical decline may be a bit more than the actual decline, because the different years do not seem wholly comparable and because some of the 1940 decline may have been

[4]Compare other estimates of the number of enterprisers, including professionals: W. I. King, *The National Income and Its Purchasing Power* (1930), p. 62, estimates them at 3,577,000 for 1910 and 3,677,000 for 1920; Edwin G. Nourse, *America's Capacity to Consume* (1934), p. 31, gives an estimate of 3,200,000 for 1930.

a temporary depression result, yet the downward trend is definite. Many independent industrial enterprisers have been wiped out by the war. Whether or not they stage a comeback depends upon postwar economic conditions and what kind of policy the middle class pursues.

Small independent enterprisers have held their own in numbers only because of the very large increase in trade and personal services (some of which in 1940 was, however, a hangover of people opening small stores to escape unemployment during the depression of the 1930's).

Independent professionals, interestingly enough, have made little contribution to an increase of small enterprisers (Table 3). They made

Table 3—INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Physicians	165,629	153,803	145,000*	60,000*
Dentists	70,601	70,344	39,597	7,988
Other Medical	48,458	48,187	19,755	5,585
Lawyers	180,483	160,605	114,704	39,791*
Architects	21,976	23,100	17,444	2,039
Photographers	37,641	32,805	31,775	7,652
Artists	62,485	57,253	34,094	4,120
Authors	14,126	12,325	4,324	1,000*
Total	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175

*Partly estimated.

Under "Physicians" surgeons are included. "Lawyers" includes judges. "Other medical" includes veterinarians, osteopaths, chiropractors and healers. "Artists" includes sculptors and teachers of art. No attempt is made to classify other and newer professions.

The totals are functional, not arithmetical; they assume that an overall average of 10% of professional persons were salaried employees in 1910 and an average of 20% in 1930 and 1940.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

considerable gains from 1870 to 1910, multiplying nearly four times, but the later gains are small compared with the great gains of salaried professionals. Among professionals, too, employment becomes increasingly institutional. Yet they make up a powerful, strategic group that is influential far beyond its numbers.

3. *The New Middle Class*

In some of its functions the new middle class of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees is not altogether new. There were office workers, public employees, a smattering of technicians and managers in early capitalism, some also in the commercial civilizations of antiquity. But their numbers were small and they were significant mainly in the repressive bureaucracy of the state. The new middle class is new in its numbers, in the variety and significance of its occupations, and in being a typical class product of large-scale collective economic activity.

The slowdown in expansion of the new middle class, as a result of the depression of the 1930's, was temporary unless there arises a new economic crisis. But a new crisis will engulf the working class, too. And the problems of policy created by the new middle class will become acute. Trends in the over-all class development since 1870 may be summed up:

The working class has grown proportionately more than twice as fast as the independent enterprisers.

The middle class as a whole has grown around 50 per cent more than the number of workers.

The new middle class has grown more than three times faster than the working class, eight times faster than the number of enterprisers, and two-and-one-half times faster than the middle class as a whole.

These are clear indications of the strength and significance of the new middle class. Its functions arise out of changes that have transformed capitalism and that carry into the future. They have brought a great increase in the number of technicians (Table 4). This increase is underestimated by the Census, which often classifies technicians as "officials" and sometimes as "clerical." Yet the Census figures show an increase of forty times in the number of technicians, with 700,000 as the probable 1940 total. The greatest expansion has been since 1910 and there was no serious slowdown in 1940 because of the depression.

While the majority of technical engineers (electrical, mechanical, mining, civil) are in industry, 26.5 per cent of them were engaged in professional service in 1930, and 12.2 per cent in public service.[5] They are active in every field of activity.

[5]H. D. Anderson and P. E. Davidson, *Occupational Trends in the United States* (1940), p. 549. This is an excellent occupational study.

Table 4—TECHNICIANS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Chemists	60,005	48,009	16,598	774
Civil Engineers	105,486	102,086	52,031	7,094
Electrical Engineers	55,667	57,259	15,125	
Mechanical Engineers	85,543	54,356	14,514	
Chemical Engineers	11,600	11,970	6,930	
Mining Engineers	9,773			
Industrial Engineers	9,803	3,261	....	....
Laboratory Technicians	17,246	8,288	4,000	250
Total	355,123	285,229	109,198	8,118

Under "Chemists" are included assayers and metallurgists. "Civil Engineers" includes surveyors. "Laboratory" includes technicians and assistants; 1940 data is not comparable with earlier years.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

Any expansion of industry must necessarily increase the number of technicians and enlarge their strategic importance. Industry becomes more and more dependent on the possessors of technical knowledge and skills while the manual labor force dwindles, with increasingly more skilled workers being transformed into "junior technicians." The technician is master of the mysterious processes of a system of production which is infinitely more complex than production in the early stages of the industrial revolution. And the strategic importance of the technician grows, socially as well as economically, as people become more technology-conscious and are influenced by the technician.

Technicians merge into the managerial group, which has grown fourteen times in number since 1870 (Table 5). Managerial employees are important in every field of activity, including government, although the largest proportion is engaged in manufactures. The slight gain registered in 1940 expresses the depression failure of industry to expand, not any decline in the importance of managerial personnel.

Around two-fifths of managerial employees are in the upper group composed of officials and managers. The top layers of this upper group, the administrative officials, may be called "institutional capitalists" (for whom, however, power is a greater motive than profit, which largely explains why they merged so easily into fascism). They are identified

Table 5—Managerial Employees: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Agriculture	62,778	70,583	52,811	2,000*
Upper	37,503	.....	.....	.....
Lower	25,275	.....	.....	.....
Manufactures	654,457	651,260	301,691	16,000*
Upper	312,000*	312,756	125,694	.....
Lower	342,457	338,504	175,997	.....
Mining	48,345	49,671	34,285	7,580
Upper	16,101	15,385	10,947	580
Lower	32,244*	34,286	23,338	7,000*
Railroads	111,311	153,996	113,003	25,000*
Upper	32,242	34,132	19,805	.....
Lower	79,069	119,864	93,198	.....
Other Transport	102,826	119,927	82,211	10,000*
Upper	50,882	63,352	34,490	.....
Lower	51,944	56,575	47,721	.....
Communication	40,024	34,182	16,551	300*
Upper	23,301	18,957	10,089	.....
Lower	16,723	15,225	6,462	.....
Construction	99,932	68,818	40,000*	12,000*
Upper	25,269	23,492	15,000	.....
Lower	74,663	45,326	25,000	.....
Trade	89,124	82,658	45,274	7,500*
Upper	50,000*	45,000*	25,000*	.....
Lower	39,124	37,658	20,274	.....
Motion Picture	2,100	1,923	.....	.....
Garage	21,250	19,247	.....	.....
Banking	95,000	93,356	56,059	15,000*
Insurance	39,735	33,997	9,501	1,000*
Unclassified	340,694	301,271	142,481	25,000*
Total	1,707,576	1,680,889	893,867	121,380

*Partly estimated.

"Upper," managerial—managers, officials; "Lower"—foremen, overseers, inspectors.

"Other Transport" includes street railways, bus, taxicab, trucking, and shipping. "Communication" includes telephone and telegraph only. "Motion Picture, Garage, Banking, Insurance" include managers and officials only.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in ***Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,*** published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

with monopoly capitalism and imperialism and are, by and large, the heart of reaction. But this is not true of the whole managerial group, especially its lower layers which are frequently in conflict with the upper (evident today in the struggle of foremen to unionize against administrative opposition). A progressive potential exists in management alongside reactionary attitudes and practices.

In objective functional aptitudes and interests the technical-managerial personnel is not capitalist. It has an instinct for workmanship, which calls for doing a job of production, and its economic interests in terms of employment and income are promoted by full utilization of productive resources and their expansion. The progressive practitioners of management recognize it can become a liberating force. One writes:

"In the increasing specialization of management, and in the consequent increasing infiltration into managerial personnel of technically trained persons whose prime interest and desire are production rather than profit, one may perhaps see an agency for a new industrial revolution and for a conversion of industry into an agency for social welfare rather than for individual profit."[6]

Salaried professionals scored an increase of thirty times from 1870 to 1940 (Table 6). They increased much more, and more rapidly, than

[6]Oliver Sheldon, "Management," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1945), p. 79. One angle is union-management co-operation, of which an interesting and suggestive, if a bit optimistic, discussion appears in *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy* (1942), by Clinton Golden and H. J. Ruttenberg. There are clearly dangers in union-management co-operation—it might become co-operation with monopoly and big business, union and management in particular industries might gang up against the consumer; it might become a merger of union bureaucracy and managerial bureaucracy against the workers. One cannot, however, repudiate union-management co-operation because of its dangers; one must fight against the dangers, which involve the problem of reactionary management and reactionary unionism. Moreover, progressive union-management co-operation must broaden into larger economic issues and action. In general, the progressive potential in management is modified by its totalitarian potential. Many managerial elements, including personnel men, are anti-democratic in temper, and the power complex of top administrators drives toward a monopoly corporate state. But there are plenty of American union leaders, including "radical" ones, whose practices and ideas are totalitarian. And the answer to the dangers is not to wipe management off the slate, and ignore it, but to develop the approach, the program and action with which progressive management (and all useful functional groups) can go along.

Table 6—Salaried Professionals: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Teachers	1,203,622	1,124,520	614,905	128,265
Designers	111,805	102,730	47,449	1,291
Reporters	63,493	51,844	34,382	5,375
Musicians	161,536	165,128	139,310	16,170
Clergymen	140,077	145,877	118,018	
Religious Workers	35,172	31,290	12,970*	44,934
Social Workers	75,197	32,241	3,000*	
Actors	40,000*	37,993	28,297	2,066
Librarians	38,607	29,613	7,423	....
Trained Nurses	371,066	294,189	82,327	1,204
Accountants	190,000*	191,571	39,239	....
Unclassified	110,000*	95,239	12,061	5,000*
Total	2,540,575	2,302,235	1,139,381	204,305
Additional	120,268	111,684	40,470	....
Grand Total	2,660,843	2,413,919	1,179,851	204,305

*Partly estimated.

Under "Teachers" college professors and presidents are included. "Designers" includes draftsmen. "Reporters" includes editors. "Unclassified" includes professional apprentices and assistants and "other professional occupations." "Additional" is the sum of the assumptions made in Table 5 regarding the number of independent professionals who are salaried employees. Excluded are laborers and other wage-workers, keepers of billiard rooms and dance halls, and managers and officials which the Census lists under "Professional service."

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

independent professionals. They include not only groups specified in the table but also salaried physicians, surgeons, architects, lawyers, and others. The largest increases were scored by actors, teachers, and editor-reporters, the smallest by physicians and clergymen. A wholly new group emerged, professional social workers. Many professionals are in the upper layers of management, while accountants are part of the administrative bureaucracy of corporate business. At least 125,000 salaried professionals (including technical-scientific personnel) are in the employ of the federal

government,[7] with many more, among them 1,100,000 teachers, employed by states, municipalities, and townships.

Among salaried professionals are the shapers of opinion and ideas: the teachers, editors, and reporters who, along with writers and artists, are the architects of ideology. They are the intellectuals—successors to the priests and medicine men of earlier religious civilizations. All intellectuals, conservative, liberal, and radical, are of the new middle class.

The economic status of salaried professionals is, in general, much inferior to that of the independents. Where the great majority of independent professionals have yearly incomes above $2,500, most salaried professionals earn yearly incomes below $2,500 (comparable with most small independent enterprisers). This condition offers a chance for professional-union organization and a tie-in with larger economic objectives and action.

Many technical-managerial and professional employees are, from the angle of their incomes, nearer to the workers than they are to members of their own class. In fact, millions of skilled union workers earn more than millions of lower-salaried employees. Nevertheless, technical-managerial and professional employees are members of the new middle class. Most of them earn more than the workers; their occupations, their functions, and their potential (if not actual) incomes differentiate them from the workers. A worker who earns around $3,000-$3,500 a year knows that is the limit: he can earn more only by ceasing to be a worker. Technical-managerial and professional employees may earn only $2,000 a year, but they know they can earn more and they need not get out of their class to do so. No more than one can say that a worker who earns $3,000 yearly is a member of the new middle class can one say that technical-managerial and professional employees who earn $2,000 yearly are members of the working class. The appeal for progressive action to technical-managerial and professional employees must be made in terms of their functional interests and class as part of the over-all struggle for reconstruction.

This problem of class appears more sharply in the case of white collar workers, whose numbers jumped from around 375,000 in 1870 to 7,600,000 in 1940, an increase of twenty times (Table 7). Many white

[7] U. S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1943), p. 165.

Table 7—White Collar Workers: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Bookkeepers, etc.	741,308*	739,077	447,411	38,776
Clerks	1,973,604	1,795,000	639,000	29,801
Stenographers-Typists	1,174,886	811,190	316,693	154
Clerks (store)	525,591	401,991	387,183	80,000*
Salespeople (store)	2,200,000*	1,988,322	877,238	160,000*
Commercial Travelers	256,000*	223,732	163,620	7,296
Sales Agents	366,312	389,358	167,578	35,000*
Operators	250,821	316,638	137,684	8,406
Unclassified	118,000*	117,397	85,240*	15,000*
Total	7,606,522	6,782,705	3,221,647	374,433

*Partly estimated.

Under "Bookkeepers" cashiers are included. "Clerks" excludes shipping clerks, who are listed with wage-workers. "Sales Agents" includes insurance and real estate agents. "Operators" includes telephone and telegraph operators. "Unclassified" includes railway mail clerks, etc.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Preliminary table.)

collar workers are difficult to classify. Salespeople and clerks in stores might be assigned to the working class, bookkeepers to the class of lower professional employees. Yet objective and psychological considerations that are determining factors should be borne in mind.

One objective distinction can be made: the amount of education and training that is needed to qualify for a particular occupation. The professionals need more education and training than the white collars, and white collars (most of them at least) need more than the workers. An important class-psychological distinction is this: the white collar occupations (most, if not all, of them) were occupations that represented an upward move in the world, an escape from the working class. They were cleaner, with better hours and pay; they provided more security, social prestige, and chance to get ahead. In general the white collars developed within the middle class, as its lower layers, and with the psychological attitudes of that class. Hence their resistance to unionism, which is only slowly breaking down.

The white collars are workers? Even if all white collar people are assigned to the working class there still remains a solid core of 9,000,000

members of the middle class, among them 5,000,000 technical-managerial, professional, and public employees. The total becomes larger as farmers (who are middle class, being proprietors) are added. Nothing is gained, and much is lost, by juggling with distortions of the concept of class, or by stretching the meaning of "working class" and "proletariat" until they become all-inclusive, meaningless concepts. That does not conjure away the numbers or strength of the middle class; nor the important problems of differences in functional occupation and interests, the differences in historical background and psychology.[8]

Yet it must be recognized that salespeople in stores are most akin to workers and that the relative position of white collars in general has seriously deteriorated since 1870. The working class has moved upward, the white collars downward. Division and subdivision of labor among clerical workers make their jobs more routine and uninteresting; a modern office more and more resembles a factory as machines in use multiply (office-machine operators almost doubled in 1930-40, rising from 36,162 to 64,178); opportunities to get ahead are increasingly limited; differentials in pay shrink, and constantly larger numbers of wage-workers are better paid than most white collars. Finally, economic security is crumbling; in the depression of the 1930's, unlike the experience in previous depressions, nearly as many white collars, proportionately, were thrown into unemployment as wage-workers. The general situation is thus summed up in a Census analysis of the white collar worker:

> The average salary is only enough to meet demands of a very moderate standard of living. Little is left for savings. He lives all too frequently—as do many workers—face to face with the hazard of unemployment and with the risk of dependency in his old age. . . . [White collars] are a class between the usually better-educated and better-paid professionals and the less well-educated but better-paid skilled workers. The skilled workers [and increasingly other workers too] often belong to unions, and many of the professional persons belong to the professional societies, but only a small proportion of the clerical workers are organized. As a class they are not yet fully group conscious. Until recent years and in many cases until the present, the relation of clerical workers

[8] Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd in their *Middletown in Transition* (1937), pp. 460-61, report that the old middle class is engaged in a "struggle to hold its own against encroaching big business"; clerks and other lower-salaried employees, or white collars, and the professionals and civil servants "for the most part think of themselves as part of the business class."

to their employers has been largely a personal relation. But the clerical class is becoming group conscious, it is beginning to organize. When it becomes thoroughly group conscious and completely organized it can exert a great influence on social and economic questions.[9]

The failure of socialism to grow among the American people, which always puzzled and irritated Marxists, becomes understandable in part as the changes in class relations are considered. Much of the socialist agitation was based on the argument that "opportunity has come to an end." But the emphasis always was on the opportunity to become independent businessmen. In this connection the socialist argument was largely true after 1910, although up until that year the opportunity, while diminishing, was still there. But a whole new field for "opportunity to rise in the world" was opened up by the astonishing expansion of technical-managerial and professional employment (in which may be included the upper layers of white collar workers). The form was new but it *was* opportunity and it offered "careers open to the talents." This, along with other factors—no American feudalism, the measurable completion in the 1820's-30's of the struggle for political democracy, the unparalleled economic expansion which brought to the American people the highest living standards in the world—distinguished this country from Europe and explains the failure of socialism. Its lessons must be learned to understand the present and project the future.

These new functional groups, moreover, were never brought within the Marxist class concept. They were, by and large, identified with the

[9]U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States,* 1870 to 1940 (1943), pp. 179-180. A most effective job of union organization has been done by the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, AFL, pioneer in the field of white collar unions. An equally effective job, with larger progressive overtones, is being done by the Retail, Wholesale and Chain Store Food Employees Union, CIO, of which Samuel Wolchak is president. Unionism among office workers trails behind. The war, with its rise in prices, has lowered the real salaries of white collar workers. In an interesting effort to work together, the CIO and the AFL sent representatives to a Congressional hearing in 1944 on the condition of salaried employees, and these proposals were made: (1) subsidies; (2) re-examination and revision of the salary stabilization policy of the War Labor Board; (3) revision of the Fair Labor Standards Act to "make sure that a floor is placed under salaries as well as wages," and (4) an immediate government study of fixed-income and salary groups to assure full employment after the war.

bourgeoisie as "class enemies." The theoretical expression of this was the Marxist analysis of surplus value (meaningful enough if it is broadened to include all useful labor, not only the manual industrial workers), which meant that, since the industrial proletariat alone produces surplus value, the useful functional groups of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees, without whom production cannot carry on, are like the capitalists in being exploiters of labor! As the new middle class multiplied, the Marxists, especially the communsts, tortured the class concept by insisting that most members of the new class were workers.[10] A class concept was tortured to maintain its schematic purity. No effort was made to study concretely and objectively the new class relations; to modify the class concept, and the consequent social-economic program and action, to meet the new conditions. The new middle class remained, by and large, immune to unionism and socialism.

4. *Toward Understanding and Unity of Action*

The future of the middle class, old and new, depends upon a continuous upward movement of production, consumption, and employment. This, in turn, depends upon a solution of the economic crisis of our generation. Upon that solution, also, depends the future of workers and farmers. Hence the need for understanding and unity of action of all useful functional groups in the struggle against monopoly capitalism.

The middle class, as much as the farmers and workers, is caught in the crisis of capitalism. As economic activity shrinks the middle class shrinks. It was hit hard by the depression of the 1930's. Small enterprises passed out. Unemployment among salaried employees was great. Profes-

[10]Reactionaries exploited the Marxist failure to draw the new middle class within the circle of socialist theory and practice. In Germany an organization of salaried employees, the *Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfen Verband,* pursued a policy that identified all members of the new middle class with top-capitalist management. It taught its members to "despise the 'street cleaners' ideal' held by millions, who will not or can not raise themselves above a purely instinctive life. In politics it struggled with all its power against the manual workers, in order to maintain the social distance between them and the white collar workers. The salaried employees who lived in its spirit did so with the consciousness of the nationalist who, according to the famous formula of Möller van den Bruck's *Drittes Reich,* is not a member of the proletariat because he does not wish to be one."—Hans Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," *Social Research,* February 1934, pp. 126-126.

sionals went begging for the chance to use their talents; in the worst years of the depression 90 per cent of the architects had nothing to do; "professional men appear to have lost more heavily [in income, proportionately] than wage-earners."[11] There was a substantial decline in middle class growth.

Most members of the middle class, especially members of the new middle class, derive their incomes from the primary incomes and purchasing power of workers and farmers, who are engaged primarily in production while the middle class is overwhelmingly engaged in the performance of services. Hence middle class employment and incomes can grow only as the primary incomes and purchasing power grow to create increasing demand for services. (There is also a direct mutual relation, incidentally, between farmer income and labor income.) Hence the middle class has a stake in an increasing utilization of productive resources, in the prosperity of workers and farmers.

Recognition of this unity of interests is necessary to solve postwar economic problems. The middle class alone cannot safeguard small business; it cannot prevent a disposal of government war plants to prevent an increase of monopoly power; it cannot assure employment and better pay to salaried employees. Any policy to promote these immediate class interests must merge into an over-all policy to promote the interests of workers and farmers. And by the same token any policy to promote the immediate class interests of farmers and workers must merge into an over-all policy to promote middle-class interests.

But this unity will be impossible if a postwar depression comes, or even if there is a low level of prosperity. Pressure groups will multiply and fight one another. Middle class, workers, and farmers will break apart into a cat-and-dog fight for a larger group share in the diminishing output of a shrinking economy. That is what brought fascism in Germany. The economic crisis was unsolved; middle class and farmers fought against workers; out of the economic breakdown and disunity came the chance for the Nazis to seize power. While the middle class, by and large, supported Hitler, millions of its members never voted for him. Understanding and unity could have averted the disaster.

It is true that there are antidemocratic forces in the middle class, as in other classes. But there can be no democracy in the postwar period

[11]Public Affairs Committee, *Your Income and Mine* (1938), p. 19.

without the middle class and its democratic elements. Already these elements are preparing for action. They are not altogether destroyed in Germany. In Japan "a second opposition group consists largely of middle class democrats who believe in Western parliamentary government on the American and British model. Thousands of such democrats are still to be found among the professional men, the educated technicians, and the owners of small or medium business. . . . They can provide much of the political leadership for the new forces which will be released by Japan's military defeat."[12] In Italy the Action Party, composed of middle-class democrats who recognize the need for socialization of monopoly corporations into public enterprises, may merge with the socialists in a synthesis of liberal democracy and liberal socialism. In the United States it was not labor alone that elected Franklin Roosevelt; the proportion of workers who voted for Roosevelt was not much larger than the proportion of middle class people, including small businessmen and farmers.

But understanding and unity cannot endure on immediate issues alone. There is a general crisis of capitalism. Admitted? If so, then unbreakable unity of all useful functional groups can be forged only by an over-all struggle and program to solve the crisis of our generation, to realize a basic program of economic reconstruction for democracy. That calls for independent political organization and action, on the model of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation of Canada (CCF), to break monopoly capitalism and build democratic socialism.

The middle class and farmers must be given a direct stake in the new society of democratic socialism. This means rejection of the old concept of absolute collectivism, in which the state owns all means of economic activity. This absolute collectivism not only antagonizes the middle class and farmers but it also brings an all-inclusive totalitarian state that is destructive of freedom and personality. The new society must be pluralistic—a *socialist* mixed economy—in which there exists alongside one another, each doing its particular job, public enterprise in the dominant large-scale areas of industry, private enterprise in small business and agriculture, and co-operatives. The Marxist emphasis on the proletariat and absolute collectivism alienated farmers and the middle class, excluded them from socialism; it brought the tragic split between labor and the other useful functional groups that was a major factor in the coming of

[12]Politicus, "Japan's Underground," *The Nation*. December 1944, pp. 776-777.

fascism. Communism is making a new approach to the problem. But it is not an approach of democratic functional unity; it is an approach of political totalitarians who use power politics and conspiratorial infiltration, who play fast and loose with the most reactionary groups while pursuing their power aims, who appeal to the obscure totalitarian urges of industrial managers, intellectuals on the make, and government bureaucrats. It is not an approach that honestly revises old concepts and practices in a clear call for democratic co-operation with the workers; but seeks totalitarian domination over the workers, who are thrown the husks of ideology.

Middle-class consciousness is developing, and the impact of postwar problems will strengthen this consciousness. It is good for a class to be conscious of its interests and ideals. But what kind of consciousness? The reactionary will try to mobilize the middle class (and farmers) against labor, it will be said that the middle class can realize its interests and ideals only in destructive struggle against labor: this can only mean fascism. The liberal members of the middle class will arouse the liberal consciousness of a middle class that can realize its interests and ideals only in a struggle for economic democracy to bring greater human welfare and freedom. This calls for progressive co-operation with labor, and for the co-operation of labor with the progressive middle class. Liberals in the middle class should not be ashamed of their class. Within this class are the talents and the ideas with which to build a finer human world—more material comfort, a more beautiful environment of rebuilt homes, cities and villages in which to enjoy greater leisure, more education, more cultural and moral integrity and freedom, world co-operation and peace.

The middle class was the great architect of political democracy; it can become an architect of supplementary economic democracy. In any event the middle class will be a crucial factor in coming social changes. Without the co-operative understanding and action of progressive middle class, workers, and farmers, there can be no peaceful change for a new society which will broaden and deepen democratic procedures and values.

GREEN TROOPS ON A BLUE BEACH

By DAVID DEMPSEY, U.S.M.C.

HITTING THE COMBAT BEACH was not exactly a new experience to the Marine outfit with which I landed on Saipan. But most of our seasoning had come in a landing that was almost unopposed and, this time, facing the largest body of Jap soldiers Marines had yet encountered was hardly calculated to ease our minds. Generally speaking, there is nothing that can ease the mind of a man in a landing barge except to put him on the beach, safely.

We boated at daybreak, transferring from our transports to an LSD —Landing Ship, Dock—a formidable looking ship the stern of which lowered to decant a hold full of amphibian tractors. Down this ramp we plunged into a sea churlish with the wakes of deploying ships. Our "amptrac" was a command boat and had radio communication with the air observers who hovered over the shimmering white beach and the chalky hills of the island. A young major passed around sticks of chewing gum and warned us to make sure that our cartridge belts were unfastened, in case we were hit and had to swim for it. Our boat would go in with the second wave of the second battalion to land.

A pilot who bombed Saipan the day before told me later that the soldiers on the island had gone into what appeared to be a sort of ceremonial fit when it became evident that we were going to invade, staging huge war dances, and in general carrying on like an Irish wake that had gotten out of hand. He said they appeared to relish the idea of the coming battle, which is more than I can say for ourselves. Our bombers tried to accommodate them by starting fires. These they promptly danced around when the planes began to leave.

We nosed out a hundred yards or so from the ship and rendezvoused, waiting for the waves to form. Ahead of us the control boat bobbed just seaward of the reef, bedecked with signal flags that would send us across the line of departure. Idling there, we had a grandstand seat for

the show our warships were putting on as a curtain-raiser to the landing. We watched the shells bite into the coral sand and shred the palm trees that lined the shore. After an hour the fire was lifted and dive bombers went in for the final strike. They wheeled in formation high over our heads, peeled off, and plummeted savagely down, dropping their bombs a few hundred feet from the ground. As they began their climb the explosions threw bursts of fire, rubble, and a talcum-fine dust into the air. In a few minutes the beach was obscured.

Ahead, the first assault wave—cannon-bearing amphibious tanks—lined up along the line of departure, like nervous horses jockeying for position. At H hour minus 30 the control vessel waved them across the line. They moved in toward the reef and became tiny specks riding deeply in the water, their tracks leaving a wake like a stern-wheeler. At H minus 20 the planes stopped bombing and went into a strafing attack. They flew at tree-top height and raked the beach, diving at a 45-degree angle from the seaward side and opening fire while still over the water. A friend of mine in one of the first waves told me later that this had thrown their boat into a dither, as the planes appeared to be firing on them. Empty shell casings were plopping into the water all around them and falling, red hot, into the boat.

Our radio man, his headphones clamped tightly over his ears and the receiver buttoned up inside his poncho, picked up an aerial observer circling jauntily in his small plane. The noise of the amptrac's motor made conversation practically impossible, so his message—that the first wave had landed on schedule—had to be shouted from ear to ear around the boat.

We readied into position. The flag on the control vessel went up and five minutes later the ensign, dressed in oilskins and balancing himself neatly on the deck, waved us over the line. The speed of the tractor plunged us deeper into the sea, cascading a steady spray of water on us; we were thoroughly soaked within five minutes.

Our plane observer had been in the invasion of the Marshalls, where we had overrun our initial objective within a few hours. Now he radioed: "This is not at all like the Marshalls. Not at all." The radio man shouted this into the ear of the Marine next to him, and he in turn passed it on. We looked at each other, and our glances formed a common pool of

anxiety. I was conscious of a tightening in my stomach and I knew that if I had been alone I would have been afraid.

Half an hour was to elapse before we hit the beach. Some of the boys tried to read the little paper-bound Navy "expendables." One man was seasick and lowered himself to the deck and vomited. We had the only Marine I have ever known who prayed before going into battle. He had written the prayer himself, something called "Stay By Me, Lord," and memorized it. Later he told me that he had recited it almost every one of the twenty-five days we were in battle.

We were half way in when word was radioed to land on Blue Beach Two, instead of Blue Beach One, as originally planned. Fire on Blue One was too heavy. We changed our course and headed for Blue Two, about a thousand yards south. In a few minutes our tractor grumbled up onto the reef, lurching tipsily as we crawled over it, giving us the feeling, for that moment, that we were very naked and exposed. We were squatting in the bottom of the tractor and a Marine near me stood up, out of curiosity, and looked over the gunwale. His eye caught a streak of flashing steel not more than three or four feet from his face, and he did a sudden flop on the deck. A moment later this apparition exploded in the water off our stern. He had had the rare, if somewhat unenvious, privilege of actually seeing a shell in transit.

Later, approaching the beach, a few more of us braved our heads over the side. Some of the amptracs had been hit and were flopped over like pancakes on a griddle. There was no small arms fire in our sector. Except for the beachmaster, waving the amptracs inland, and a group of wounded waiting transportation back to the ships, the beach was deserted. There certainly were no Japs. I think most of us would have felt better about it if there had been a few, preferably dead, just to reassure us that they had tried to stop us and hadn't succeeded. Our machine gunner, who had his weapon trained on trees that looked like good nesting places for snipers, turned to me and said, "It gives me the creeps. Like fighting a bunch of ghosts." It gave me the creeps too, although I didn't tell *him*.

We advanced inland a few yards, detouring around the trees that had been blown down, and snaked single file along the road to Charon Kanoa. This was a village of white concrete one-story buildings, and ablaze with bougainvilleas in bloom. For the sake of the record I should

like to say that Japanese towns are *not* made of bamboo and paper—at least not the towns in the Marianas—and from what I could determine they were just a little less strongly put together than Parkchester; their military fortifications are about as solid as the Croton Dam.

The town had been pretty well messed up by our naval gunfire, yet even the wreckage seemed tidy and intimate, the way the Japanese there had lived. Our tractor rolled down what had been the main street, and it was about all we could do to squeeze through; it obviously had not been constructed with an eye to accommodating amphibian tractors and from what we could discover later even the Japanese had lost their tempers when two trucks tried to pass. We went on to what should have been the town square, but was actually an American baseball diamond. A Buddhist temple stood across the street on one side and the town club was on the other.

Our unit was to pass through Charon Kanoa, mop up any resistance, and join the attack pressing toward the ridge about a mile inland. Before we had gone very far word came back that our forward elements were held up, and we debarked and began to advance on foot. I remember looking up and seeing a pair of men's drawers impaled on the limb of a tree. There was no sign, however, of its owner, or any other living Japanese, and for perhaps half an hour quiet, and a caressing sun, lay over the town like a soft blanket.

Then a shell crashed thunderously in the wooded area just ahead of us. Another came down. And another. There was no time to dig foxholes, so we flattened ourselves behind trees and in the shelter of buildings that were still standing. Two lieutenants had dived into a small shellhole and were arguing the possibility of the shells being short rounds from our own warships. Then one crashed very close by. There was an emphatic silence, until one of the lieutenants settled the argument in his familiar Harvard accent. "Definitely hostile," he announced.

A scout and I backed across the road and got into a Japanese stand-up foxhole; together we deepened and widened it and in so doing came across a case of port wine and some papers that had been cached there. We drank a bottle of the wine, which was mild and sweet, and in a short time had passed the remainder out among the CP. We crouched in the foxhole for some time. The shells were falling closer, and more of our men were being hit. Yet there was no panic and very little real fear.

Somehow you figured they would never get *you*. Anyway, the tension was lifted when somebody behind me stood up and said, "Aw, knock it off, Shorty." We laughed for the first time that morning.

At the same time we were sure that our sector had been picked out by the enemy as a special target and when my buddy and I were ordered back to the regimental CP we both felt a sense of relief. We were under the impression that it would be safer. Actually, shells were falling thicker on that part of the beach than in the town.

A medical aid station next to the CP was overloaded with casualties and some of us volunteered to dig foxholes for the wounded and help load them on the tractors going back to the ships. One man was brought in with his leg almost blown off between the hip and the knee; the doctor amputated it without removing him from the stretcher. The shell-shock cases began to come in, too: boys who had "cracked up" under very heavy fire at the front and had to be led, or carried, in. They hid behind trees and cowered at each new shell burst. Some could not remember their names.

We were loading the wounded into tractors later when a Pfc stretcher case expressed the desire to relieve himself. A corpsman handed him the helmet of a nearby sergeant, who was also a casualty. The sergeant lay there and watched in horrified fascination as his helmet was subjected to its ultimate indignity. "That I should live to see the day," he groaned, "when a Pfc should do *that* in my helmet."

The shelling went on all night and its pattern became almost predictable; the barrage would last for about 15 minutes and then let up for half an hour as the batteries were switched to some other target area. These interludes were almost harder to bear than the periods of shelling, creating suspense rather than relief. We went about pretty much as though *our* lives at least were charmed, although it was pretty clear from the casualties coming in that a lot of lives weren't. After a while we could estimate where the shells were going to land by the sound of their whistles, and we dived into our foxholes only when the interval between the scream overhead and "whop!" of the explosion narrowed to a second or less.

Our beachhead was from 300 to 1,000 yards inland along a shoreline of two miles. The Japs counterattacked at several points that night. One of these was a large-scale affair supported by tanks. A friend of mine who has seen a tank attack (the only Jap tanks I have ever seen have been

going in the other direction, which is a different matter) tells me that even Japanese mechanized warfare retains all the medieval ritualism of the Field of the Cloth of Gold. After all, the opportunities for chivalry are about as great in a tank as in a suit of armor. The commander, in the lead tank, unbuttons the turret, stands up, and flourishes his saber over his head in the manner of a Don Cossack—at least in the manner of the Don Cossacks I have seen at Carnegie Hall. The Japanese being short people, he generally has to stand on tip toe to be seen. He is answered by a similar flourish from each of his tank drivers, who conclude this gesture with a resounding slap of their sabers across the side of the tank. This, I would say, is a good illustration of the Japanese faith in ritual, as their tanks are admittedly not as good as ours, even when they have been spurred with a saber.

Following what is probably the nearest thing to a ceremonial dance that a tank can participate in, the sabers are then tucked away and the turrets buttoned up. By this time our scouts have usually gotten the idea that something is about to come off. I do not know if they went through this rigmarole that night, but it is not unlikely, for on this occasion they became confused and about half of them went down the wrong road, their drivers giddy, perhaps, from too much warming up. Our antitank guns began picking them off and when the battle was over we had knocked out twenty-eight of them—which was just about all they had. The sabers were considered a prize find.

* * *

Day broke over a landscape that reeked with the smell of rotting vegetation and gunpowder. Stories began to filter back to the CP from our front lines. There were plenty of heroes, all right, but most of the heroism came from just hanging on. No one had charged a pill box, or picked up a machine gun to run headlong at the enemy, à la Humphrey Bogart. The American fighting man is much more businesslike, and finds it easier to kill Japs by waiting for them to come at him. A machine gun at night has an attraction for the Jap soldier that is seldom developed by our own boys and it was not unusual, in the weeks that followed, to find from twenty-five to fifty of them stacked up in the field of fire of one of our guns. We were told that it was part of their *bushido* code, and that they had died happy. I hope so, because the machine gunners I knew

had not been very happy killing them. Heroics, I am glad to say, is usually thrust upon an American by circumstances, and he is more likely to be around to tell about it later.

I saw our colonel early that morning, and he told me that we had lost nearly half of our men. Then I went back to Charon Kanoa to join my landing team. A few minutes after I arrived one of our boys looked up and saw a Japanese artillery observer slung in a hammock in a tall tree. He had a transmitter and had been radioing our position to his batteries. An automatic-rifle man shot him. "What the hell," he said, "he would have committed hara kiri if we'd tried to capture him." At the time, we were too indifferent, and tired, to cut him down.

Then someone told me we had cracked the Jap password, which was "Seven lives for the emperor," and meant, in Japanese at least, that each son of Nippon had pledged himself to kill seven of the enemy. As a password, it might come in handy, if you spoke Japanese. I didn't, but I was grateful to know what the odds were on the Jap side of the lines. I made up my mind right there that *I* wasn't going to be one of the seven, for the emperor, Roosevelt, or anybody else—not if I could help it.

LANDLORD COOPER AND THE ANTI-RENTERS

By GRANVILLE HICKS

BECAUSE MOST OF US became acquainted with James Fenimore Cooper by way of the Leatherstocking tales, we think of him as a romantic novelist of an uncomfortably genteel sort, forgetting that much of his career was devoted to writing tendentious novels, many of them about the contemporary scene. Van Wyck Brooks reminds us of this in *The World of Washington Irving,* and says something, too, of the peculiar muddle in which Cooper's political thinking ended. Nowhere, as Brooks points out, is the confusion more apparent than in the three novels on the rent question. Few critics have tried to maintain that Cooper's account of the anti-rent movement was accurate, and in discussing its falseness one need not feel that one is carrying on a crusade against widespread error. However, the movement has not been fully understood, for until this year, with the publication of Henry Christman's *Tin Horns and Calico,*[1] we have not had an adequate history of it. Of course the tenants' uprising was important, quite apart from anything Cooper may have thought and written about it, and this essay will comment on its causes and consequences and the course it followed. But the novels, if only because of their wrongheadedness, provide a useful approach to the subject, while the contrast between Cooper's version of the struggle and the version that emerges from Mr. Christman's research sharpens for us the problem of the novelist's politics.

Satanstoe, the first of the novels, describes the experiences of Cornelius Littlepage who in 1758 ventured into the wilderness north of Albany to examine a tract of some 20,000 acres purchased from the Indians for a matter of $250. He becomes involved in General Howe's disastrous attack on Ticonderoga, and a close friend is killed by Indians. In *The Chainbearer* it is Mordaunt Littlepage, Corny's son, who goes northward in 1784, and his battle is with squatters who have settled on the estate. Finally, in *The Redskins,* Mordaunt Littlepage's grandson, Hugh, returns from a tour of

[1]Henry Holt. $3.75.

Europe in 1845 to protect Ravensnest from the masked ruffians who call themselves anti-renters. Each of the three Littlepages finds a bride in the course of his upstate adventures.

Satanstoe is one of those nineteenth-century novels in which the pure effortlessness of the narration compensates for the longueurs of which Henry James complained. The liveliest scenes are those in Albany: Corny's sliding escapade, the stealing of the mayor's dinner, and particularly the hazardous sleigh ride on the Hudson. But the preceding episodes in New York City have so quiet and intimate an authenticity that it is hard to believe Cooper is not writing about his own times, and the subsequent battles with the Indians are vigorously described in his most practiced manner. Even Anneke Mordaunt, paragon of refinement that she is and must be to be a Cooper heroine, is alive in the particular setting in which she is placed.

In *Satanstoe* Cooper was concerned only to lay the groundwork of his case against the anti-renters, but in *The Chainbearer,* taking as his theme an eighteenth-century parallel to the anti-rent war, he became more argumentative. Thousandacres, the squatter, is a more fully realized character than Andries, the self-righteously honest chainbearer of the novel's title, and despite Cooper's hatred of him he is the dominant figure in the book. Andries' niece, the heroine, has possibilities, but they are lost in Cooper's embarrassed determination to demonstrate her gentility. In general, however, the characters and situation would serve well enough if Cooper had let them alone, but this he could not do.

If *The Chainbearer* is argumentative, *The Redskins* is purely didactic, and there are few pages that are not devoted either to comments on the struggle between the landlords and the tenants or to exhibitions of the fallacious and immoral reasoning employed by the anti-renters. One of the chief virtues of the heroine, in the hero's eyes, is the soundness of her views on property, and their most romantic passages—like the romantic passages in certain novels of the '30's—have a way of lapsing into political discussion. Both the hero and his uncle express themselves with so brash a snobbishness that one might suspect Cooper of satire were it not for the footnotes in which he endorses their opinions.

Of the strength of feeling that lay behind *The Redskins* there can be no doubt: quite clearly Cooper wanted to deliver a deathblow to the cause of anti-rent, and thought he was succeeding. The basis of his argument,

as laid down in *Satanstoe,* is that the original landlord in taking up a grant expended time, money, and labor at a considerable risk and without the hope of immediate return. "You see," Herman Mordaunt says, "that my twenty thousand acres are not likely to be of much use to myself, even should they prove to be of any to my daughter. A century hence, indeed, my descendants may benefit from all this outlay of money and trouble; but it is not probable that either I or Anneke will ever see the principal and interest of the sums that will be expended in the way of roads, bridges, mills, and other things of that sort."

The landlords, in other words, had made a heavy investment for the sake of a much later return. They had allowed the tenants to secure farms with virtually no outlay of money, and the tenants had been delighted with their bargain. Now the bargain must be kept by the great-grandchildren of the men who made it. If the leasehold system were feudal—Cooper denied it—that made no difference. If the original titles to the manors would not bear scrutiny—Cooper did not try to maintain that they would—that did not matter either. The issue was purely one of principle.

It followed, therefore, that the anti-renters were immoral men, and it is in this guise that Cooper displays them. Their type is foreshadowed in Thousandacres, "a selfish, ignorant, and vulgar robber," and they are themselves specifically described as thieves, cowards, and fools. To express his condemnation, Cooper not only puts his arguments in the mouths of all the Littlepages but introduces a group of bona fide Indians to reprove the anti-rent "Injins." An ex-slave and an English butler join in the attack on the revolting tenants, and so do such local farmers and mechanics as are worthy or, as Cooper once puts it, "semi-worthy" characters. The supporters of the cause—and Cooper does not disguise the fact that they are in the majority—are endowed with no traits that could be considered either admirable or likeable, and their spokesmen are unabashed demagogues.

By the time Cooper wrote *The Redskins,* the state legislature had adopted measures to mitigate the hardships of the tenants, and this compromise with evil filled him with fury. Since he failed to recognize any justice in the tenants' claims, the acts of the legislature seemed to him a demonstration of the venality of politicians. The tyranny of the majority, he maintained, had reached such a point that landlords were discriminated

against in the courts. Anti-rentism, indeed, was part of a great demagogic plot against property and against law and order. In *The Redskins* Uncle Roger says, italics and capitals and all, *"Let this attempt on property succeed, ever so indirectly,* AND IT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS, WHICH WILL AS INEVITABLY DRIVE US INTO DESPOTISM, AS A REFUGE AGAINST ANARCHY, AS EFFECT SUCCEEDS TO CAUSE."

Uncle Ro's speech and other passages of the same character are appeals to the men of commerce and industry to realize that the landlord's cause is their own. In general, however, Cooper was suspicious of the commercial interests, and, as we shall see, he had consistently opposed their political influence. Try as he might to convince himself and others that he was defending the rights of private property in the abstract, it was a particular kind of property that interested him, and this the kind that was currently in danger. "Nothing contributes so much to the civilization of a country," says one of the characters in *The Chainbearer,* "as to dot it with a gentry." Uncle Ro is more specific: "I say that, in a country like this, in which land is so abundant as to render the evils of a general monopoly impossible, a landed gentry is precisely what is needed for the higher order of civilization, including manners, tastes, and the minor principles, and is the very class which, if reasonably maintained and properly regarded, would do the most good at the least risk of any social caste known."

We have come at last to the roots of Cooper's indignation against the anti-renters. Undoubtedly he was worried, and not without reason, by the growing power of demagogy in American political life. At bottom, however, he was specifically defending the class to which he belonged, the class of large landlords, which he regarded as a bulwark not only against the masses but also against the commercial aristocracy. The anti-rent trilogy is starkly and one might almost say uniquely class-conscious, for it is both a theoretical defense of a class and an emotional expression of class-feeling at a high pitch.

II

The tenant system in New York State developed in strange and devious ways. Whether or not it was a survival of feudalism, as its opponents maintained and as Mr. Christman says in his *Tin Horns and*

Calico, is largely a matter of definition. What does seem clear, however, is that both the Dutch government and the British imposed upon the American colonies a system of land tenure that was being outgrown in the home countries. The Dutch West India Company, in its eagerness for colonists, frankly appealed to the desire of the commercial *bourgeoisie* to ape the landed gentry, and Kiliaen Van Rensselaer was only one of several merchants to take advantage of the company's offer. Apparently the directors of the company believed that the patroons would hold their manors intact, but this was not specified. It was Maria Van Rensselaer, Kiliaen's daughter-in-law, who insisted that the old man had founded Rensselaerwyck "in order that his children, with God's mercy, might live off it and that they should not alienate it."

Rensselaerwyck was the only manor in the colony when the British took possession in 1664, but the Duke of York was quick to see the advantages of a group of powerful landlords who were under obligations to the crown, and his governors not only confirmed the Van Rensselaers' title to an estate of a million acres but made several other large grants before the end of the seventeenth century. Further grants were made down to the beginning of the Revolution. In many instances colonial officials were paid large bribes for the making of grants or participated in the profits through dummies. The patentees, moreover, were often less than scrupulous in their extinguishing of Indian titles. For instance, Robert Livingston, who came to this country a poor bookkeeper in 1674 and was the lord of 160,000 acres in 1686, "stretched" his title by thousands of acres. It was this piece of chicanery that laid the basis for the Dutchess County uprisings of the 1750's, in which border warfare between Massachusetts and New York merged with the tenant-landlord struggle.

Some landlords sold property outright, but others followed the example of the Van Rensselaers, who either reserved a perpetual rent or leased for long periods of time. The rent might be in money, in wheat or other commodities, or in services. Mineral and water rights were retained by the landlord. It was usually provided that the tenant could not sell without first offering the property to the landlord, and in case of sale he was to pay to the landlord a stated proportion, a quarter or in some instances a half, of the money received.

On the verge of the Revolution, Governor Tryon recommended the leasehold system as "a method which will ever create subordination and

counterpoise in some measure the general leveling spirit." The New York Federalists felt as the royal governor did. Many of the Westchester landlords were Tories, and their estates were broken up by the confiscation act of 1779, but most of the large landowners, in New York as in Virginia, favored the Revolution. A series of acts during and after the Revolution abolished entail, primogeniture, and some feudal obligations, but Alexander Hamilton devised a form of permanent lease that was constitutional, and the majority of tenants were no better off than they had been before.

It was after the Revolution that the greater number of farms were taken up in the large manors, and the occupants were for the most part New Englanders. I have before me an indenture, dated July 11, 1793, by which Stephen Van Rensselaer, "Lord and Proprietor of the Manor of Rensselaerwyck," conveyed to Francis West the piece of land on which I now live. West's rent was nine and one-quarter bushels of "good clean merchantable winter wheat," to be delivered at the mansion house (twenty-odd miles away) the first of each January. There were the usual reservations of rights, but, presumably because of the unattractiveness of the hill country, West was to pay only a year's extra rent in case of sale instead of a quarter of the selling price.

Francis West had moved from overpopulated Rhode Island with a large family, and it is likely enough that he had no ready cash with which to buy a farm outright. (It is also likely that he was attracted by the patroon's advertising in the Rhode Island press, and that the exact terms were not set before him until after he had built a log cabin and begun to clear the land.) West may have felt that he was getting a bargain, but Stephen Van Rensselaer and Alexander Hamilton were no fools. The soil in this portion of Rensselaerwyck was—and is—thin and full of boulders, and a rent of even a few cents an acre was not to be scorned. Rents were calculated at 6 2/3 per cent of the estimated selling price, and the better the land, the more the tenant paid. Moreover, the quarter-sale provision, which was more common than the terms in the West indenture, brought a handsome profit as the restless farmers pushed west. Eight farms in a neighboring town paid the Van Rensselaers more than $5000 in quarter sales, in addition to rent, between 1790 and 1850. One of these farms, which changed hands six times, brought in $1,162.

The tenants paid as long as they could, but by the 1830's it became apparent that in the hilly sections on both sides of the Hudson the rents

were an intolerable burden. Because of the rents, the farmers could not easily find buyers, and if they did sell, the landlard would take a quarter of what they received. They had built homes, cleared and cultivated the land, and yet they owned nothing.

III

Stephen Van Rensselaer let the rents go, and it is said that $400,000 was owing him when he died in 1839. The tenants had hoped that the good patroon would forgive the back rents in his will, but, on the contrary, he left his property to his sons in such a way that they were virtually compelled to collect the debts even if they had wished not to. The tenants petitioned the new patroon, Stephen IV, who had inherited the western half of the manor, to make arrangements whereby they could settle their debts and buy their farms outright at a reasonable figure. He replied that he would sell only in certain of the less fertile areas and at a price double that offered by the tenants. And when the farmers of the rocky Helderbergs began to hold meetings of protest, he sent the sheriff to eject those whose rent was in arrears.

This was the beginning of the anti-rent war. Whenever a deputy sheriff tried to serve a writ, he found a group of farmers assembled, and his papers were taken from him and burned, while he was more or less roughly treated as he proved recalcitrant or amiable. Van Rensselaer answered this challenge by persuading Sheriff Artcher to lead a posse of five hundred men into the Helderbergs. When they were met by a larger group of farmers, armed with clubs and pitchforks, they ingloriously retreated, and Sheriff Artcher appealed to newly elected Governor Seward to use the militia. Seward, remembering the desperate need of the Whigs to appear as the people's party, promised the farmers that he would do his best to redress their grievances if they would not resist the troops. As the militia marched into the hills, the farmers offered no resistance, but the men for whom the sheriff had writs could not be found. Seward's face had been saved, and he set about doing what he could to keep his promise.

"The Manor War is over for the present," Cooper wrote his wife, "but the evil lies deeper than the surface." He was right, though perhaps not in the sense he meant. The farmers had shown their strength, but they had also learned that they could not indefinitely resist the power

of the state. For the moment they were willing to trust the governor, and Seward was doing what he could, but the patroon was not conciliatory. As Cooper wrote, "This property is not only invested to his entire satisfaction, as regards conveniences, security and returns, but also in a way that is connected with some of the best sentiments of his nature." Stephen Van Rensselaer the younger, in other words, wanted to be a landed gentleman, and he intended to stand on his legal rights.

It was at this stage that Thomas Devyr entered the fight. An Irishman by birth, he had taken part in an unsuccessful Chartist uprising in Newcastle in 1840, and had fled to America. As editor of the *Williamsburg Democrat,* he had proved too radical for the Democratic Party, and he was looking for a cause when he came across a copy of an anti-rent paper, the *Helderberg Advocate*. He began sending the editor articles on the fight against feudalism, and was invited to address a rally of Helderberg farmers in July, 1842. Drawing on the support of his friends in the National Reform Association, he undertook a campaign that was intended not only to win the anti-rent battles for the farmers but also to win the farmers to a radical program of agrarian reform.

Not the least of the achievements of *Tin Horns and Calico* is Mr. Christman's discovery of the part played by Thomas Devyr and, to a lesser extent, by other theoretical agrarians in the anti-rent war. It is, indeed, a great merit of the book that it brings to life and to our attention a considerable number of persons who have been inexcusably overlooked by the historians. Devyr's theories would have seemed dangerously subversive to Cooper, and it may have been some of Devyr's editorials that inspired the novelist's fear of a great conspiracy against property, but no one could be less like the anti-rent lecturer in *The Redskins* than Thomas Devyr. Devyr, Evans, and Bovay, whatever their ideological shortcomings, were all men whose devotion to a cause might have inspired the respect even of their enemies, and most of the local leaders seem to have been men of high calibre. To one of these local leaders, a country doctor named Smith A. Boughton, Mr. Christman devotes some of his most eloquent pages, basing his account in part on a manuscript autobiography. "I could not stand idle," wrote Boughton, who had seen at first hand the hardships of the leasehold system, "and see thousands deprived of their natural and, as I conceived, social and legal rights."

In May, 1844, five years after the outbreak of resistance, a meeting of leaders was called representing thousands of tenants in Rensselaer, Albany, and Schoharie Counties. The movement had gone beyond the phase of spontaneous violence, for such men as Devyr and Boughton had given it a body of ideas and were about to give it a plan of action. The first decision of the conference was to spread the movement into Hudson and Delaware Counties, and men were assigned specific tasks of organization. The second was to organize a secret army to prevent sheriff's sales and evictions. Bands had gathered for that purpose at the beginning of the Helderberg battle, and sometimes members were roughly disguised as Indians, but the leaders now envisaged a disciplined organization, its members pledged to secrecy. The third decision was to bring pressure on candidates of both parties to pledge themselves to legislation that would help the tenants. In the course of the summer, while the anti-renters openly prepared for the election, the Indians prevented many sales.

For more than five years the landlords had hoped that the movement would die out, but the election in 1844 of a number of assemblymen who were committed to the tenants' cause warned them that their time was short. They struck in those counties in which the movement was only beginning. Dr. Boughton was arrested in Columbia County, and while he was being held for trial, Hudson was filled with militia. Despite the talk of imminent revolution, the first jury was eleven to one for acquittal, but Boughton was held without bail for a second trial, and the following summer he was condemned to life imprisonment for "high treason, rebellion against your government, and armed insurrection."

Meanwhile a deputy sheriff had been killed in Delaware County, and more than two hundred tenants were arrested and nearly one hundred of them specifically indicted for the murder of the deputy. Judge Amasa J. Parker opened the trial by lecturing the jury on the evils of anti-rentism, and he took advantage of a technicality to make conviction certain. More than two hundred cases were disposed of in three weeks, and in the end two men had been sentenced to hang, four had been sent to prison for life, ten had been given terms of from two to ten years, and fifty-one had been fined or received suspended sentences. "There is nothing to equal it in this country since the hanging of the witches in New England," wrote George Evans in *Young America.*

The Indians vanished after the Delhi sentences, but, as Mr. Christman points out, they had served their purpose, not only by protecting the tenants in the infancy of the movement but also by calling national attention to the leasehold system. The public that had been told it ought to be outraged by the violence of the Indians felt that the gods of law and order had been appeased by the severe treatment of Boughton and the Delaware County Indians, and opinion began to swing the other way. Of course, people said, there was no excuse for the murder of sheriffs, but that had been punished, and perhaps the tenants did have a grievance after all.

The next and final stage was inevitably that of compromise. Thomas Devyr urged the farmers to accept no minor concessions but to press on to total victory, but the farmers were not sure. Ira Harris, who had been elected to the legislature by the tenants' vote, and who was in the midst of maneuvers he regarded as politically expedient, was embarrassed by Devyr's radicalism and declared open war on him. In 1846 the legislature voted to tax the landlords' income from rent and to outlaw the seizure and forced sale of tenant property for nonpayment of rent. In the same year a constitutional convention took steps to expedite the end of the leasehold system. Devyr, of course, was not satisfied, but he had lost his influence, and he returned to New York a disappointed man. All the anti-rent prisoners were eventually pardoned, and Stephen Van Rensselaer sold his titles to speculators to make of them what they could. Legal struggles continued into the '80's and '90's, and it still happens now and then that an old Van Rensselaer claim has to be bought off, but to all intents and purposes the manor aristocracy was dead by 1852.

IV

We should not leave the subject without noticing the pattern of social conflict it reveals. In Iowa and South Dakota in 1932, when thousands of farms were being sold by the banks and insurance companies that held mortgages on them, bands of farmers got together and either prevented foreclosure sales altogether or defeated their purpose by keeping the bidding to ridiculously small sums—the five and ten cent sales, as they were called. The Farm Holiday Association, led by Milo Reno, had originally sought to raise the prices of farm produce, but foreclosure had become a more important issue than prices. Reno favored political action,

and won some concessions from the Iowa legislature, but farmers continued to protect property that was in danger. The financial interests looked for an incident, and they found one when Judge Bradley was taken from his Le Mars courtroom, threatened with hanging, and forced to kiss the American flag. Martial law was declared in seven counties, and hundreds of farmers were arrested. Organized resistance collapsed, and Reno urged the farmers to put their faith in Roosevelt. The Communists, some of whom had taken an active part in the holiday movements, were at that time opposed to Roosevelt, and they did their best to persuade the members to reject Reno's advice. Communist influence, however, quickly died out as New Deal relief measures were adopted.

One can also draw certain conclusions from the progress of the anti-rent war that seem applicable to a good deal of labor history. In the first place, American workers and farmers alike seldom resort to violence until they have tried all other methods of redressing their grievances. In the second place, cynical though it may seem to say so, violence often gets results. That is not to say that it achieves the aims at which it is specifically directed, for it usually arouses the public and brings punishment on innocent as well as guilty, but it does, as a rule, set in motion the processes of compromise. In the third place, political action in social conflicts ordinarily takes the form of bringing pressure on the major existing parties. The anti-renters were peculiarly fortunate, for the Democrats were traditionally friendly to the common man and the Whigs were bidding feverishly for his support, and there were friends in both parties for the tenants to reward. In the fourth place, though theoretical radicalism may be given a hearing at the height of struggle, the radicals are usually ousted by the compromisers, who may or may not be opportunistic self-seekers, in the final stage.

Turning to the defenders of the *status quo,* whether they happen to be industrialists or landlords, one notes that their first bulwark is the law. If that fails, they turn for support to the elements of the public that are not directly involved, emphasizing the theory of the entering wedge: their defeat will lead to a larger social catastrophe that will involve the general public. Finally it may be observed that the reprisals of the defenders, though legal in form, are in fact more violent than the acts they are designed to punish. This excess of violence becomes, in turn, a

factor in the modification of public sentiment that contributes to the ultimate compromise.

V

We have come a long way from James Fenimore Cooper and his novels. Judged in the light of the story told in *Tin Horns and Calico, Satanstoe* and its sequels strike one simply as the work of a confirmed reactionary. That Cooper should hold reactionary views cannot seem surprising. His father, Judge William Cooper, a strange combination of pioneer and country gentleman, was a staunch Federalist and a man who could threaten his tenants with ruin if they did not vote as he told them to. The son was brought up with full consciousness of the station of life in which it had been his good fortune to be born, and he married into the rich, conservative DeLanceys. For ten years he lived the life of a country gentleman, forsaking it only when accident turned him to literature, and in 1834, after several years in Europe, he remodeled palatial Otsego Hall in Cooperstown and settled down there for the rest of his life.

Yet nothing could be more false than the assumption that Cooper was the simple kind of reactionary his father's son might so easily have been. Cooper called himself a democrat at a time when many of the powerful landlords were still dreaming of monarchy, and during his years in Europe he constantly preached the superiority of American institutions. What is more, he became a Democrat with a big D, supporting Jackson in his fight against the bank and in most of his other controversial actions. Even when he was writing the anti-rent trilogy, he threw in footnotes to register his approval of Democratic expansionist policies, and he remained a loyal Democrat until his death.

Cooper's political partisanship has been minimized by most of his biographers, but, as Miss Dorothy Waples has shown in *The Whig Myth of James Fenimore Cooper,* he was a consistent Democrat and was treated as such by his enemies. Although she makes too little of other factors in his unpopularity in the '30's and '40's, she does sustain her contention that the attack upon the man and his books came in the Whig press. "You hate aristocrats," his Whig friend Peter Jay wrote him in 1832, "and therefore should not complain that they hate you. Your publications are intended to do them harm, and their writers attempt to injure you."

COOPER AND THE ANTI-RENTERS

No one has quite explained how Cooper became a Jacksonian, and in fact not enough of his correspondence has survived to make possible the full understanding of his frame of mind. Parties were in flux between 1804 and 1832, especially in New York State, and it was only gradually that the Whig Party formed itself out of various coalitions and realignments. Most of the Federalists, of course, emerged as Whigs, but at some point in the process of transition Cooper broke with his associates. The explanation, quite obviously, lies in his dislike of the merchants and industrialists, who were coming to dominate the new party. To Cooper money-grabbing seemed vulgar, and, furthermore, he was convinced that the commercial spirit was contrary to the spirit of democracy. "It is a mistake," he wrote a few years later, "to suppose commerce favorable to liberty. Its tendency is to a monied aristocracy, and this, in effect, has always been the polity of every community of merchants." A self-respecting landowner, he seems to have felt, might better ally himself with the party of the people than with a party of businessmen and cheap politicians. Most writers, as Brooks points out, shared Cooper's distaste for the Whigs —Bryant, Paulding, Morse, even Irving and Willis. "The left," as Brooks puts it, "was the side of the American imagination."

Cooper believed ardently in political democracy but he did not believe for a moment in the abolition of social distinctions. One of the great virtues of a democratic system of government, as he saw it, was the very fact that social distinctions could exist without injustice. In *The American Democrat* and in one novel after another he set forth his ideal of the American gentleman: this gentleman neither had nor sought special political privileges, but he was fully conscious of superiority to the masses in intelligence and taste, and he proposed to keep himself aloof from them. "It is unjust," Cooper wrote, "to require that men of refinement and training should defer in their habits and associations to the notions of those who are their inferiors in these particulars as it is to insist that political power should be the accompaniment of birth." Most gentlemen, he recognized, were born to that estate, but he saw no reason why the less fortunate should not strive to acquire merit: "It would be clearly unworthy of all noble sentiment to say that the groveling competition for money shall alone be free."

While he was in Europe, Cooper apparently convinced himself that in the United States there were precisely those degrees of political equality

and social inequality that he believed to be right. He returned to discover not merely that things were not as he had imagined but also that he, the arch-defender of American principles, was being attacked for lack of patriotism. Under the influence of surprise, he behaved tactlessly, and the battle was joined. The issue was wholly to the Whigs' liking: in their new strategy of popular appeal, which reached its climax in the Log Cabin campaign of 1840, nothing could be better than to attack Cooper the avowed Democrat as a snobbish, overbearing landlord, who looked up to Europe and maligned his own country. Cooper refused to be silenced by the onslaught, and pursued the Whigs in the courts and on the printed page.

The distinctions that Cooper made were not always easy to maintain in practice. "He was often at war with himself," Brooks writes, "for his tastes and prejudices were by no means in harmony with his conscience and convictions." Perhaps he felt that he had gone a long way in standing so staunchly for political democracy and that he was therefore entitled to speak without restraint on the subject of the social inferiorities of the masses. Perhaps, indeed, it was a suppressed desire to be an aristocrat in the political sense of the word that made him so outspoken in his claim to social eminence. At any rate there is a strange fury in his attack on lower-class vulgarians and middle-class upstarts. Take, for instance, his description in *Home as Found* of Aristabulus Bragg's behavior at the Effinghams' dinner, which not only is utterly devoid of the sympathy another writer might have exhibited but is sustained from start to finish by pure moral indignation. Cooper knew that there were worse sins than slovenly speech and bad table manners, but there were none that filled him with such rage.

Whatever else Cooper was, he was a member of the landed gentry, and he never forgot it. The fact that the governor who temporized with the Helderberg anti-renters was a Whig did not diminish the satisfaction with which Cooper sat down to "treat the subject of anti-rentism with the utmost frankness," but he would have done it in any case. The issues were to him perfectly clear: principle vs. expediency, law vs. anarchy, gentlemen vs. ruffians. If his democracy had been of a less abstract order, he might have been less assured, but he had conscientiously kept himself aloof from the people of the state, and he could believe anything about them he wanted to believe. He could also cling to his dream of the

American gentleman, though almost everyone else knew that the leasehold system was decaying and would continue to decay, no matter how patiently the tenants bore their hardships.

Looking back, one feels that Cooper's theme in the trilogy had admirable possibilities. Despite all the libel suits and polemics, he had been highly productive in the years since his return from Europe, and such diverse works as *The Deerslayer, Afloat and Ashore,* and *Home as Found,* to say nothing of *The American Democrat* and *The History of the Navy,* gave evidence of the range of his interests. One of these interests was the contemporary scene, but as the introduction to *Home as Found* shows, he was conscious that this was new and difficult ground for an American novelist, and he commented, as writers were to continue to do for several decades, on the barrenness of "ordinary American life" for the writer of fiction. What the rent theme gave him in the first place was a starting-point in the past, and of this, as has been said, he made excellent use. It also gave him, as he reached his own period, as dramatic a conflict as any novelist could ask to deal with. But he could not see this conflict at all, for he knew nothing about the people on one side. *The Redskins* is essentially a novel about the ideas and feeling of the Littlepages, not a novel about the struggle between the Littlepages and their tenants.

One emerges from the study, however, with more rather than less respect for Cooper. *Satanstoe* demonstrates how well he could write, and of the politics of *The Redskins* one can say that they represent Cooper at his worst. Outside the area in which he was dominated by his obsession with the idea of a landed gentry he had generous hopes for his fellow-countrymen. And he had courage, both as a man and as a writer.

THE FOLK ART OF JAZZ

By DAN G. HOFFMAN

THE AMERICAN SCENE for the last quarter-century has been characterized as "the jazz age." The cacophony of the industrial world, our frenetic attempts to escape the mechanization all about us, a turning away from the problems of modern life to a variety of opiates—these are some of the strains which comprise "the jazz age," and, we might imagine, may be detected in jazz music.

These conceptions are widely held, for it was not until recently that any accurate descriptions of jazz were available to the general public. Jazz reflects not a single one of the factors comprising "the jazz age." The last twenty-five years have been the jazz age for well-to-do sophisticated white people, while jazz has been the creation of a group at the opposite end of our social structure. The unlettered, unmoneyed Negroes created jazz—it is a form of their folk music, the most highly developed and integrated form of folk music ever to come into being in this country. Since folk art portrays the emotional and aesthetic nature of the group in which it arises—just as a more reflective form of art reveals the character of its individual artists—there is, then, a great deal to be learned from an analysis of jazz music.

This is especially true because jazz music at times has swung off the periphery of folk art, and has entered the sphere of reflective art in a form never before encountered. And this form promises a fruitful musical expression of many aspects of American life other than the Negro culture in which it arose.

Whether or not jazz itself becomes a mannered art form, already it has made some undeniable contributions to music—and modern music in America is sorely in need of contributions. But by now the question must have arisen, just what is jazz? The term is used in common speech to denote a wide range of popular music, whereas for the discriminating student it has a very specialized meaning. Jazz is most often confused with swing (dance music), as the same instruments and sometimes the same tunes are used in both, and often even the musicians are the same,

playing swing at one time and jazz at another. The similarities between jazz and dance music are only superficial, for jazz is intense and spontaneous, characterized by its improvisatory nature, while swing is an endless reiteration of musical clichés. Jazz is a way of playing music as well as a kind of music itself.

The music created and played in the jazz manner has in the past been almost entirely derived from the musical heritage and experience of the American Negro. This expression is obviously quite different from the music of Western Europe, and it is therefore of great interest to look at jazz critically to see what it can offer. Such an examination has been made several times in the past decade. One of the most comprehensive and persuasive criticisms has been that of Winthrop Sargeant, and the following passage from his book, *Jazz: Hot & Hybrid,* expresses the most widely held and most serious criticism of this music:

> The attendant weakness of jazz is that it is an art without positive moral values, an art which evades those attitudes of restraint and intellectual poise upon which complex civilizations are built. . . . It is a far cry from the jazz state of mind to that psychology of perfectability that lies, for example, behind the symphonies of a Beethoven, or the music dramas of a Wagner. . . .[1]

It is one of the purposes of this paper to examine "the jazz state of mind," and to show that jazz is an art form based upon musically expressed emotions which are communally experienced by its creator-performers, and communicated by them to their audiences in a form in which restraint, intellectual poise, and aesthetic discrimination play their proper parts. This form is new and unfamiliar, and even critics who have traced the origins of jazz as comprehensively as Sargeant has, are not always sure of its essential character.

II

It is important to see where jazz came from and how it became what it is, so that we may evaluate it intelligently and perhaps predict what will become of it. Jazz is a direct lineal descendant of Negro folk music, and Afro-American music is, of course, strongly related to the music of Africa. As everyone recognizes by now, the Negro is of a very musical race, and the circumstances of legal (and later economic) slavery in which American Negroes have lived are ideal for the development of

[1]Sargeant, Winthrop. *Jazz: Hot & Hybrid.* New York: Arrow Editions, 1938.

folk music. This kind of music has always been the genuine expression of the human spirit, coming from the common experiences of races and peoples; it could not survive unless it represented universal truths. The folk arts disappear as culture spreads over a people; when the heavy heritage of the past is readily available, the need for expression is all too often filled vicariously by previous generations' works, or, more rarely, it is developed into a highly mannered individual art which is usually not a universal expression of the society in which it is created.

The Negro in America has been left, musically, to his own devices, and his creative instincts have developed in directions not determined by the imposition of a more complex culture. The only musical instrument to which Negro slaves had access was the banjo. The only white music they heard was that of the hymnal. With the exception of that influence —and harmonically it may have been a strong one—the Negroes drew upon their African heritage and their own culture pattern in creating music in the new world.

Jazz can become extremely complex. Lest this be interpreted as a refinement added since the exposure of Negroes to white music, let us briefly examine some specimens of African tribal music which are available on records. On the Straus West African Expedition of the Field Museum of Natural History, Laura C. Boulton recorded some fine examples of the ceremonial and social songs and dances of various Negro tribes. These records (Victor album P-10) reveal a remarkable diversity and intricateness of musical expression among peoples of a civilization much less complex than our own.

Folk music, like any art form, is limited in the scope of its accomplishments by the techniques possible in its medium. In Africa the flute, xylophone, and various forms of harp impose the melodic limits. However, the Negroes turned to other components of musical form in the development of their tribal music. Analysis of some of the drum performances in the Boulton album will show how complex and integrated a development of rhythm exists in the Negro culture. European and American unfamiliarity with such a highly developed rhythmic expression has led many critics astray when they characterize African music as primitive or barbaric because they find it inadequate melodically or harmonically. Familiarity with the African idiom shows that its polyrhythm may easily be compared to the polyphony of European music in the baroque period.

Even more important than instruments in folk music is the human voice. The "Ceremonial Song of Obba's Wives and Obba" is a chant, the structure being that of the leader and the chorus singing alternate phrases. This, of course, can be encountered on any level, all the way to the Greek drama. "Obba's Wives" is no "Trojan Women," but it does provide a striking example of the type of music the Negro brought to America.

The Negro, after the Civil War, was, then, in this position musically: he had the temperament and talent to express himself, but heretofore he had been by circumstances—we might say mechanical circumstances—limited in the outlets for his expression. His first Afro-American music was (and is, for it still exists) vocal. The fanciful extravagance of the ballads,[2] the bitterness and vitality of the work songs,[3] and the personal sorrow of the blues[4] are by now well known. Striking similarities to the African records may be observed in these American Negro songs. Although the American music tends toward more complex melodies and the elimination of polyrhythms, in the structure of these songs their relationship to the African examples is clearly evident.

After the war many Negroes migrated to the cities. By the turn of the century they were in New Orleans and had learned to play the trumpet, trombone, tuba, clarinet, saxophone, and piano. New Orleans was certainly not the only home of early jazz, but it is New Orleans jazz which is best documented, and therefore of most interest. From the moment that the Negro learned to play instruments his music developed by leaps and bounds, since innumerable channels for his musical ideas were thus made available to him.

For the most part the Negroes learned to play their instruments without the benefit of classical instruction, and therefore they were able to discover qualities in the instruments which the traditional music of Europe

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[2]Good examples: "John Henry" and "The Gray Goose," Library of Congress recording no. AAFS 15. Transcribed by Lomax and Lomax in *Our Singing Country* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 260, and *Negro Folk Songs as Sung by Leadbelly* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 108, respectively.

[3]"It Makes a Long Time Man Feel Bad," Library of Congress recording no. FM 2; and "Jumpin' Judy," Library of Congress recording no. AAFS 13, transcribed in *Our Singing Country*, p. 392 (under the title "Drive It On").

[4]"I Been a Bad, Bad Girl," transcribed in *Our Singing Country*, p. 364; and "Fine and Mellow," by Billie Holliday, Commodore record no. C-526.

and America had not brought to light in over three centuries. The vibrato, hitherto the exclusive preserve of the aristocratic strings, emerged to bring emotion to the clarinet and saxophone, and to save the brasses from eternal fanfares. The trumpet was made more strident, muted to a moan, given a dozen voices by applying different mutes. This diversity in tone quality has progressed so far that any well-informed follower of jazz can easily distinguish between a score of performers on each of these instruments practically on the basis of tone quality alone.

In classical music the reeds and brasses had long been stereotyped, bound by tradition to certain tone qualities, and therefore severely limited in the emotional range they could portray. One of the greatest contributions, therefore, which jazz has made to music is the liberation of these instruments and the consequent enrichment of the emotionally evocative techniques at the disposal of the composer.

However, our immediate concern is with the kind of music the Negroes themselves played on their instruments. The tradition of their folk music molded the direction in which their instrumentalization moved. The polyrhythmic nature of Negro music found a freer expression in instrumental polyphony. Emphasis on the use of three or four instruments *harmonically* did not come in jazz for many years. The instruments were used as separate voices interpreting the same themes, rather than as unindividualized parts of an interpretation imposed upon the performers. As we shall see, this freedom of the individual, built about the discipline of remaining an integral part of the rest of the orchestra's interpretation, is the key to the most significant thing jazz has given us.

A record made in 1926 illustrates the transformation of Negro folk music from vocal to instrumental. "Salty Dog,"[5] is played by Freddy Keppard and his Jazz Cardinals, consisting of a trumpet (himself), clarinet, trombone, piano, banjo, and drums. The vocal chorus is part of the folk tradition:

Scaired as Ah ever been . . . in mah life,
Uncle Buddy like to caught me . . . kissin' his wife!
You salty dog . . . you salty dog!

The Lawd made a woman . . . He made her mighty funny,
Sweet lips aroun' her mouth . . . sweeter than honey,
You salty dog, sweet mamma, you salty dog!

[5]United Hot Clubs of America recording, no. UHCA-73.

The song, accompanied by four chords on a guitar or banjo, would be a fairly good example of folk singing. However, on this record the melody is taken by the trumpet, and the harmony is subservient to the counterpoint created by the clarinet (above) and the trombone (below). This polyphony, of course, must somehow be integrated, and it is the primary function of the melody's harmonic basis to furnish the integrating structure of chords on which the separate melodies are constructed. This record demonstrates the inventiveness of these early jazz musicians—the performance is characteristic of Negro jazz as far back as 1900-1910. Keppard plays the melody six times over, but only in a rudimentary sense could the successive choruses be called repetitions. Every phrase in each chorus differs from the corresponding phrase in any of the others. In addition to melodic differences, the rhythmic value of the notes varies widely. Offbeat emphasis, the delay of musical thought while the rhythmic pattern moves ahead of the melody, the melody's subsequent rush to recover the time almost lost, characterize not only this performance, but all good jazz of this kind.

III

It was not long before jazz had spread through the South, and white men were imitating it. For the most part "white jazz" was merely the forerunner of modern swing music, the true spirit of jazz being completely lost in the reduction to slick styles and written arrangements. Some white musicians, however, grew up in environments which placed them under strong Negro musical influences, and by the middle '20's there were a few who were trying to play real jazz themselves.

When jazz became commercially attractive the Negro bands fanned out from New Orleans, many of them in the early '20's coming to Chicago. A small group of young musicians in West End Chicago grew up with the jazz of King Oliver, Freddy Keppard, and Louis Armstrong as their musical fare, and they turned to this jazz because they found it in key with their own emotions. As it became their natural idiom they contributed to the Negro folk music various factors from their diverse backgrounds. Chicago jazz, the white jazz closest in style and feeling to the Negro sources, is characterized by cleaner playing and more restraint than is found in the music of New Orleans. Phrases are often economically constructed; sometimes they are even sparse. A feature of Chicago style is

the stop-and-go chorus toward the end of a performance, in which the melodic line of the theme is refined in a manner similar to the Cubist reduction to basic planes. Good examples of Chicago style are "Nobody's Sweetheart" and "Liza,"[6] recorded in 1927 by McKenzie-Condon's Chicagoans, and "The Jazz Me Blues" and "China Boy,"[7] played eleven years later by some of the same musicians, then in Jimmy MacPartland's band.

However, by the time a folk music becomes this complex, and the music is being discussed in terms of isolated performances and the solos of certain individuals, one may well wonder if it is still a folk music, and what its further development may be. As long as jazz has been improvisation strongly based upon the folk music of the Negro, it has been highly developed folk music whether played by Negroes or white men. Jazz is highly developed folk music not only because its techniques are so varied, but because they permit individuals to rise above the folk level of musical expression and to achieve something that other musicians have not been able to do. Using the term "race" in the sense of culture-pattern, folk music may be characterized as the race interpreting its own themes in song. Jazz may be said to be the individual interpreting the race's themes instrumentally.

In folk music the communal expression is sincere, but it is necessarily limited. While individuals comprising a group may have diverse and imaginative musical ideas, it is only in those realms in which their ideas are similar that the individuals can perform as a group. As pointed out above, the limitations of the human voice kept early American Negro music on a plane of development no higher than that of their ancestral African music. In jazz the communal nature of folk music is preserved, for without it there could be no unity in any improvisatory performance. Improvisers play in the same style; they are members of the same musical community, responding to influences in musical ways which complement one another's performances. Yet the emphasis is on the accomplishment of the individual, what his imagination can create to fit into the musical framework being created by his fellows. And as long as the things jazz attempts to express are based upon common experience within a culture pattern, the resulting music is genuine in the same sense that every folk music reflects the society in which it is created. That is why white musicians have been able to remain true to the spirit of jazz, while at the

[6]Columbia 35952 or UHCA 11-12. [7]Decca 18042.

same time adapting it to express themes not found in the Negroid pattern. "The Jazz Me Blues" has nothing in common with Negro blues, yet when played by the Chicago musicians mentioned above it is genuine jazz music.

IV

The question naturally arises, how far can the borders of jazz be extended? There have been serious and noteworthy attempts by some prominent composers to utilize the new techniques of jazz. The most important of these experiments is "La Creation du Monde," a ballet suite by Darius Milhaud.[8] The first half of the composition is impressionistic in its harmonic coloring, the jazz influence being present mainly in the orchestration. On the third side of the recording there is a long clarinet solo, accompanied by a typically jazz-like progression of chords repeated beneath it. The clarinet exhibits no vibrato (was Milhaud afraid of vibrato, if brave enough to attempt symphonic jazz?) and it is interesting to hear jazz figures executed with the clear tone of a symphonic clarinetist. However, this is one reason why the solo is obviously unspontaneous, despite Milhaud's efforts to create the dynamic atmosphere of a jazz performance. His studious syncopations turn out to be stereotypes, and when, on the final side of the recording, he tries to compose a tremendous collective "improvisation" the result is quite unwieldly. He has written polyphony for nineteen instruments, and in his efforts at spontaneity he has deliberately produced terrific disorganization and much more incoherence than results from a real jazz improvisation. Whatever its merits as ballet music, "La Creation du Monde" amply demonstrates that any further development of Negroid jazz must come from jazz itself, and not at the hands of "symphonic" composers. Some of the devices and musical effects of jazz can certainly be used to great advantage by contemporary composers, but it is unlikely that the folk themes of jazz will be improved by being divorced from a folk expression.

Jazz itself has developed away from its own backgrounds, and with the increasing sophistication of both musicians and audiences it is no surprise to find that arrangements and stylized effects are no longer being used by commercial bands only. Or, to put it differently, many of our former jazzmen have gone commercial, to the detriment of their jazz.

[8]Columbia Masterworks Set X-18.

Almost without exception, dance band compromises between improvised prototype and written stereotype have left jazz poorer.

There has been one notable exception, in which good jazz has been at lease partially written. This is the much-discussed case of Duke Ellington and his orchestra. The Ellington band is unique in that it existed for fifteen years (1927-1941) with practically no changes in personnel. Ellington is a man with a vivid orchestral imagination, and his musicians were carefully selected to fit the requirements of the band. As must be the case with a great hot band, every member is outstanding; the soloists are almost all in a class by themselves. And yet, more successfully than in any other large jazz orchestra, they play as if they felt and thought together.

Not only do the instrumentalists fit into Ellington's music, but he is also influenced by their styles, and to an appropriate degree molds his arrangements about them. There is little monotony in their music; quite to the contrary, the soloists in the Ellington band—Hodges, Bigard, Williams, Stewart—exhibit remarkable degrees of contrast, which have enriched his music.

Because of this diversity, and the skilful way in which these musical qualities have been woven together, it has been possible for this band to extend the emotional range of jazz music beyond that which any other orchestra has been able to achieve. Some of their best records bear this out: "Black and Tan Fantasy,"[9] "The Mooche,"[10] and "Echoes of the Jungle,"[11]—these are in the sombre, savage jungle style; "Mood Indigo,"[12] "Clarinet Lament,"[13] and "Warm Valley,"[14] are nostalgic and sensuous; and "Limehouse Blues,"[15] "It's Glory,"[16] and "Boy Meets Horn,"[17] are vigorous and robust. These selections show a great virtuosity and imagination on the part of the composer (Ellington) in using orchestrally the instrumental techniques developed by jazz. One reason for Milhaud's lack of success was that he tried to combine jazz themes with classical embouchres, whereas Ellington thinks in terms of exactly what he deals with.

While each of the above compositions seems to create a certain mood, improvisatory jazz such as the New Orleans and Chicago music has been most successful in the realm of music which does not convey intensely any *specific* mood. "Nobody's Sweetheart" and "China Boy" seem to

[9]Victor 24861. [10]Victor 24486. [11]Victor 22743. [12]Victor 22486. [13]Brunswick 7650. [14]Victor 26796. [15]Victor 22743. [16]Bluebird. [17]Columbia 36123.

convey an openheartedness, an enthusiasm, and sometimes the sense of the musician's struggle to surpass himself. But on the whole this improvised polyphony, like the polyphony of Bach, is abstract, while the Ellington combination of arrangement and improvisation may be called impressionistic.

Ellington has departed far from the cane fields of the Delta and the honkeytonks of Storeyville when he and his band produce a "Clarinet Lament." It is well known that Ellington is an admirer of Debussy and Delius, and he has not hesitated to draw upon European musical thought to come to grips with the moods he wishes to present. In "Clarinet Lament" there is little that is Negroid. In fact, some critics doubt that music like "Clarinet Lament" is jazz at all.

V

As has been pointed out above, jazz is not necessarily limited to Negro folk sources. If the methods of musical expression which were developed by jazz can be successfully applied to reflect the experience of other culture patterns, the resulting music will be true to the spirit of jazz. In this respect the fact that the members of the Ellington band are Negroes has obscured the much more relevant fact that their music stems from their participation in a common culture pattern. The thing which has been overlooked is that this pattern is one peculiar to the Ellington orchestra. It is a synthesis which they alone have achieved, of Basin Street, French impressionism, and the development of their own ideas within the framework of this unique pattern.

Ellington's orchestra has demonstrated the only direction in which jazz can extend its scope without betraying its essence. Improvised individual expression based upon a common pattern of experience is the method which jazz offers modern music. There is no reason to assume that this method could not be applied to many other schools of musical thought besides those discussed in this article. Integrated polyphony might be one essential characteristic of such a musical culture pattern; this should produce music possessing both dignity and vitality. Another trend might be to continue the Ellington practice of improvised solos against dynamic, intricately arranged backgrounds. It is quite possible that entirely new patterns may be evolved by experimenting with the method, rather than applying the method only to already existing channels of expression. The prospect is indeed exciting.

As for the purely improvisatory Chicago and New Orleans jazz, many fear that it is being exterminated by commercialism. It seems unlikely, however, that it will be completely lost until the conditions under which it came into being have ceased to exist. Folk arts do not disappear overnight unless the folk who create them change just as quickly. Perhaps the phenomenon of hot jazz musicians in night clubs and concert halls, and even in recording studios, will no longer be common, but as long as the Negro is kept in economic serfdom and cultural isolation, there will be Negro folk music.

Yet this free, improvisatory jazz does not seem due for much further aesthetic development. There may be later King Olivers and Bix Beiderbeckes, there may be Benny Goodmans yet to come who will make Goodman himself sound as archaic as Johnny Dodds seems beside him, and this will add variety to the ways in which jazz expresses its Negroid-based folk culture in polyphony. But it seems likely that we have heard almost all that such polyphony has to say, if not yet in all the ways it has to say it.

However, this is no indictment of pure jazz. Like all folk arts, and all arts, it has its merits as well as its limitations, and in this case the merits are considerable. Jazz should be accepted for what it is and for what it has given us: a new approach to musical creation, a democratic approach never before encountered on so high an aesthetic level. The experience of jazz is rich and inspiring, and if it is understood and applied with taste and intelligence, it may well provide a much-needed opportunity for American music to express more adequately the perplexing times in which we live.

JOHN PETER ALTGELD: PIONEER PROGRESSIVE

By CHARLES A. MADISON

JOHN PETER ALTGELD, the most abused and reviled man of his generation, was an infant of three months when his parents brought him here from Germany in the spring of 1848. The family settled on a farm near Mansfield, Ohio, and eked out a bare existence. Mr. Altgeld was a harsh and bigoted man and forced John Peter, his eldest son, to help him on the farm from early childhood. At the age of thirteen the boy was doing a man's share in the field and the chores of the farm as well. Notwithstanding his very little schooling, however, he early evidenced a marked eagerness for reading and pored over every book he could lay hands on. In 1864, when only sixteen, he enlisted as a substitute for one of the Ohio Home Guards. During his hundred days of service he contracted a fever which kept him at the field hospital for a fortnight and from which he was to suffer recurrently in later years.

Life on the farm now became increasingly irksome to him. He read a great deal, attended a term in high school and another in a nearby seminary, and then taught school for two years. At twenty-one he fell in love with Emma Ford, a fellow teacher. When her father objected to him because of his poverty he decided to go west in search of his fortune. After working his way along from farm to farm, and nearly dying from a virulent recurrence of fever, he reached Savannah, Missouri, where he quickly established himself as an able and ambitious youth. By 1871 he had learned enough law to be admitted to the bar, and two years later he was elected state attorney for the county on a combined Democrat-Granger ticket. In the campaign he first articulated his liberal views. But the work of public prosecutor did not prove congenial to him, and late in 1875 he resigned his office and left for Chicago.

Altgeld was twenty-eight when he arrived in the Illinois metropolis to begin his legal career anew. After several months of increasing hardship he began to get a few clients. In another year he was not only earning his expenses but saving money. He now again wooed Emma Ford,

this time successfully. The marriage proved highly felicitous, except for childlessness.

With Chicago growing fast, Altgeld was quick to perceive the possibilities of large profits in real estate manipulations. In 1879 he invested five hundred dollars in a lot. One advantageous deal led to others. Before long his farsighted and shrewd enterprise gained him considerable wealth. He thereupon turned his talents to the erection of office buildings. Each new structure gave him the pleasure of creative achievement—becoming to him a means of sublimating his strong parental craving.

Altgeld also resumed his interest in politics. His known liberal views and his knowledge of German made him a welcome speaker at labor rallies. In 1884 he ran for Congress, but lost because Illinois went Republican. Success came to him two years later, when he was elected as judge in the Cook County Superior Court with the open support of labor.

An important factor in his election was the publication in 1884 of his book, *Our Penal Machinery and Its Victims.* Here he was the earnest reformer, urging the removal of the causes of crime. He criticized the prevailing penal system as a tragic failure; pointed out that most criminals come from the poor with broken or no homes, and that the police furthered crime by their brutality and needless arrests; and condemned especially the indiscriminate imprisonment of young offenders. Among the reforms he advocated were a more intelligent system of fines, paid work for prisoners, indeterminate sentences, and the abolition of grand juries. His discussion of each proposed improvement was based on facts and figures gathered from many sources and buttressed by a humane and persuasive logic. The book was well received and brought him invitations to address gatherings of professional groups. It also gained him the devoted and lifelong friendship of George A. Schilling, a young Chicago labor leader.

Altgeld served as judge for five years. While on the bench he became known for his fair and fearless conduct and was highly respected by lawyers and litigants alike. In 1890 his colleagues honored him with the office of chief justice. The following year, however, he resigned. Court procedure had begun to irritate him; the judicial robes proved tawdry and confining. He had by now acquired assets worth around a million dollars and was eager to make the most of his wealth. Once free from his judicial duties, he decided to erect "the finest and best office building

on earth." He was very proud of this enterprise, which he named Unity Building, and spared no expense in its construction.

Despite his preoccupation with the rising Unity Building and his extensive law practice, Altgeld continued to participate in public affairs. He took his stand as a liberal each time, never forgetting his lowly origin and his devotion to Jeffersonian ideals. As early as 1886—the year of great labor unrest, capped by the Haymarket riot—he wrote in favor of the arbitration of strikes. He also advocated legislative reforms, the Australian ballot, the abolition of the sweatshop system, and the enactment of the eight-hour workday. In 1890 he published a number of his papers on these and other similar subjects in the first edition of *Live Questions*. Subsequently the volume was reissued to include his later addresses. The book at once established him as a vigorous and intelligent critic of current social maladjustments. The liberals in Chicago eagerly claimed him as their own, while the Chicago *Tribune* was the first to disparage him as a follower of Karl Marx.

* * *

Early in 1892 the politicians in both major parties knew that they could not win in the coming election without the help of the rising Populist vote. Since the Republicans were generally regarded as the party of the large corporations and therefore inimical to the impoverished farmers, the Democrats tried to capitalize on their favorable opportunities by picking candidates able to win the allegiance of the aroused People's party. It was this political exigency which forced the Illinois Democrats to nominate John Peter Altgeld as its candidate for governor. An experienced and shrewd campaigner, Altgeld made his stand on a reform platform and won by a sizable majority.

Friends of Governor Altgeld assumed that one of his first official acts would be the pardon of the surviving Haymarket anarchists. Instead he busied himself with the replacement of Republican officeholders by deserving Democrats and able reformers. To Schilling and Clarence Darrow, who prodded him about the pardon, he said that he would act when he was ready and that he would do what he thought was right. On June 3 he condemned the lynching of a Negro in Decatur in an official proclamation that made a stir over the nation. Four days later he delivered his notable address to the graduating class of the University

of Illinois, in which he told the students, among other things, to think of justice realistically as "a struggling toward the right."

On June 26 Altgeld issued his famous 18,000-word pardon of the three Haymarket anarchists. Citing the record and many affidavits, which Schilling had obtained for him, he demonstrated that the jury was not chosen by chance as required by law but from a panel collected personally by a special bailiff who boasted that he had called only those men who "he believed would hang the defendants," and that Judge Joseph Gary had upheld the bailiff and had assisted in selecting the prejudiced jury. He showed further that much of the evidence was "a pure fabrication" on the part of the police officials who had terrorized and bribed witnesses; that it was Captain Bonfield's sadistic brutality which was chiefly responsible for the Haymarket riot. Finally he pointed out that "the State has never discovered who it was that threw the bomb that killed the policeman, and the evidence does not show any connection whatever between the defendants and the man who did throw it." Yet the record revealed "that every ruling throughout the long trial on any contested point was in favor of the State; and further, that page after page on the record contains insinuating remarks of the judge, made in the hearing of the jury, and with the evident intent of bringing the jury to his way of thinking."

Governor Altgeld knew the consequences of his outspoken condemnation of this judicial wrong. He knew also that he could have issued the pardon as a matter of mercy and received the plaudits of the public. But he refused to compromise with justice. A study of the record had convinced him that the anarchists had been wronged by a prejudiced judge and jury and his conscience impelled him to rectify this injustice done to the dead and living victims. Even more important to him was the need to expose and thus to nullify a judge-made precedent which would have deprived the people of a trial by a jury of their peers.

The expected happened. The storm broke with exceeding violence. With very few minor exceptions the newspapers of the country followed the lead of the Chicago *Tribune* in a protracted outpouring of personal vituperation. The very eminent citizens who had earlier petitioned him for the pardon now execrated him for impugning the sanctity of the courts. These men of wealth and power, unwilling to concede their unsavory part in the trial of the anarchists and finding Altgeld's legal

position impregnable, tried to hide their own guilt by denouncing him as the enemy of our hallowed legal system.

John "Pardon" Altgeld faced the storm without flinching. "It was the crowd on one side and John Peter Altgeld on the other," as he was to remark more than once. Armed with a clear conscience, he stood pat. When asked if he regretted the pardon, he quickly exclaimed: "Never! If I had the matter to act upon again tomorrow, I would do it over again." But he deeply resented the scurrilous invective which the gentlemen of the press and the clubs continued to publish against him—and his heart hardened against them. Instead of shrinking into obscurity, as his enemies had expected, he emerged from the slanderous onslaught firmly resolved to battle for the right as he saw it. Nelly Bly of the New York *World,* who had come to scoff, perceived the true Altgeld during her interview with him: "I am glad to say that I have met and talked with Governor Altgeld, who is going to do as he thinks right every time, if the whole world stands still."

* * *

The deepening economic depression forced Governor Altgeld to act in a manner which nonplussed and irritated the heads of corporations and their vociferous mouthpieces. In June, 1893, strike riots in Lemont, causing the death of several workmen, made it necessary for him to send state troops to the scene of disorder. Unlike previous executives, however, he followed them at once to make sure that justice was done. In his report he put the blame for the killings on the employer. The following Labor Day he told Chicago workmen candidly that hard times were ahead and that while he as governor would not let them down, constitutional provisions would make it impossible for him to give them much assistance. He urged them to organize along lawful lines in an effort to help themselves. He also addressed the state militia to impress upon them their duty to keep law and order above all things and to kill only as a last resort.

Early in 1894 the soft coal miners went out on a nationwide strike. In sending militia to the Illinois strike scenes Governor Altgeld instructed the officers that "it is not the business of the soldiers to act as custodians or guards of private property." His readiness to send the militia promptly and his insistence on law and order helped to prevent bloodshed.

The Bourbon obstinacy and callous greed of George Pullman and his chief stockholder Marshall Field forced the aggrieved employees of

the Pullman factories to strike in May, 1894. Pullman was indignant at this ingratitude. "Why," he told reporters, "the average wage being earned is $1.87 a day!" He made no mention however, of the reserve of $4,000,000 which remained in the company's treasury from the profits of the previous year, or of the $26,000,000 which it possessed in undivided profits. For more than a month the strike remained almost unnoticed in the excitement of more acute labor disturbances. Late in June, however, the American Railway Union, of which most of the Pullman strikers were members, began a boycott against trains containing Pullman cars. This action was taken after Pullman, despite the urging of business and political leaders, had flatly refused to arbitrate; it was voted also against the pleas of their president, Eugene V. Debs, who feared the consequences of a general strike. So effective was this boycott at first that few trains were in operation. The union appeared on the verge of victory.

At this point Attorney-General Richard Olney, intimately connected with the railroads, determined to break the strike. He knew the mind of Governor Altgeld and decided to act without him. In appointing Edwin Walker, also a railroad attorney, as his representative in Chicago, he advised him "to go into a court of equity and secure restraining orders which shall have the effect of preventing any attempt to commit the offense." Judges Grosscup and Woods helped Walker to prepare the sweeping injunction before granting it. Olney then ordered the Chicago marshal to engage several thousand deputies. These armed officers, who were paid by the railroads and whom the Chicago superintendent of police characterized as "thugs, thieves, and ex-convicts," at once acted to incite disorder and thus give Olney the excuse to call out federal troops.

All this time the state authorities were being deliberately and contemptuously disregarded, even though Governor Altgeld had earlier demonstrated his readiness to send the state militia at once wherever it was needed to preserve order. While he kept himself informed about conditions in Chicago and held several regiments in readiness, he could not legally interfere so long as the city remained relatively quiet. The arrival of the federal soldiers, however, quickly resulted in severe rioting and several deaths. At that point the mayor, largely at Altgeld's initiative, made the request for state troops. The militia arrived promptly and readily succeeded in restoring order.

Several days later Debs and three other union leaders were indicted for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. It was the first prosecution under this four-year-old law—a law passed to curb not labor unions but monopolistic businesses like the Pullman Company and the large railroads. A week later, however, realizing that action under this law would result in a long-drawn-out legal battle, Olney was instrumental in having the four defendants rearrested for disobeying the federal injunction. Debs was sentenced to six months in jail and the others to three for contempt of court. Once they were safe in the penitentiary the Department of Justice conveniently dropped the earlier indictment. But by that time the strike was already lost.

Altgeld was deeply provoked by this brazen and unconstitutional interference with his duties as executive officer. He had been sending state troops to strike centers in other parts of Illinois at the slightest sign of disorder, although he knew that in most instances the trouble was fostered by the railroads who were unable to get crews to run their trains. Olney's machinations to break the strike at all costs appeared to him as the antithesis of democratic government. When the federal troops entered Chicago Altgeld sent a long telegram to President Cleveland protesting against the unwarranted and unconstitutional federal interference in the local affairs of the state of Illinois. He reminded him that the Constitution gave the President no right to send troops into a state unless there was obvious proof of need or unless requested by local officials. He further pointed out that the state of Illinois was able not only to look after its own obligations but to furnish help to the federal government.

President Cleveland's guarded reply briefly denied these allegations and insisted that the federal government had acted within its rights. His supercilious attitude only intensified Altgeld's concern for the fundamental principles of our democratic form of government. He immediately telegraphed his detailed accusation that the President was evading "the question at issue—that is, that the principle of local self-government is just as fundamental in our institutions as is that of Federal supremacy." Point by point he demonstrated that the action of the federal government served to undermine local self-government and encourage dictatorship. The President's second reply was curt and final. His dogmatic assertion of authority and his refusal to discuss the issue in question put an end to

the controversy—but not before Altgeld had stated fully and unequivocally the basic problems raised by Olney's methods of breaking the strike.

Again the press and the politicians resumed their campaign of calumny and imprecation against Governor Altgeld. Without bothering to ascertain the facts or to consider the principles involved, they attacked him with intensified ferocity and condemned him as a traitor and scoundrel. Again the Chicago *Tribune* led the pack at his heels: "This lying, hypocritical, demagogical, sniveling Governor of Illinois does not want the laws enforced. He is a sympathizer with riot, with violence, with lawlessness and with anarchy." The highly respectable *Nation* was equally abusive, calling him "boorish, impudent, ignorant," a "professional blatherskite." All these agents of public opinion, representing both major parties, lauded President Cleveland for his successful preservation of law and order. Yet the facts of the strike as stated by Colonel Carrol D. Wright, chairman of Cleveland's own investigating committee, vindicated not the federal government but Governor Altgeld. He and later investigators agreed that Altgeld was correct in his insistence that the newspaper accounts of violence before the arrival of federal troops were mostly either pure fabrications or wild exaggerations. Nor were Cleveland and Olney able to substantiate their claim that the strike had held up the mail trains—their chief excuse for interference. According to L. L. Troy, Superintendent of Mails, throughout the strike "the greatest delay to any outgoing or incoming mails probably did not exceed from eight to nine hours at any time."

* * *

In 1894 Governor Altgeld's detractors gloated in their certainty of having killed him off politically for good and all. But they were thoroughly mistaken. They had merely kindled his righteous anger. Convinced that his cause was just, he was all the more determined to fight the greedy corporations and their henchmen in office. As governor he was in a position of power. He severely criticized the coal company at Spring Valley, whose cupidity had resulted in repeated strikes and bloodshed. "While we welcome," he stated, "every honest enterprise and industry, we cannot allow our State to become merely a forage ground for wolfish greed." In his detailed and acidulous review of the Pullman strike he lashed out against the malpractices of corporations and the "usurpation

of power" by the courts. The danger to the country, he declared, came not from the so-called anarchists but "from that corruption, usurpation, insolence, and oppression that go hand in hand with vast accumulation of wealth, wielded by unscrupulous men." Symptomatic of this danger was the "new form of government" effected by the judiciary—*"government by injunction."* The first state executive to bring the ominous issue into the open, he discussed the origin and effect of labor injunctions with incisive clarity, and stressed the dictatorial powers which the courts were wielding by this means. Eager for the force of his criticism to strike home, he added: "These injunctions are a very great convenience to corporations when they can be had for the asking by a corporation lawyer, and these were the processes of the court to enforce which the President sent the federal troops to Chicago!"

A few months later the Supreme Court fully validated Altgeld's arraignment in its decisions against the income tax rider and the Debs petition. For many years a federal income tax had been regarded as legal by the courts. Such a tax helped greatly to finance the Civil War. In 1894 Congress restored a federal tax on incomes as a rider to the Wilson-Gorman tariff bill. The following year the eminent corporation lawyer Joseph H. Choate persuaded a majority of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Fuller, who had been Marshall Field's attorney, that a tax on incomes "is communistic in its purposes and tendencies and therefore unconstitutional." This legalistic speciousness was criticized by Altgeld in a public statement charged with sarcastic scorn. He pointed out that the unexpected reversal would save millions of dollars to "the Standard Oil kings, the Wall Street people, as well as the rich mugwumps" at the expense of the producing classes.

In denying Debs' appeal the Justices unanimously upheld not only the use of injunctions but also the employment of federal troops to enforce them. Altgeld's comment on this decision was equally caustic. He observed that "for a number of years it has been marked that the decisions of the United States courts were nearly always in favor of corporations." This power of capitalism has caused, among other evils, "that corrupt use of wealth, which is undermining our institutions, debauching public officials, shaping legislation and creating judges who do its bidding." This denunciation of the rapacious rich and a reactionary court, while motivated as much by personal resentment as by crusading

zeal, made him widely known as the protagonist of the poor and the champion of the underdog.

* * *

The Populist movement continued through the early 1890's to gain in strength and to center its attention upon the monetary problem. Altgeld, despite the persistent vilification in the public press, was too shrewd and sharp a judge of men not to take advantage of the logic of events. While not at first a strong "silver" man, he was quick to use this issue as a weapon against the Cleveland faction and the corrupt city bosses. Always the student, he applied himself to the subject of money with a thoroughness which soon familiarized him with its history and basic principles. His skilful use of facts, figures and financial logic made him the most formidable opponent of the eminent "goldbugs." At the same time his sagacity and drive in building up the silver forces brought him to the fore as their effective spokesman. At his instigation free-silver Democrats met at special state conferences in order to make known their views and to prepare for the national convention in 1896. The Illinois Democrats enthusiastically adopted his free-silver plank and made him chairman of the state delegation.

When the Democrats began to gather in Chicago for the national convention most of them turned to Governor Altgeld for leadership. His "no compromise" stand became their pillar of strength, and they clung to it as the rock of their salvation. The "gold" Democrats found themselves without influence. The delegates proceeded to adopt the most radical platform on record. The reform planks on labor, the courts, injunctions, civil and personal liberties, money and the income tax were Altgeld's to the letter; while he was not on the drafting committee, he dominated it by virtue of his towering political and intellectual stature. In the light of his Ishmaelite status two years earlier, his triumph was truly extraordinary. In the opinion of many observers he would certainly have received the nomination for President had he been born in this country. As it was, he helped to select William Jennings Bryan, whose "Cross of Gold" speech had won the hearts of the delegates.

The campaign was noted for its intense acrimony and violent passion. Mark Hanna, wealthy businessman and McKinley's manager, collected and spent millions of dollars to "educate" the voters concerning the merits

of his candidate. He cleverly avoided the main monetary question. Instead, he concentrated the attack on the radicalism of the Democratic platform and Bryan's "rattlepated" youthfulness. Governor Altgeld was assailed with intensified fury. All the Republican dailies and weeklies delineated him as the vicious and anarchistic boss of his party, with Bryan as his pliant dupe. Republican orators everywhere did their utmost to condemn the Democratic platform as a subversive and pernicious document fathered by a notorious anarchist.

Governor Altgeld, though ill and weary, fought back with leonine grit. He neglected his own campaign for re-election in order to devote himself to national issues. In speeches and interviews he argued for the liberalism of the Democratic platform with consummate cogency. He went to New York to present his side of the Pullman strike and to clarify the principles involved. He also presented the case for free silver with such common-sense forcefulness that none of his Republican opponents —not even the eminent Carl Schurz who was sent to Chicago for this purpose—succeeded in vitiating his premises. Yet the forces under Mark Hanna, aided by an endless supply of money, managed to attract enough voters to win at the polls.

* * *

When Altgeld became governor in 1893 he was worth more than a million dollars and highly esteemed as a civic leader; when he ended his term four years later he was nearly penniless and one of the most abused men in the history of our country. Again the Chicago *Tribune* led in the gloating over his defeat and congratulated the citizens of Illinois on having rid themselves of the greatest threat to their welfare. The record, however, was otherwise. Handicapped by corrupt and antagonistic legislatures that fought his recommendations with every trick at their command, he nevertheless pushed through the following reforms: a civil service law, an inheritance tax law, laws providing for the indeterminate sentence, parole and probation of prisoners, regulating the sweatshop system and child labor, limiting the period of work for women to eight hours, as well as laws instaling factory inspection and a state board of arbitration for industrial disputes. He was untiring in his efforts to protect and promote the rights of the poor, to put an end to public corruption and to tax evasion on the part of rich corporations, to build up the Uni-

versity of Illinois and the Chicago park system, to further the ends of justice by tempering it with mercy—although he exercised his pardoning power very sparingly.

His use of the executive veto is best seen in his fight against public utility franchises, or the "Eternal Monopoly Bills," which the state legislature passed in 1895 after receiving the required graft from the interested companies. When these corporations learned of his attitude toward these bills, their agents tried to offer him upward of a half million dollars. And he might have let the bills become laws by default or even by vetoing them perfunctorily—as he badly needed the money. Instead, even as in the Haymarket case, he followed his crusading conscience. His vigorous veto exposed the evil of these measures, terming them "a flagrant attempt to increase the riches of some men at the expense of others by means of legislation." He also excoriated the corruption of the legislators and fought against the defeat of his veto—succeeding by the grace of one vote.

Altgeld left the governor's office an old man at forty-nine. The four years of intensive struggle for the right had sapped his strength and impaired his health. Nor were his troubles at an end. Bank failures involving men he had trusted, his impoverished condition, the illness of his wife, and the continued persecution in the press served further to depress his spirit. Moreover, after years of great political and intellectual exertion he could not get used to a relatively tame existence. Nor were his spirits lifted by the few speeches which he made during the next two years. He was still in this dark mood when his friends persuaded him to run for mayor of Chicago against the turncoat Carter Harrison in 1899. The latter had aligned himself with the reactionary Democratic bosses and was ready to scrap his 1896 platform. Since he was in control of the city political machine, it was necessary for Altgeld to place himself on an independent ticket. Lacking both the money and the physical energy to put up a strong campaign, the weary crusader failed to dislodge Harrison from office.

Defeat acted as a powerful prophylactic. The fear that his enemies were about to seize control of the Democratic party strengthened Altgeld's combative spirit. He began a strategic campaign that once more revealed his great skill as a politician and his uncompromising devotion to progressive reform. In speeches, interviews, and personal conferences he helped to acquaint the people with the designs of the scheming reactionaries.

The latter tried to choke his influence at the source by getting Harrison to keep him from being a delegate to the national convention. Altgeld, however, attended the gathering as a member of the party. The spontaneous cheers of the delegates made it possible for him to address them from the rostrum and subsequently to exert a major influence over the deliberations of their committees. In the end the 1896 platform was reaffirmed and Bryan was again the nominee for President. Altgeld's triumph was complete when his proposed plank against imperialism was adopted as "the paramount issue of the campaign."

Altgeld and Bryan fought strenuously and effectively, visiting many states and rousing the voters to a consideration of the important issues. But prosperity was over the land again and the "full dinner pail," for which the Republicans claimed full credit, was a more potent argument than any of those offered by the Democrats. McKinley's majority was even greater than in 1896.

Altgeld felt deeply the sting of defeat. Yet he continued to believe in the rightness of his principles and in the ultimate triumph of social justice. Shortly after the election he resumed the practice of law as a means of earning a living. His zeal was remarkable and his achievements in the courtroom renewed his reputation as a great lawyer. He did not, however, slacken his strong interest in public affairs and continued to address audiences on topics of timely importance.

On March 11, 1902, after a strenuous day in court defending a hackman's union against a strike injunction, he went to Joliet to speak in behalf of the Boers. He discoursed for about forty-five minutes, ending with the words, "Wrong may seem to triumph. Right may seem to be defeated. But the gravitation of eternal justice is toward the throne of God. Any political institution which is to endure must be plumb with that line of justice." He sat down and was applauded enthusiastically. Two minutes later, feeling dizzy, he left the stage and collapsed in the wings—the victim of a cerebral hemorrhage. Early the next morning he was dead. For once both friends and foes joined together in honoring his memory. Civic leaders and tens of thousands of common citizens stood for hours in the cold rain to pay their respects to the man who in Darrow's words "died as he had lived, fighting for freedom."

In the last year of his life Altgeld published a small book, *Oratory: Its Requirements and Rewards.* It was a clear, practical manual based on his own successful efforts as a public speaker. Its favorable reception pleased him deeply. To his friend H. D. Lloyd he wrote, "It is one of my children that the world is not frowning on."

For all his preoccupation with legal work and civic affairs, he was able to complete another short work immediately before his death, *The Cost of Something for Nothing.* Friends brought it out posthumously. Its thesis is well explained by the title. While each chapter dwells on a different topic, all of them concentrate on the admonition that in the long run one never gets something for nothing; "that a man cannot indulge in a mean trick, be it ever so small, without lowering his moral status." It is most severe on those who prized wealth and personal success above the rights of their fellows. Even the most affluent of them were in truth failures and victims of moral leprosy if their millions were tainted by injustice. However, it lavished praise on the honest and the upright—those who cherished true democracy and worked to make it prevail. It assured these lovers of justice that "to establish liberty for mankind is the highest mission on earth." No doubt thinking of his own agitated career and of the agony he had suffered over and over again, Altgeld asserted that "he who has deep down in his soul the knowledge that he has always fought for the right and that he never knowingly has wronged another, could not be unhappy though the whole world were arrayed against him."

The Cost of Something for Nothing is in a real sense Altgeld's last will and testament. For all its naive moralizing and vague mysticism, it truly expresses his distilled thoughts on the values and vices of human existence. One cannot read these didactic essays without being moved by their complete sincerity, their eloquent idealism, their prophetic nobility of spirit. In these pages the whole man emerges life-size. His career is clearly reflected in his ethical conclusions. His deep hatred of injustice and oppression bred in him the belief in moral retribution, and made him, in the words of Brand Whitlock, "one of the forerunners of the newer and better time of the moral awakening in America."

AUTHORITY, ORDER, DISCIPLINE, LOYALTY

By ALTON PARKER THOMASON

BACK IN THE 1830's, in Tennessee, a man named McNeil, I think it was, got into trouble, bad trouble. Some of his friends went to him, said: "You've got to get away, got to escape!" He got away and settled down in Arkansas and before long he got in trouble again. Same thing, had to get away. So he went down to Texas, got in trouble again. Somebody said to him: "You've got to get away, got to escape." And McNeil said: "Where in the hell can I go—I'M IN TEXAS NOW!"

* * *

It comes about that Mr. Eric R. Bentley, writing in the Spring 1944 issue of the *Antioch Review,* presents an essay called "Romanticism: A Re-Evaluation." The editors say that in their judgment it is "one of the finest it has been their privilege to print." I heartily concur. But Bentley's piece made a few people very, very angry. Among the angry men is Mr. Robert Heilman, who comes back in the Winter 1945 issue of the *Sewanee Review* with a blistering rejoinder: "Mr. Bentley's Bad Boys: Reactionaries."

These two essays, together, represent another terrific slugging match over that most compelling of all present-day questions: Who's a Fascist, What is He? Of the two writers Heilman is the more violent; so much so in fact that "Mr. Bentley's Bad Boys" would be richly comic if its implications and overtones were not so serious and so menacing. I am in Texas now, writing in January of the year 1945; nothing is very funny to me and my associates, and the fascist concept and fascist method are the unfunniest of all. Since the national press has not been overly diligent in reporting the affair, I should perhaps point out that the University of Texas is now engaged in a death struggle for survival, and that the outcome is still in grave doubt. It is hardly necessary to say further that the University of Texas is one of a comparatively few free universities left in the whole wide world.

Bentley suggests that T. S. Eliot and a number of poets and critics in America are fascist in temper, or he nearly suggests it, or he suggests that they are a little bit fascist—which last, for my money, is like being a little bit pregnant. Heilman comes back with a bitter and vociferous: Not so; we are not anything of the sort, you rascal you. You can't put a brown shirt on us. We don't want a gestapo. All we want to do is to tell people how to behave. Heilman goes on to show that this is a time of chaos and disorder, that somebody must set it right. Then he hits some knotty questions. Who? How? By what method?

Obviously Heilman writes from a We-Us point of view. He dives into the Bentley essay and comes up with some fighting words: *reactionary, nostalgia, Nazi, authoritarian.* These are bad words; he submits some good words of his own: *authority, order, discipline, loyalty.* He says, in effect, that Bentley doesn't know B from Bullsfoot about semantics and doesn't know how to read. He doesn't even know what a poet is, who The Poets are. He doesn't know that the nineteenth century ought never to have happened. Bentley beats the English language to death, Heilman intimates, forgetting the sawed-off baseball bat he is whirling around his own head. I am reminded of the Irishman who yells, "What lowdown, misbegotten bogtrotter threw that brick?" while he bends down to pick up a paving block.

I will not discuss the notion that T. S. Eliot, the Hutchinsites, the agrarian poet-critics, or anybody else whom Heilman undertakes to interpret may be called fascist or nearly fascist. To me the spectacle of how-his-hair-is-growing-thin Eliot sitting in his privately imagined and privately shared waste land, sprinkling sanctified ashes over his toupee is simply embarrassing, if not downright obscene. Cry heretic, philistine, anything you please; I submit that it is attaching too much importance to yourself to wake up, find your own world bankrupt, and thereupon issue the poetic pronouncement that all human worlds are bankrupt.

I propose to talk about two apparently contradictory attitudes, attitudes that, as I see them, come to the same thing in the end. It is not difficult, indeed, to understand how the advocates of the one should also espouse the other. The first attitude reveals reaction followed by headlong retreat (for reaction and retreat, read defeatism and appeasement if you like); the other attitude is a demand by the same group for authority, order, discipline, and loyalty. I propose to show that a small group of strangely

assorted companions are in full flight, and that as they flee they are calling for the police. They are "classicists," "medievalists," "agrarians," "Hutchinsites"—and hitchhikers.

We have learned about the usual procedures that go before the official setting up of a fascist state. In some of its external manifestations, it looks deceptively like a lower-middle-class movement, so that in America we have been in the habit of looking with wry amusement upon the antics of the front men, the men who are out in the open. Huey Long is dead, we say; Martin Dies has been "retired to private life"; O'Daniel has lost his hold on the common people. All true—maybe; at least Huey is dead. But perhaps we have not fully realized that front men come a dollar a dozen, and some of us don't know that they are never funny. But what I am inquiring into here is a novel and not generally recognized aspect of fascism, a possible literary-scholastic approach by intellectuals, poets, and a few educational administrators. This is all the more curious and interesting since in America the poets and the intellectuals are almost universally considered unimportant people.

The once solid group who brought out the book *I'll Take My Stand* is now scattered, has no solidarity and very little weight. They were sometimes called the Southern Literary Agrarians, sometimes the Confederate Poets, sometimes things that I wouldn't lay my tongue to. To snipe at them is about like shooting at a dead duck with a ten-gauge shotgun. As a matter of fact, I am not myself in the least scornful of the agrarians. When they were going good they raised a lot of satisfying and important hell. They brought forward by a combination of original invention and diligent resurrection some arresting ideas about poetry and criticism. For a while it even looked as though they might plunge into the economic and political struggle of the real South, the South of 1865-1940, but they fizzled out and drifted away. Bilbo, Rankin, Talmadge and the others are mighty disagreeable men, and they play a rough, tough, and dirty game. But the agrarians woke up a lot of people who had been asleep for a long time, woke them up and made them mad, and made them talk back. And then *they* went to sleep.

But Heilman once again raises the agrarian ghost. At one point in "Mr. Bentley's Bad Boys" he says:

> But it is no longer impressive to cry "Nostalgia!" when a critic uses an area of the past [Ancient Greece, The Middle Ages, the Old South] to demonstrate

> the working of values which have been lost and which we might, as our changed social forms would permit, with advantage recover.

Lost to whom? Recover how?

Two great neofeudalistic systems have existed within the borders of what is now the United States. (Various remnants of agricultural feudalism remain in some Latin-American countries.) The peons in the Spanish feudal system of New Mexico and California were reasonably well treated; and so, we are told, were the slaves in the Old South. The latter situation once led John Crowe Ransom, one of the slickest and most articulate of all the agrarians, to write: "Slavery was a feature monstrous enough in theory, but, more often than not, humane in practice. . . ."

The Spanish feudal system and the Old South's feudal system both decayed and died in the Awful Nineteenth Century, and within a few years of each other. It is pointless to argue that they were abruptly killed off in their full flower by force of arms; any competent historian can show you in a few minutes that they would have decayed and died anyhow in a relatively few years. Of course it may be that if the gentlemen of the Old South had accepted the colonial status which the industrial North intended to force upon them, they might have dozed along, humanely, for quite a spell longer. But they refused and they fought and their poor-white neighbors and kinsmen fought along with them and so did the riffraff of New Orleans and Charleston and we all lost. And the South got made a colony anyhow.

It seems to me Heilman goes completely off the rails in setting up *authority, order, discipline,* and *loyalty* (in the ante-bellum sense) as good words and good things. He fails to make a distinction between the fascist mind and the fascist method. I mean to say that there are a good many Nice People living comfortably and elegantly now in Italy, in France, in Argentina, in Spain, in Germany, and that these Nice People ignore now, and always have ignored, the methods of their spies, informers, terrorists, and police. An exception can be made of a few sadists who enjoy going down to headquarters and watching the show. The others, the very nice nice people, are having each other to dinner, they are maintaining a high standard of hospitality at home, and if need be bravely in bomb shelters, they are listening to music, talking about poetry and painting: they are determined, come what may, to be nice. And when the shooting stops they fancy they can win over our notoriously gullible

and readily charmed striped-pants corps, just as they have already done apparently with some of our military-occupation officers.

It occurs to me that the possessor of a fascist mind finds the structure of the fascist state attractively simple. The top men set up, maintain, and protect a minor aristocracy, an elite, and any highly skilled superior persons will be granted admission and security on certain conditions. These people are technicians, engineers, managers, poets, dancers, actors, doctors, teachers, and so forth. If the state needs their skills, and if they refuse to meet the conditions set, they disappear. That much is already recorded history. Ultimately, it has been argued, the fascist state would bring order out of chaos, refinement out of vulgarity, discipline out of lawlessness, loyalty out of resistance. It is expedient for those who think in this direction to overlook the fact that the order, discipline, and loyalty must be in one area of society, the refinement in another.

Yet Heilman says, speaking for himself and a number of others, that there must be an elite, since you can't change human nature and since people afflicted with human nature will inevitably elect or select an elite or better still have an elite bestowed upon them, and that members of this elite will be our modern poet-critics. Nonsense! A poet is a man who walks alone. He will not summon Robert Hutchins, Aristotle, John Donne, the Confederate Ghosts, or Thomas Aquinas to require that he and his fellows be studied. It is one thing, and for all I know very reasonable to disdain such college courses as radio selling, basketball coaching, and flower arrangement; it is quite another, just as wrongheaded, just as wilfully blind to assert that only Robert Hutchins, his peers and disciples (plus T. S. Eliot and some others who haven't any place to go) can show the rest of the country the way and the truth in education. The whole elite idea, at least this aspect of it, comes down to something like this: only the man who can legitimately take a college degree under the rigid, nonelectives, great-books plan of university education can be called a whole man, entitled to apply for entrance into the elite. That leaves a lot of people out, people who for my purpose here may be called ordinary people. Now if you distrust and scorn ordinary people, deny them an education on the grounds of unfitness and ineducability, you can yell your head off that you do not need police and spies and informers and terrorists and prisons and executioners, but all you will be making is a noise. Bill Brown, say, is an ordinary man. A deputy from the elite comes

to him and says, "We require you to do so and so, say this and that, believe the following things." Suppose Brown says, "No, I won't do it, I won't say it, I don't believe it." Then you've got to get some cops, take him to jail and work him over. If he still says "No!" and keeps on saying "No!" you've got to kill him.

Of course it is to the advantage of just about everybody in the United States, except 130,000,000 people, that a good bit of our elementary, secondary, and collegiate education should be extravagant and meaningless farce. But Hutchins, Heilman, Tate, and the others do not offer improvement and reform; on the contrary they would perpetuate the farce as long as possible, labeling it extravagant and meaningless all the while. In the meantime, they, the literary-scholastic elite, would share the secrets among themselves, and would communicate, as now, only with each other. Their poems and philosophies, like their dinner parties and salons, would be exceedingly private. To be sure the poems and the philosophies would unfold in some other time and in another place, and they would set aright some other century and some other peoples, but not our century and not us.

The only right people in our century would be You Know Who, and with them the top men and the front men and the cops of a fascist state. From time to time the literary-scholastic elite would admit a small number of initiates, but not too many, since a shortage of product is just as desirable in the human market as in the commodity market—barring labor, which in the fascist state is nonhuman. You must keep all labor starving some of the time, and some labor starving all of the time, and all labor scared all of the time.

If you turn back the hands of a clock at twelve midnight, the time is still going to be twelve midnight, or thereabouts, no matter what the face of the clock says. You can't abolish, you can't wish away the nineteenth century, because there it is, right there between the eighteenth and the twentieth. Big-scale farming, big-scale industry are here; it remains to figure out how they are to be managed. In the future, small farms, however independent their legal titles, will be, as now, actually part of big farms. Schools and colleges will take their rightful part in attempting to face their problems of popular education or they will retreat further into defeatism and slavishness, and the most beautifully executed part of this retreat will be that of the literary-scholastic elite, a retreat to

previously prepared positions. Past feudal eras seem admirable to this elite; do they then see industrial feudalism as inevitable and desirable? Inevitable for ordinary people, and desirable for Them?

Finally, I want to quote from Walt Whitman's *Democratic Vistas:*

> The People! Like our huge earth itself, which, to ordinary scansion, is full of vulgar contradictions and offence, man, viewed in the lump, displeases, and is a constant puzzle and affront to the *merely educated classes.* The rare, cosmical, artist-mind, lit with the Infinite, alone confronts his manifold and oceanic qualities—but *taste, intelligence,* and *culture* (so-called), have been against the masses and remain so. There is plenty of glamour about the most damnable crimes and hoggish meannesses, special and general, of the feudal and dynastic world over there, with its "personnel" of lords and queens and courts, so well dress'd and so handsome. But the People are ungrammatical, untidy, and their sins gaunt and ill-bred.
>
> Literature, strictly consider'd, has never recognized the People, and, whatever may be said, does not today. Speaking generally, the tendencies of literature, as hitherto pursued, have been to make mostly critical and querulous men. It seems as if, so far, there were some natural repugnance between a literary and professional life, and the rude rank spirit of the democracies. There is, in later literature, a treatment of benevolence, a charity business, rife enough it is true; but I know nothing more rare, even in this country, than a *fit scientific estimate* and reverent appreciation of the People—of their measureless wealth of latent power and capacity, in their vast artistic contrasts of lights and shades—with, in America, their *entire reliability in emergencies,* and a certain breadth of grandeur, of peace or war, far surpassing all the vaunted samples of book-heroes, or any "haut ton" coteries, in all the records of the world. (italics mine)

Let me say that I have been teaching twenty-odd years one place and another, and that many of my former students are fighting in this phase of The World War. One of them, and a proper hellion he was too, when I knew him, not long ago charged a German pillbox in Italy, with a few hand grenades and a Colt automatic, which is about like charging hell with a teacup full of water. He knocked out the pillbox, came back alive, and got a ribbon to show that he had efficiently carried out *one* of his chores in the job of saving the less wasted part of the waste land, even the waste-land poets, critics, and teachers. In some quarters the account of this incident in a soldier's day might be called cheap; not to me it isn't. For me, like that Texas soldier in Italy, the time is now, not in Ancient Greece, medieval Europe, or the ante-bellum South.

Where can you go, if you have to stay where you are? What democracy means, among numerous other things, is that when trouble, bad trouble, comes to you and your fellows, you have to stay where you are and fight it out: that is the authority, the discipline, and the loyalty of a man among men.

REHABILITATION

By K. G. HANSSON, M.D.

REHABILITATION, reconditioning, and convalescence are used to designate the final touches of restoration after trauma and disease. Rehabilitation means restoration to normal capacity, reconditioning means return to health, and convalescence means return to strength. However, these words are often used interchangeably and there is no better definition of our subject than the one given by John Galsworthy, the English novelist, at the Allied Conference on the Aftercare of Disabled Men, in Washington, D. C. in 1919:

> Restoration is at least as much a matter of spirit as of body, and must have as its central truth:—Body and spirit are inextricably conjoined. To heal the one without the other is impossible. If a man's mind, courage, and interest be enlisted in the cause of his own salvation, healing goes on apace, the sufferer is remade; if not, no mere surgical wonders, no careful nursing will avail to make a man of him again. Therefore, I would say: "From the moment he enters the hospital, look after his mind and his will; give him food; nourish him in subtle ways; increase that nourishment as his strength increases. Give him interest in his future. Light a star for him to fix his eyes on, so that, when he steps out of the hospital, you shall not have to begin to train one who for months, perhaps years, has been living mindless and will-less, the life of a half-dead creature."
>
> That this is a hard task none who knows hospital life can doubt. That it needs special qualities and special effort, quite other than the average range of hospital devotion, is obvious. But it saves time in the end, and without it success is more than doubtful. The crucial period is the time spent in the hospital. Use that period to recreate not only the body, but mind and will power, and all shall come out right; neglect to use it thus and the heart of many a sufferer and of many a would-be healer will break from sheer discouragement. A niche of usefulness and self-respect exists for every man however handicapped; but that niche must be found for him. To carry the process of restoration to a point short of this is to leave the cathedral without a spire. To restore him, and with him the future of our countries, that is the sacred work.

In a speech before the National Rehabilitation Association, Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, Administrator of Veterans Affairs, estimated that the number of persons throughout the world who will need rehabilitation after the war might reach 20,000,000. These will include, besides war casualties, bombing victims and industrial accident victims. He also estimated that normally there are 1,500,000 handicapped persons in this country who could be made employable through training and where restoration would add at least a billion dollars to the national income and save hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money.

Historically speaking we may consider a country's legislative interest in handicapped people a criterion of its civilization or cultural level. It therefore becomes

of interest to analyze our Federal Security Agency as submitted by Michael J. Shortley, Director of the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, to the Baruch Committee on Physical Medicine.

The Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1943, approved by the President on July 6, 1943, provide surgical and medical care, hospitalization, therapeutic treatment, artificial appliances, vocational guidance and training, and maintenance during training, and placement in employment. The entire cost of these services will be assured by the federal government in the case of war-disabled veterans. In other cases the federal government pays one-half the cost. The administration, supervision and control of this program rest with the state boards for vocational education.

Disabled persons who appear to be in need of rehabilitation are referred to the appropriate center in their respective states. Such a program as this must be reassuring to labor and industry alike and should invite their wholehearted co-operation.

Return of the Handicapped

Everyone today accepts the existence of a relationship between physical and mental life. The impact of physical disability on one's emotional life is assuming increasing importance. The more unstable our emotions are, the more we suffer changes when we are taken out of civilian life and put into military training. Conditioned throughout our formative years to seek security and comfort, to love peace and freedom, we are quickly and brutally exposed to a system that replaces comfort with hardship and strain, offers peace only in the future and denies that freedom is preferable to authoritarian discipline and regulation. We must adjust ourselves to the distinction between killing a man in peacetime and killing him in war. Is it any wonder that thirty per cent of all volunteers and inducted men discharged between July, 1941 and January, 1943 were discharged because they were incapacitated by mental diseases or mental disorders?[1] We are facing a similar problem when servicemen are returned to civilian life. These men have been poured into the mold of war and to remove them from it requires adjustments as difficult as those they were forced to make when they changed from civilian to military life. These men present all degrees of difficulty when they return to the peaceful, prosaic, and trivial circumstances of home life. There will be every gradation in the changes which war has wrought in these men, because of the differences in their experiences, their physical health, and their emotional life. Large numbers of servicemen are unprepared for return to civilian life. They have been daydreaming of home, family, and friends. When they come they expect compensations for the sacrifices which they have made. The experience of homecoming is frequently a disillusionment and this will result in bitter resentment and despondency. The rehabilitation of our

[1]According to Colonel Leonard Rountree, Chief of the Medical Division of the Bureau of Selective Service.

servicemen is a complicated problem that calls for the co-operation of the community, the family, and friends.

Psychoneurotic Rehabilitation

In war we deal with human beings faced with an acute crisis—death, fear of death, separation from home, disturbing environments, a conflict between the desire for self-preservation and the necessity to carry out certain orders from the commanding officers. This produces an anxiety state which predominates in the present war picture. Anxiety neurosis is by far the most common psychoneurosis in this war. The clinical picture is otherwise made up of hypochondriasis, neurasthenia, hysteria, and obsessive-compulsive neurosis. Fatigue, lack of sleep, as well as stress of battle, produce the battle neurosis that we hear so much of now. This condition responds dramatically to immediate therapy given in the front lines. Dr. Thomas Rennie of the New York Hospital considers the psychoneurotic individual the biggest problem in rehabilitation. It consists of psychoneurotic casualties, rejectees, and those discharged for neurotic ills. The number of individuals so disabled as to need hospitalization will be only a small part of the problem. The majority will be ambulatory, for which out-patient facilities will be needed.

It has been found that seventy-five per cent of the men were predisposed to breakdown because of the existence of psychoneurotic difficulties in their lives prior to their army experience. The breakdown comes soon after induction. Sixty per cent of the breakdowns take place within six months of training and never get overseas. Few break down from fear of death and most of the breakdowns result from everyday emotional reasons which also is true in civilian life. Dr. Rennie reported of this group that some fifty per cent nine months later were improved or recovered.

Rehabilitation in Civilian Life

The lessons we are learning in wartime medicine today must some day in the near future influence civilian care of patients and their rehabilitation. We have already begun to investigate the time-honored prescription for bedrest. In the *Journal* of the American Medical Association for August 19, 1944, the "abuse of rest" as a therapeutic measure is discussed in relation to cardio-vascular diseases, orthopedics, surgery, obstetrics and to psychiatry. Our convalescence of various diseases will be reinvestigated and more active treatment will replace our former passive complacent attitude.

The rehabilitation program now carried out in the armed services will undoubtedly be introduced in civilian practice. If we realize that the accident toll for the entire United States population in 1943 amounted to 10,000,000 killed or incapacitated, we shall understand the large field for carrying forward the experience now going on in the armed services. According to the report of the National Safety Council, approximately 4,200,000 workers were killed or injured as a result of accidents. The Council observes: ". . . these accidents resulted in a loss of 720,000,000 man-days, enough labor to build 30,000 heavy bombers or 55 battleships." This

represents a challenge to industrial medicine and it is high time that employers and labor get together to formulate a rehabilitation program for such civilian victims.

The labor unions have a great opportunity to show that they have the workers' welfare at heart. Once a member of a union, a worker should feel as confident against future disabilities as a soldier does today when he is out of active service because of a wound. The employer has the same responsibility toward his employee as the government has toward its servicemen and should shoulder at least part of the financial support necessary for such a program.

Another solution lies in the insurance companies. The Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in Boston is operating an excellent rehabilitation unit and finding it worth while to encourage the program and convince industry and labor of the cash value of salvaging the injured. Thus, from the monetary standpoint the value of rehabilitation to industry, labor, and financial interests is being demonstrated. To society in general, the cash benefit has been figured as follows: "In one study it was found that for every dollar spent for rehabilitation, forty-seven dollars were returned to society." If this were only partly true we might salvage something out of the present destruction of life and material and make a valuable contribution to future generations.

WE NOTE . . .

PRAGMATISM'S SOCIAL PROGRAM

It may not be good etiquette for a magazine to devote space to intramural discussion among the editors. But Mr. Corey's "We Note" in the last issue of the *Review* was so specific and eloquent a questioning of certain assumptions of pragmatism and scientific humanism that it deserves comment (especially since he was kind enough to quote some of my own sentences).

There is, of course, no serious quarrel between us. Mr. Corey is deeply sympathetic to the whole humanist tradition. Perhaps that very sympathy makes him impatient with what he believes to be the inadequacies of pragmatism as a theory of social action. He lists a number of such alleged deficiencies: at least three of them can be easily identified. (1) Pragmatism is too much interested in means and methods and not enough in ends and goals. For method can be deflected to serve any purpose. (2) Partucularly, what about the end or value of democracy? Pragmatism must pay more attention to defining democracy and to understanding the conditions without which it cannot be realized. (3) By its very philosophy pragmatism is dedicated to bits-and-pieces political liberalism and is apparently insensitive to the significance of social revolution.

Therefore "pragmatists are, on the whole, backward in the social application of their philosophy (except in education)."

The parenthesis in Mr. Corey's sentence is illuminating. Now, I don't want to quibble, and perhaps the point is not important, but I'd like to know what else Mr. Corey wants from a theory besides "education." Certainly he grossly misuses the word if he understands pragmatic (or any other legitimate) "education" to imply nothing more than faculty meetings or parent-teacher get-togethers, however progressive. Education is nothing less than growth, according to John Dewey. Growth in all fields, including the political. All growth that does not inhibit other growth. Mr. Corey himself is now engaged in political and economic "education" of no mean order—he is interested in the work of co-operatives, in making the middle class and farmer concerned with the significance of the labor movement, in laying the basis for a possible new political alignment, in arguing for the importance of a mixed economy and a functional instead of a monopolistic social order. Only his opponents would call this propaganda. Nor would he himself regard his efforts as rushing to the barricades in some dramatic class struggle. What is it but "education"?

This apparently minor point seems worth emphasizing because I think it is a clue to Mr. Corey's entire underestimate of pragmatic humanism. To declare that "pragmatists are, on the whole, backward in the social application of their philosophy" is, I'm confident, a serious libel. The revolutionary reconstruction and secularization of all applications of human thinking, including the social, that has been an integral part of the whole humanist

tradition is hardly backward or petty. But this is simply a *tu quoque,* putting one assertion over against another. Let's consider Mr. Corey's three charges.

1. The criticism of pragmatism as "merely" a methodology is, of course, the most familiar weapon in the critics' arsenal. A complete answer would demand nothing less than an entire theory of value, but at least this may be said: An interest in means instead of precluding a concern with ends is the only way to prevent the very divorce that Mr. Corey worries about. He points out that techniques can be used to support any goal, that planning, full employment, and technology in general can be fascist as well as democratic. But this perversion is precisely the result of regarding means as *merely* means. When the pragmatist insists on the apparent paradox that "method is more important than conclusion" he is being more profound than Mr. Corey gives him credit for being. For a method that does not affect and redirect the results that spring from it is not the method that the pragmatist celebrates. He regards ends as "final" or "ultimate" in no other sense than that of the *last* step in a process—the *finis* or literal "end." To separate such an end from its techniques is transparently meaningless.

Mr. Corey seems to sense all this because he admits that pragmatism looks upon method, especially scientific method, as containing within it the conditions that we regard as goals or values, above all, democracy. But he will not allow himself to see the possibilities of method *qua* method. He is not being asked to believe that "the means justifies the end," but simply to observe that it is a vicious caricature to say, for example, that fascists have used legitimate scientific method to further their own ends, or to admit that Mussolini knew what he was talking about when he claimed to be a pragmatist and a follower of, among others, William James. Scientific method *as* method, as a general way of solving problems, all problems, is completely incompatible with fascism. Because totalitarians use the vocabulary and some of the gadgets of what they please to call science or technology should not deceive so acute an observer as Mr. Corey. As method—and nothing else—scientific enterprise demands conditions that can be fulfilled by nothing of the nature of fascism. Those conditions would include such things as unrestricted research; free communication of all manner of information—including social and political; unhampered publication of and education in the results of experiments; no disqualification of scientific workers because of race, color, or religion; in general, "democratic" access to the field of science as well as to its social contributions. To speak of "fascist science" is, in any philosophical sense, as coherent as to speak of round squares.

Mr. Corey's own illustration from Marx is, I think, enlightening. But I wish he would reread it and see that his point seems to be the very one that I am trying to make, i.e., that "Marxism" may now have become, in some circles, a goal and a religion that justifies any means—but only because, in that case, it has lost the methodological power that first gave it significance.

Now, if Mr. Corey is asking why pragmatism (or Marxism, or Christianity, or democracy, or anything else) has permitted itself to be suborned, he is asking for a complete philosophy of history. (His own repudiation of Marxism has not been, so far as I know, replaced by one.) I can't speak for

humanists in general, but I for one am quite prepared to admit that the failure of "good" ideas is complex and persistent enough to require more than a monolithic explanation. In such a complex there would be a prominent place for the economic and political forces that have frustrated the unrestricted use of scientific method, but there is more to it than that. The whole anthropology of supernaturalism must be included, with its strange indications of myth, magic, and the elemental human irrationality that has to be recognized by the most scientific of humanists. Ideas as such, especially those philosophical ideas, secular as well as religious, that have given a secondary role to man's intelligence are also very much in the picture. And there would be other things, too. All I am trying to do is to suggest that it is much too easy to proclaim: "methods have been corrupted; therefore they are to be rejected."

If pragmatism can be permitted to utter pronouncements on this matter, which it is ordinarily hesitant of doing, it would still demand from any theory of social action or any philosophy of history a central concern with these things: (a) what place does the theory or the philosophy make for critical and intelligent human inquiry? (b) what emphasis is given to the contextual (or technological) continuity between methods, the conditions they presuppose, and the consequences that follow? Without these concerns, goals or values, however noble—even if they be termed Democracy, Democratic Socialism, or whatever—are in danger of becoming absolutes: and by "absolute" I mean that which is divorced from a context and therefore meaningless or arbitrary.

2. To accuse pragmatism of being insufficiently concerned with the social conditions presupposed by democracy, as Mr. Corey does, is answerable in only one way (and I hope I'm not being pedantic): by a thorough study of the works of scientific humanism, especially of John Dewey. Perhaps the articles in the *Review* which Mr. Corey specifically mentions have been deficient in this respect (although, as I see it, they have been laying a methodological foundation which is vitally necessary and will be built upon, it is hoped, by future writers). But the general writings of Dewey, Max Otto, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, Boyd Bode, George Mead (to mention only a few modern humanists) are almost hypnotized by the social and *educational* implications of democracy. Certainly Mr. Corey has not forgotten—to use simply one illustration that comes to mind—Dewey's work with the *New Republic* (and the People's Lobby) in the years following World War I. His investigation of democratic planning even then (and the phrase was Dewey's own), his yeoman work for the recognition of Russia, his almost missionary zeal in showing the incompatibility of economic monopoly with social democracy, and in displaying the meaninglessness of old-fashioned "individualism"—just to hit a few high spots—seems to be precisely the things Mr. Corey wants. And I venture to think that Dewey's example is typical of pragmatists.

3. I must confess I don't understand Mr. Corey's implied sneers at "bits-and-pieces" social reform, and his feeling that pragmatists just don't understand "revolution." If "revolution" means profound economic and political change, then I'm sure anyone left of center realizes that we are living in a "revolution." But Mr. Corey seems to suggest some-

thing more dramatic and esoteric than that. Which is what confuses me, since I should have thought that his own present work in economics is definitely "piecemeal"—and I mean nothing derogatory by that. And has he not himself repudiated the inevitable-class-struggle type of revolution? I know this is an argument *ad hominem,* and therefore bad logic, but the abstract and superior use of the term "revolution" seems a kind of block. There is nothing in pragmatism which is anti-revolutionary, as I have used the word above. On the contrary, its whole temper is one of almost elemental reconstruction and change.

To take the next step next may well be to overthrow an economic class or a political state. And the "bits-and-pieces" of reform may be large ones indeed—as they are in Mr. Corey's own case. What the pragmatist is concerned with always is to get away from "the logic of general notions," to show the essential meaninglessness in abstract phrases like "free enterprise," "the American way," or even "the class struggle" and "dialectical materialism." Or in "social revolution." If those words stand as symbols for *specific* and *concrete* changes and conditions, well and good. But the *specific* and *concrete* referent is what counts. That's what "bits-and-pieces" means—not something small, lukewarm, and inoffensive. And I should like to think Mr. Corey would be the first to accept such an interpretation.

* * *

As a postscript, I want to repeat that there is no quarrel between us. I'm sure Mr. Corey is in the humanist tradition, and I am intending no criticism, personal or ideological, of his general position. I do wish, however, he could be persuaded to see the "revolutionary" and "democratic" significance of scientific humanism. —G.R.G.

DEMOCRACY AS PRACTICE

How the common man is to participate in carving out his own destiny has become one of the chief problems of our time. The common man has the vote; he can choose his own leaders; he has already made those leaders feel the weight of his own needs and his own rights. And yet, in this his century, the common man is not altogether prepared to assume the new responsibility for his own welfare. By and large, he is inarticulate. By and large he is scarcely aware of what he is now faced with or how he can participate. The problem might be stated in this way: How can the common man find the technical means for his own participation and how can he develop the strength and the knowledge necessary to participate intelligently and successfully?

George B. de Huszar gives an answer to these allied questions in an important little book, *Practical Applications of Democracy.*[1] In a word his answer is "do-democracy" (democracy in action), and he not only defines it, but exhibits it in specific situations, and discusses the effect on those individuals who participate in it. At the moment we are still enmeshed in the details and demands of war. But after the war the pressure will be off and there should be more

[1]Harper. 140 p. $2.

leisure. And that is when "do-democracy" might come into its own.

How will the common man use his leisure? The conservative will answer that he will use it for "sitdown" recreation like going to baseball games and to the movies. That is human nature, he will say. That is the way the common man has always reacted to opportunity and to responsibility.

The progressive must answer that a monopoly of leisure time in such activities will spell disaster for our own political economy as well as for international relations, that it will not provide the participation to keep our democracy long alive. He will argue that human nature demands more than bread and circuses (a job and a show), and that there is more real satisfaction for anyone in effective participation in making our democracy work than in all the "escapist" fun that anyone can think up. But in the nature of the case, the progressive ought to have something more to work with than a nice argument.

Professor de Huszar has the tool the progressive is looking for. The trouble is, he says, that we have not given democracy its due. There is, for example, talk-democracy (windy declamation with little or no reference value), and consent-democracy (the vote or indirect action). Neither of these is as important as do-democracy, on the level of direct action.

The job of do-democracy is "to deal with disintegrating institutions and to transform authoritarian institutions into democratic ones." It works on a local level in small groups of not more than twelve people per group. The focus of each group is a problem relating to all the participants. A group meets "around a round table," defines the problem, determines how to deal with it, and then decides who should do what about it. The problem can be of any kind (except that it must not be several problems mistakenly considered as one), and each person, however reticent, should be drawn out for his contribution to making an integrated solution.

Telescoped in so summary a fashion, do-democracy may seem either obscure or overly simple. The fact is that the idea is really not new but has simply not been widely applied. It is easier to grasp if seen in relation to a specific situation. In the schools do-democracy turns out to be progressive education. In industry it can be shop committees, effective working labor-management committees, or a carefully worked out scheme of personal interviews. Professor de Huszar applies it to government, the community, vocational training, art, and leisure. One of the most interesting chapters deals with a co-operatively produced newspaper published in Chicago by John H. Millar.

In a final section the book touches upon the problem so ably set forth a few years ago in Eric Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*. Do-democracy would be worth the effort if it taught the common man how he might positively and successfully tackle the emotional struggle for his own emancipation and freedom.

The whole story of how the common man may shape his own destiny is not here, of course. Professor de Huszar gives no indication that there might be powerful forces out to break up some of his cohesive little groups once they hit an especially "hot" subject nor does he suggest what might be done if they did; he might well have told more about the genesis of his groups in particular areas; and he says too little about the handling of national issues and of national planning. But for the practical-

minded person who wants to do something about democracy, I can think of no other book more valuable or more exciting. If the country were covered with a network of working de Huszar groups, it would be held so firmly in the grip of democracy that nothing could shake it loose short of an economic earthquake.

* * *

On one of the last pages of his book, Professor de Huszar touches upon the subject of equality in democracy—something which is agitating the public mind a little more these days than democratic method. It is interesting that a very recent book, *Are Men Equal?*[2] by Henry Alonzo Myers, considers the subject in full. Professor de Huszar would probably say that Professor Myers' work is talk-democracy. It seldom touches upon specific examples, and when it does (as on pages 173-76), it does so a little sourly and ungenerously. But Professor Myers has got hold of something, and his search through American literary and social history has its reward on the more common level of the history of ideas. It would be a mistake not to offer Professor Myers some praise for his pains. Especially as the word might eventually get around to some of the de Huszar participants. What a first-rate time they might have tackling the problems in the area of equality! —P.B.

[2]Putnam. 188 p. $2.50.

THE READER WRITES

Keynes, Hansen, and Bretton Woods

(The following letter concerns Editor Valdemar Carlson's article, "Bretton Woods and Wall Street," in the fall issue.)

Dear Mr. Carlson:

I was amazed at the way you ended your article on postwar economic affairs in the current issue. . . . As a student of economics I don't see how you can compare Keynes and Hansen. To find any words to describe the difference I would have to turn back to some of the famous comparisons of Robert Ingersoll when he was a spellbinder for the Republicans in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

One has but to read any of Keynes' writings to see how far he is ahead of Hansen. But really to see the difference one need but to read the criticism which Hansen made of the book Keynes wrote in 1936. Since then unquestionably Keynes has gone ahead whereas Hansen has gone backwards if he has gone anywhere.

Mr. Hansen's latest pronouncement . . . sounds to me like a conversation between a group of receivers about to liquidate the last assets of a defunct business. His address at the Nation Associates Conference, held in the Hotel Astor in New York City on October 7th and 8th, was certainly the low spot in the conference. Mr. Hansen who had predicted in 1941 that we could not attain a national income of more than 110 billions even at the very peak of war production and that carrying on the war would mean a domestic level of consumption far below that of 1932 was forced to admit that he was absolutely wrong. What else did he say? Probably the most important thing was, "We shall have to learn a great deal in order to achieve our goal." He was referring to creating full production and full employment.

He goes on to say, "We know now, as a result of the war experience, that we have reached a stage in technique and productivity which a few years ago no one believed possible. All of us had our sights too low. . . . "

It is probably safe to say that Mr. Hansen represents by far the most advanced thinking in economic affairs in the field of "professional" economists, at least in the United States. But to say that only emphasizes the absolute bankruptcy of American economic thought.

In order to solve the problems which prevent us from having full employment we must first recognize that we have reached a point in the development of our economic system when we must shift from an expanding economic system to one depending almost wholly upon the consumption of goods by those who get the money for the production of those goods.

It makes no difference whether the money is paid out as wages, dividends, salaries, bonuses, or interest so long as those who get the money actually spend it for consumer goods or services instead of saving it in the hope of investing it.

As I have pointed out, that to recognize that we have reached this stage in our development, opens our eyes to the needed solution, and strange as it may seem to the orthodox economist we could actually achieve a large volume of investment and a fairly rapidly increasing national income.

At the present time we can have an income of about 200 billions and could probably invest about 10 billions a year for the next ten years which, by then, would give us a national income of 300 billions. After that the amount would have to be decreased and in the next ten years we might well increase our national income to 350 billions. When we consider that with a national income of 200 billions we have potential savings of from 50-70 billions, we see how puny the 10 billions we could actually invest is, as far as absorbing the 50-70 billions of savings, and that most of those savings must be forced into circulation for the buying of goods. What the professional economists should be thinking about now is the best method to be used to force those savings into circulation without having them used for speculative purposes. There should be no disagreement among them as to the fact that this problem exists. That should be accepted 100 per cent. The strange thing is that not one single professional economist realizes what the problem is, much less has any solution for it.

Baltimore, Md. CLARENCE ARMSTRONG

MR. CARLSON COMMENTS:

It was not my intention in my article to come to the defense of Mr. Hansen either as economist or prophet. Keynes and Hansen are linked together as representing a fiscal policy which breaks with the classical tradition, at least as far as government responsibility for the operation of the economic system is concerned. (In the Winter 1942 number of *The Antioch Review* Max Lerner contributed an article called "The Keynes-Hansen Mechanism," in which the two men were linked together as representing a similar policy.) The ideas of Keynes seem to have become economic orthodoxy in England; not so the ideas of Hansen in this country. And this is the one fact which may prevent the acceptance of the Bretton Woods Conference Report by the American Congress.

It is probably pointless to compare Keynes and Hansen either as economists or as writers. The American economist has the appearance of a trudging pedestrian alongside the brilliance of Keynes. But if Hansen cannot reach the rhetorical flights achieved by Keynes, neither has he written anything quite as esoteric as *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.*

Hansen underestimated America's productive war potential. But so did Keynes and so did practically every economist who expressed himself on the subject three

or four years ago. Whatever the intellectual fare of graduate students today, contemporary economists were indoctrinated on the static analysis of Ricardo and J. B. Clark; they were taught to interpret a functioning economy against a backdrop of the law of diminishing returns. Hansen's training has been conventional and as such he is unable to free himself completely from the strait jacket of classical orthodoxy. But he is educable as few men of his age are. He is an exception to the generalization of Keynes that "in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age." A few years ago I was with a group of economists when one of them asked the question, "Who is America's greatest economist today?" One of the wisest of the group said, "If ability to learn after the age of fifty is the criterion, I nominate Alvin Hansen." V.C.

The Misplaced Modesty of Scientists

To the Editor:

Usually, after a strenuous bout of self-control, I can resist writing the Editor when a piece of writing arouses me. But on this occasion I failed. The piece in question is "The Misplaced Modesty of Scientists." Dr. Ramsperger concludes that reality is relative and that values have the same status in our knowledge of reality as qualities (sense data) and dimensions. This is excellent, and I hope he persuades all other philosophers to his view.

But then he goes on to say that scientists, therefore, should give their attention to discovering true knowledge of values! Now what, may I ask, does he think that poets, painters, composers, sculptors, novelists, dramatists, moral philosophers, and religious teachers have been doing for the past 3000 years? Does he not realize that they have been giving us knowledge of values? Would Dr. Ramsperger dismiss them all and have their function assumed by scientists? Or would he have scientists become critics of the arts and tell us in what respect and in what degree works of art are true or false?

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from Dr. Ramsperger's premise is that goodness, beauty, and truth are all aspects of reality, and that the function of moralists, artists, and scientists, together, is to give us a comprehensive knowledge of reality.

Incidentally, there is no such thing as a science of psychology. Psychologists do not even have an identifiable object of enquiry; they disagree as to methods and conclusions; and they have established no fact in our knowledge of man which they agree upon and which was not known before psychology was invented. Shakespeare knew and revealed more about human nature than all psychologists put together. Psychology is a modern aberration, a pathetic illusion of the times.

Lord save us if art, morals, and religion are taken over by scientists. And if by psychologists ————!

Boston, Massachusetts. GEORGE R. WALKER

Professor Ramsperger replies:

Mr. Walker takes me to task for not giving artists, moral philosophers, and religious teachers their due. In the first place, Mr. Walker apparently fails to distinguish between the value experiences that the painter or the musician presents to us and knowledge about them. In so far as the artist or the aesthetician is able to formulate the rules and techniques by which he produces his effects he has scientific knowledge about the values he creates, and I have no quarrel with him

My quarrel with the moral philosophers is that most of them misconceive their task to be the determination of what man *ought* to value instead of the discovery of the conditions under which actually experienced values occur, their compatibility with the conditions for realizing other values, and so on. The answers to these questions are to be found only by the scientific method of experimenting with new ways of living, new laws, new social institutions which are to be tested in terms of the actual experiences of better or worse living. Either, then, moralists must become scientific in this sense, or scientists in the various other branches of science having to do with human behavior must overcome their reluctance to tackle these matters —a reluctance based on the false assumption that these are not scientific questions. As for religious teachers, they are committed in advance to an authoritarianism which presumes to have had the ultimate blueprint for the good life all along. As I look at our world the results do not commend their presuppositions. Mr. Walker prays that the Lord may save us if art, morals, and religion are taken over by the scientists. Alas, the Lord has not even saved us though morals have been taken over by religion.

I should not care to assume the role of apologist for the science of psychology which Mr. Walker regards as "a modern aberration, a pathetic illusion of our time." I shall only suggest that perhaps Mr. Walker would find reason to think better of that science (or pseudo science) if it were seriously to undertake the comparative evaluation of different types of conditioning, habits, social approvals and disapprovals in terms of the satisfactions they yield.

Madison, Wisconsin. A. G. Ramsperger

CONTRIBUTORS

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN is professor of social philosophy at the New York School of Social Work of Columbia University. He is well known for his work in adult education and in the progressive movement.

CHARLES E. NOYES is assistant director of the Staff Bureau and director of the Civilian Surveys Division, Office of Civilian Requirements, War Production Board. He was previously associate director of the WPB Division of Information, and before entering government service was a staff writer for Editorial Research Reports.

JULES ABELS directed "the Study on Smaller Companies after the War" for the Research Institute of America. He is executive editor for the Research Institute, and his background includes considerable work both in law and in public administration.

DONALD MONTGOMERY says it was originally the steel trust which made a "consumer" out of him. Work with the Federal Trade Commission in its case against "Pittsburgh Plus" led to a job with the State of Wisconsin helping farmers against fake merchandising and eventually to similar positions with federal agencies. In 1938 he left the government for a job as consumer counsel for the CIO, where he has since been "doing for union members what the government has been unwilling to do for consumers as a whole."

A dress designer (college to 1940), author of *Fashion is Spinach* (1937), and editor of the News for Living department at *PM,* (1940-42), ELIZABETH HAWES has more recently worked as grinder in a war plant and served in the education department of the UAW-CIO. At present she is consultant to Reynal and Hitchcock on the UAW-CIO Labor Book Club, and is writing a novel.

In Germany, FRIEDA WUNDERLICH was a professor of economics and sociology at the Berufs-Pädagogisches Institut (Berlin), editor of *Soziale Praxis,* general secretary of Gesellschaft für Social Progress, and served in other political and economic positions. At the present time she is a member of the staff of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, organized under the New School for Social Research.

LEWIS COREY's article on the middle class is his fourth in a series.

STAFF SERGEANT DAVID DEMPSEY is a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent. His "invasion" dispatches, particularly those about Iwo Jima, have been widely used in newspapers and over the radio. Readers will remember his "War for Democracy—or Restoration?" in the Summer, 1943 issue.

GRANVILLE HICKS lives in a part of New York State which lends the subject of which he writes special meaning. He is the author of a number of books, of which the most recent is *Behold Trouble* (Macmillan).

LIEUTENANT DAN G. HOFFMAN is assigned to the Air Technical Service Command, Wright Field, Ohio, where he is the editor of an Air Force magazine, *The Technical Data Digest.*

CHARLES A. MADISON's present essay is the third in his series on American rebels to appear in these pages. He is college editor for Henry Holt and Company.

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DR. K. G. HANSSON is assistant professor of surgery and clinical instructor in the Department of Orthopedics at Cornell University Medical College, and is consultant in physical medicine at a number of hospitals in or near New York City. His work appears frequently in the medical journals.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND MARCH 3, 1933 of Antioch Review, Inc., published Quarterly at Yellow Springs, Ohio for March, 1945.

State of Ohio, County of Greene:

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the state and county aforesaid, personally appeared Paul Bixler, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Editor of the Antioch Review and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business manager are: Publisher, Antioch Review, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio; Editor, Paul Bixler, Yellow Springs, Ohio; Managing Editor, Paul Bixler, Yellow Springs, Ohio; Business Manager, Max Astrachan, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

2. That the owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding one per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a firm, company, or other unincorporated concern, its name and address, as well as those of each individual member, must be given.) The Antioch Review, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio; a non-profit corporation.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.

(Signed) Paul Bixler, Editor

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 11th day of January, 1945.

(Seal) (Signed) J. H. Horner

(My commission expires November 27, 1945.)